(aktualisiert 11.08.2013)

Libor Skandal

Normalerweise kommt der Blitz vor dem Donner, aber beim Libor ist das anders. Niemand der Fachleute hat den Blitz gesehen, als in den letzten Jahren in großem Stil von London aus die Interbankenzinsen manipuliert und damit Milliarden verdient wurden. Bedenklich ist vor allem, dass beim rechtzeitigen Erkennen der Manipulationen in 2007, die die schlechte Lage der Banken vertuschen sollten, der Meltdown in 2008 und damit die Finanzkrise hätte verhindert werden können. - Schließlich wird am 28.09.2012 mit dem Untersuchungsbericht von Wheatley der Weg zur Reform des LIBOR beschritten. Das hält jedoch geschädigte US-Hausbesitzer nicht davon ab, Sammelklage gegen 12 Banken einzureichen (14.10.2012). Später wird bekannt, dass 9 Banken bereits im August und September mit Subpoenas durch den New Yorker Generalstaatsanwalt Eric Schneiderman und den Generalstaatsanwalt Connecticut George Jepsen belegt wurden.

Die Aufsichtsbehörden in den USA und UK reagieren mit Geldstrafen:

Barclays £59,5 Mio FSA, $200 Mio CFTC, $160 Mio USDoJ

UBS £160 Mio FSA, $700 Mio CFTC, $500 Mio USDoJ, Fr59 Mio Finma

RBS £87,5 Mio (FSA), $325 Mio (CFTC) und $150 Mio (USDoJ)

Strafverfahren gegen Personen bleiben aus.


Unterdessen kommt der Unabhängige Bericht von Salz nicht zum Schluss, dass Barclays aufgrund seiner zweifelhaften Geschäftspraktien aufgespalten werden muss.

 

Übersicht:

  • Nachrichten-Chronik
  • Donner
  • Blitz
  • Hände in Unschuld waschen
  • Aufdeckung
  • Politische Hintergründe
  • Fehler und Ursachen
  • Wirtschaftliche Konsequenzen
  • Personelle Konsequenzen
  • Firmeninterne Konsequenzen
  • Regulatorische Konsequenzen
  • Juristische Konsequenzen
  • Politische Konsequenzen
  • Offene Fragen
  • Befragungen des Treasury Select Committees
  • Beschuldigungen von FSA, CFTC, U.S.DoJ an RBS
  • Beschuldigungen von FSA, CFTC, U.S.DoJ, Finma an UBS
  • Beschuldigungen von FSA, CFTC, U.S.DoJ an Barclays
  • Dokumente

Nachrichten-Chronik

2013

10.01. RBS: Einigung mit Behörden wegen Libor-Strafe steht bevor

10.01. Libor: UBS und FSA vor Banking Standards Committee

10.01. UBS: House of Commons befragt Ex-Manager; keiner wusste was

10.01. UBS: House of Commons befragt FSA-Ex-Direktor Sants u.a.

10.01. Barclays: Sants fängt als Compliance-Chef an für £3 Mio p.a.

10.01. RBS: Investmentbank-Chefs Hourican und Nielsen vor dem Aus

11.01. Euribor: EBA und ESMA legen Plan zur Rettung vor

25.01. Deutsche Bank: Händler Chr. Bittar w Libor beschuldigt

29.01. RBS: $500 Mio und US-Strafverfahren gg Asien-Abteilung?

02.02. Osborne fordert von RBS, Strafe aus Bonus Pool zu zahlen

06.02. RBS: FSA £87,5 Mio, CFTC $325 Mio, DoJ $150 Mio Bußgelder

08.02. Euribor: EU-Kommissar Barnier droht Banken Meldepflicht an

05.03. FSA räumt Ignoranz von Hinweisen ein

25.03. FSA veröffentlicht Empfehlungen zur Neuregelung

27.03. US-Richter Buchwald sieht kein Verbrechen in Libor-Manipulation

31.03. FSA wird aufgelöst, Ex-Chef Turner verliert Posten

03.04. Barcays: Salz-Untersuchungsbericht zu Geschäftspraktiken

03.04. US-Attorney General Schneiderman ermittelt weiter

18.04. BaFin zweifelt an interner Ermittlung der Deutschen Bank

22.04. CFTC: Genssler für Abschaffung von Libor und Euribor

26.04. BaFin findet keine systematische kriminielle Manipulation in DE

14.06. Tucker kündigt Rückzug aus Bank of England im Herbst an

28.05. BaFin: Ermittlungen w "personeller Engpässe" nicht fertig

Manipulationen nur durch einzelne Händler, nicht Management

30.06. King: Amtszeit bei der Bank of England endet

06.08. BaFin: Ermittlung w Manipulationen bei Derivate-Zins ISDAfix

11.08. Darin: Ex-UBS-Händler (06/2006-08/2012) von Anleger angezeigt

...

2012

vor 26.06.: Siehe Unten

27.06. Barclays: FSA bestraft mit £59,5 Mio wegen Libor-Manipulation

27.06. Barclays: CFTC bestraft mit $200 Mio wegen Libor-Manipulation

27.06. Barclays: US-Justice Department bestraft mit $160 Mio

27.06. Barclays zahlt freiwillig £290 Mio, Diamond verzichtet auf Bonus

02.07. Barclays: Chairman Agius tritt zurück

03.07. Barclays: CEO Bob Diamond zurückgetreten

03.07. Barclays: COO Del Missier zurückgetreten

04.07. BaFin startet Ermittlungen wegen Libor-Prüfungverfahren

04.07. Bank von England: Vize Tucker bittet um Anhörung vor TSC

04.07. Barclays: Diamond sieht sich unschuldig bei TSC Befragung

04.07. Osborne sieht Verwicklung von Labour-Ministern unter Brown

05.07. Barclays: BoE-Vize Tucker wird vor den TSC am 09.07. geladen

05.07. Barclays: Labour lehnt Cameron-Plan für Parlemants-Inquiry ab

05.07. Barclays: Attorney General Grieve zieht Strafermittlungen vor

05.07. Barclays: Parlament mit 330 zu 226 für Kommittee ohne Richter

05.07. Ermittlungen: mind. 12 Banken weltweit verwickelt

05.07. Bank von England: Asset Purchase Programme +£50 auf £375b

06.07. SFO/UK Serious Fraud Office startet Kriminalermittlungen w Libor

06.07. BaFin leitet Sonderprüfung gegen Deutsche Bank ein

07.07. UBS hat Labour-Brown-Regierung zur Libor-Senkung beraten

07.07. Libor: UBS-Note on Bank Recapitalisation (Financial Times)

07.07. UBS hat Labour-Brown-Regierung zur Libor-Senkung beraten

08.07. Finma/CH leitet Sonderprüfung gegen UBS und Credit Suisse ein

08.07. UK: Office for Budget Responsibility empfiehlt £50 Mrd-Maßnahme

09.07. BoE-Vize Tucker: Mails an Diamond aus 2008 aufgetaucht

09.07. Federal Reserve hatte schon 1998 Hinweise auf Differenzen

09.07. FMA/AT ermittelt gegen Erste Bank und Raiffeisen wegen Euribor

09.07. Libor: Tucker-Diamond Email Correspondence 2008

09.07. BoE-Vize Tucker will nichts gewusst haben, Krise war Schuld

10.07. Libor: Letters from Barclays relevant to Agius Evidence

10.07. Diamond erhält 12 Monate Gehalt, obwohl 6 M. Kündigungsfrist

10.07. Diamond verzichtet auf £20 Mio Bonus

10.07. Barclays veröffentlicht Briefe zwischen Agius und FSA

10.07. Agius wusste seit April 2010 Bescheid, Compliance versagt

11.07. TSC: Befragungsprotokoll Barclays Ex-CEO Diamond

11.07. TSC: Befragungsprotokoll Bank von England Vize Tucker

12.07. TSC: Befragungsprotokoll Barclays Noch-Chairman Agius

13.07. Diamond nimmt Staranwalt Levander (wie MF Global Corzine)

13.07. Fed NY: Korrespondenz Libor/Barclays Aug 2007 - Okt 2008

13.07. Fed NY: Alle US/UK-Aufsichtsbehörden wussten es im Mai 2008

13.07. Fed Richmond, Lacker: Vertrauen in Finanzindustrie erschüttert

14.07. U.S. DoJ bereitet Strafverfahren gegen einige Banken vor

16.07. Del Missier, Ex-COO: Anweisung von BoE über Diamond

16.07. TSCBefragungsprotokoll Barclays Ex-CCO Del Missier

16.07. Turner, FSA-Chef: "Agressive Management", Diamond gedrängt

17.07. King, BoE-Chef: "We are not a regulator", keine Verantwortung

17.07. King: "Became aware of misreported Libor 2 weeks ago"

17.07. King: "There was no evidence of wrongdoing that time" (2008)

17.07. Tucker, BoE-Vize: "Fed NY-Note had not set alarm bells ringing"

17.07. Gensler, CFTC: Libor-Ermittlungen seit 2008 ohne Abschluss

17.07. TSC: Befragungsprotokoll BoE King, Tucker, FSA Turner

17.07. Libor: US Senat weitet Untersuchung auf Citi, BoA und JOM aus

18.07. EZB will EURIBOR verändern

18.07. King bittet Zentralbankenchefs bei BIZ um Reformvorschläge

18.07. Geithner verteidigt Libor-Reaktionen in 2008 als ausreichend

19.07. Ermittlungen gegen Händler von DB, HSBC, SocGen, CreditA

19.07. Crédit Agricole bestreitet Libor-Verwicklung

19.07. Europaparlament will eigene Untersuchung w EURIBOR

20.07. Deutsche Bank ermittelt intern mit 100 Mitarbeitern

20.07. Banken verhandeln gemeinsam um Vergleich mit Ermittlern

20.07. Citigroup vermutlich am stärksten verwickelte US-Bank

20.07. Bank von England veröffentlicht Korrespondenz von 2008

20.07. BBA: John Ewan, Libor-Director, trat April zurück, ging 13.07.

22.07. BaFin hält Rückstellungen grundsätzlich für erforderlich

22.07. Euribor: Festlegung durch folgende deutsche Banken

DB, CoBa, DZ-Bank, LBBW, BayernLB, Helaba, NordLB, LBBerlin

22.07. U.S. Staatsanwälte bereiten bis Sep. Verhaftungen vor

22.07. Blair: "haben Gefahr durch UK-Finanzsektor nicht erkannt"

23.07. Deutsche Bank: Libor-Rückstellung 30.06. €300 Mio - €1 Mrd?

24.07. Deutsche Bank: Interne Ermittlungen ohne tiefe Verwicklung

24.07. Barclays will erst Frühjahr 2013 Ermittlungen vorlegen

24.07. HSBC: Ex-Chef Wirtschaftsminister Green schweigt weiter

25.07. FSC Financial Services Committee: Geithner verteidigt sich

26.07. Lloyds Banking Group: Ermittlungen von Behörden gestartet

26.07. King, BoE-Chef: Politiker haben schwerwiegende Fehler gemacht

26.07. Del Missier, Barclays' Ex-COO erhält £9 Mio Abfindung

26.07. BaFin will noch keine Konsequenzen aus Libor ziehen

27.07. Libor-Manipulation schon seit 1991 (Ex-MS-Trader D. Keenan)

27.07. Hedgefonds: Investoren befürchten Libor-Strafen für Fonds

27.07. RBS-Chef Hester attackiert unbelehrbare Financial City Banker

27.07. Barclays: FSA untersucht 4 laufende und ehemalige Direktoren

27.07. Barcalys: £450 Mio Rückstellungen für geschädigte Kleinbetriebe

28.07. Libor: Händlernetzwerk bei Barclays, UBS, RBS in Verdacht

30.07. London: Geheimtreffen 6 UK-Banken w Schadensbegrenzung

30.07. Libor: Britische Regierung untersucht Manipulation 2 Monate

30.07. FSA: Libor Review Chef Wheatley fordert dringende Reform

30.07. Serious Fraud Office bereitet Strafen für 8 Finanzinstitute vor

30.07. Berkshire Bank NY verklagt 16 Banken wegen Libor

31.07. EU-Kommission schlägt Maßnahmen gegen Zinsmissbrauch vor

31.07. Deutsche Bank: Aufsichtsrat entlastet Jain wegen Libor

31.07. RBS zahlt D. Agar £25m für Falschverkauf von Interest-Swap

03.08. RBS entlässt für Libor-Manipulation verantwortliche Mitarbeiter

03.08. Keenan, Ex-Morgan Stanley: Libor-Abweichung schon 1991

03.08. US-Behörden: Aufschluss von Ex-Barclays Mitarbeiter R. Reich?

05.08. UBS entlässt 2 Dutzend Händler und Manager w Libor

07.08. Hausfeld, Michael, Staranwalt, weitet Sammelklagen aus

08.08. UBS gerät ins Visier der Finma-Ermittler w Euribor

09.08. Barclays: David Walker wird am 01.11. Nachfolger von Agius

09.08. JPM: Weltweite Dokumenten-Anforderung von Aufsichtsbehörden

DoJ, CFTC, SEC, EU-Comm, UK FSA, Canada Competition Bureau,

Schweizer Wettbewerbesaufsicht, Banking Associations, etc.

10.08. FSA: Libor soll unter Aufsicht der Behörden kommen

13.08. Barclays: Ex-Händler Jay Merchant von UBS entlassen

14.08. UBS: Ex-Händler Roger Darin ("Submitter-1") entlassen

15.08. Libor: 7 Vorladungen von NY Attorney General Schneiderman

17.08. Barclays: TSC bezweifelt Diamond's Aussagen

18.08. Libor: Treasury Select Committee Untersuchungsbericht

24.08. Libor: RBS-Vergleich mit USA Anfang Oktober

30.08. Barclays: Antony Jenkins als Nachfolger von Diamond ernannt

05.09. Barclays: Executive Ritankar Pal am 30.07 entlassen

05.09. Libor: CFTC ignorierte Warnungen von Richard Robb 1996

09.09. Libor: King BIS-Economic Consultative Committee will ermitteln

19.09. Barclays: FSA warnte Bank vor Jamie Dimon

24.09. CFTC: Gensler fordert Libor-Reform oder Abschaffung

25.09. Libor: RBS-Manager geben Duldung zu

26.09. Händler: Emails tauchen auf

"Our six-month fixing moved the entire fixing, hahahah"

“Where would you like it, Libor that is,”

“Mixed feelings, but mostly I’d like it all lower so the world starts to make a little sense,”

“The whole HF world will be kissing you instead of calling me if Libor move lower,”

“OK, I will move the curve down 1 basis point, maybe more if I can,”

“We need to bump it way up high, highest among all if possible,”

“We want high fix in 3s,”

“Neil is the one setting the yen Libor in London now and for this week and next.”

"Go Neil, hahahaha"

“It’s just amazing how Libor fixing can make you that much money or lose if opposite,”

“It’s a cartel now in London.”

“Must be damn difficult to trade man,”

“Especially you not in the loop.”

26.09. BBA British Banking Association gibt bald Libor-Verantwortung ab

28.09. Treasury veröffentlicht Wheatley Untersuchungsbericht

14.10. Libor: Sammelklage von US-Hausbesitzern gegen 12 Banken

Barclays BoA UBS ...

15.10. RBS suspendiert Head of Rates Trading, Jezri Mohideen

25.10. Libor: 9 weitere Banken in Aug/Sep mit Bußgeldern belegt

BoA Mitsubishi CS Lloyds Rabo RBCan SocGen Norinchukin WestLB

29.10. Libor: UBS, RBS entlassen mind. 3 Händler in Singapur

29.10. Libor: Staatsanwaltschaft Paris ermittelt w SocGen

19.12. UBS: FSA £160 Mio, CFTC $700 Mio, DoJ $500 Mio, Finma Fr59 Mio

Befragungen durch Treasury Select Committee

Am 09.07.2012 erschien der Vize-Gouverneur der Bank von England Tucker auf eigenen Wunsch vor dem Treasury Select Committee (TSC), um verdeckte Anschuldigungen von Barclays' Ex-CEO Diamond entgegentreten zu können. Hier einige Auszüge aus den Fragen (Q) und Antworten (A) sowie eigene Äußerungen von Tucker (T): (in Englisch)

  • Q: Why didn't you provide these emails before the meeting with Mr. Diamond? Was absolutely important! A: I don't think we had a (explicit) request from you
  • Q Andy Love: Why did it need US authorities to uncover libor and will regulatory reforms restore London credibitlity? 
  • T: I'm a really strong believer in twin peaks ... London is going to get a proper securities & markets regulator for the first time. We need to get a point where (bank) treasury departments are not profit centres. Extenting the scope of criminal sanctions (for white collar crime) really important ... and pays needs massive reform too.
  • T: What irritates me, is that the compliance people on the floors didn't notice the abyss (Abgrund) and elevated it

Die dazugehörigen Protokolle finden Sie unten.

Bemerkenswert ist der Umstand, dass keine Protokolle von der Befragungen der Bank von England und der FSA veröffentlicht wurden.

 

am 18.08.2012 veröffentlicht das TSC seinen vorläufigen Untersuchtungsbericht auf seiner Website (Siehe auch Dokumente unten). Diamond soll nicht die ganze Wahrheit gesagt haben.

Beschuldigungen von FSA, CFTC und U.S. DoJ an RBS

Beschuldigungen der FSA an RBS

Am 06.02.2013 veröffentlicht die britische Financial Services Authority, dass sie die RBS mit einer Strafe von £87,5 Mio für Fehlverhalten in Verbindung mit dem Libor belegt hat:


RBS’ breaches of the FSA’s requirements encompassed a number of issues, involved a number of employees and occurred over a number of years.  The individuals involved in the misconduct were located in the UK, Japan, Singapore, and the US.  Between January 2006 and November 2010 the misconduct included:

 

  • RBS making Japanese yen (JPY) and Swiss franc (CHF) LIBOR submissions that took into account its derivatives trading positions.  
  • RBS allowing derivatives traders to act as substitute submitters and make JPY LIBOR submissions that took into account its derivatives trading positions.
  • RBS making JPY, CHF and US dollar (USD) LIBOR submissions that took into account the profit and loss (P&L) of its money market trading books.  
  • RBS derivatives traders colluding with other LIBOR panel banks and interdealer broker firms to influence the JPY LIBOR submissions made by other panel banks, including one derivatives trader entering into “wash trades” (i.e. risk free trades that cancelled each other out and for which there was no legitimate commercial rationale) in order to make corrupt brokerage payments to one broker firm to garner influence.  The derivatives trader used this influence to get the broker firm to try to change other panel banks’ JPY LIBOR submissions.  
  • RBS derivatives and money market traders colluding with individuals at other panel banks and interdealer broker firms who sought to influence RBS’ JPY and CHF LIBOR submissions.  

The misconduct was widespread.  At least 219 requests for inappropriate submissions were documented – an unquantifiable number of oral requests, which by their nature would not be documented, were also made.  At least 21 individuals including derivatives and money market traders and at least one manager were involved in the inappropriate conduct.

RBS failed to identify and manage the risks of inappropriate submissions.  RBS established a business model that sat derivatives traders next to LIBOR submitters and encouraged the two groups to communicate without restriction despite the obvious risk that derivatives traders would seek to influence RBS’ LIBOR submissions.  It also allowed derivatives traders to act as substitute LIBOR submitters which created an obvious risk that derivatives traders would make submissions that took into account their trading positions.  RBS also failed to identify and manage the risk that money market traders would take the P&L of their money market books into account when making RBS’ LIBOR submissions.  

RBS did not have any LIBOR-related systems and controls in place until March 2011, failed to adequately address the risk that derivatives traders would seek to influence RBS’s LIBOR submissions until June 2011, and failed to adequately address the risk that money market traders would take into account the impact of LIBOR on the profitability of transactions in their money market books, until March 2012.  

In response to a specific request by the FSA as a result of its enquiries into LIBOR, RBS attested to the FSA in March 2011 that its LIBOR related systems and controls were adequate.  This was inaccurate as RBS’ systems and controls were inadequate.  Although it had reviewed its LIBOR submission process in February and March 2011 at the FSA’s instigation RBS had failed to identify the risks that submitters would make LIBOR submissions that took into account derivative trader requests and the impact on the profitability of transactions in their money market books.

From January 2005 through to March 2012, RBS also failed to have adequate transaction monitoring systems and controls that would have assisted it to detect wash trades.  

Tracey McDermott, director of enforcement and financial crime, said:

“The integrity of benchmark reference rates such as LIBOR is of fundamental importance to both UK and international financial markets.  The findings set out in our notice today demonstrate a failure by RBS to take that wider context into account.

“The failures at RBS were all the more serious because of the attempts not only to influence the submissions of RBS but also of other panel banks and the use of interdealer brokers to do this.

“During the course of the FSA's work on LIBOR, RBS provided the FSA with an attestation that its LIBOR related systems and controls were adequate.  This was not correct. Primary responsibility for the conduct of the individuals within firms and the efficacy of the controls that are in place, rests with those firms.  The FSA takes it very seriously when firms tell us that they have appropriate systems but do not.

“The extent and nature of the misconduct relating to LIBOR has cast a shadow on the reputation of this industry and we expect firms to take steps to ensure that this can never happen again.  This is the third penalty we have imposed in relation to LIBOR related misconduct.  The size and scale of our continuing investigations remains significant.”

The FSA continues to pursue a number of other significant cross-border investigations in relation to LIBOR and other benchmark rates.

RBS agreed to settle at an early stage of the investigation and therefore qualified for a 30% discount under the FSA’s settlement discount scheme.  Without the discount the fine would have been £125 million.

This was a significant cross-border investigation and, in particular, the FSA would like to thank the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the US Department of Justice (DoJ) together with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) and the Japanese Financial Services Authority (JFSA) for their co-operation.

FSA vs. RBS Final Notice - 06.02.2013
FSA vs. RBS Final Notice.pdf
PDF-Dokument [428.5 KB]

Donner

Wie ein Donnerschlag traf es die Finanzwelt am 27.06.2012 Mittwoch Nachmittag um 16:23 Uhr als auf Twitter die Meldung umlief, dass die britische Bankenaufsicht Financial Services Authority (FSA) ein Bussgeld von £59,5 Mio gegen die britische Barclays Bank Plc verhängte. Parallel veröffentlichte die Derivatehandelsaufsicht U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) eine Strafe von $200 Mio und das amerikanische Justizministerium U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) eine Strafe von $160 Mio gegen Barclays. Zusammen sind das rund $450 Mio.

Beispiel aus der FSA Final Notice. Seite 19:

  • For example, on 26 October 2006, an external trader made a request for a lower three month US dollar LIBOR submission. The external trader stated in an email to Trader G at Barclays “If it comes in unchanged I’m a dead man”. Trader G responded that he would “have a chat”. Barclays’ submission on that day for three month US dollar LIBOR was half a basis point lower than the day before, rather than being unchanged. The external trader thanked Trader G for Barclays’ LIBOR submission later that day: “Dude. I owe you big time! Come over one day after work and I’m opening a bottle of Bollinger”.

Blitz

Der Blitz wurde übersehen und es gab viele davon. Immer mehr Nachrichten aus der Vorzeit tauchen auf, denen bisher keine Beachtung geschenkt wurde:

  • Am 28.08.2007 verbreitet ein unbekannter Barclays-Mitarbeiter in einer Rundmail unter anderem an die Weltbank und Federal Reserve NY den Verdacht, das USD Libor unnatürlich niedrig sei.
  • Am 11.04.2008 befragte ein Analyst der Markets Group der Fed NY einen Mitarbeiter von Barclays über das Ausmaß der Probleme bei der Libor-Meldung. Der Barclays-Mitarbeiter sagte, dass seine Bank und auch andere Banken den Libor zu gering melden, um ein Stigma der Bank zu verhindern. Die Analysten von der Fed NY verbreiteten noch am selben Tag eine Briefing Note, dass Libor-berichtende Banken den Zins zu niedrig meldeten um Anzeichen von Schwäche zu vertuschen. Empfänger dieser Briefing Note waren:
    • Senior Officials at Fed NY (Chef Geitner)
    • Federal Reserve Board of Governors (Chef Bernanke)
    • Andere Federal Reserve Banken
    • U.S. Department of Treasury (Chef Henry Paulson)
  • Am 16.04.2008 tauchten erste Presseberichte über Probleme mit Libor auf (Angabe von Fed NY)
  • Am 01.05.2008 brachte Geithner (Fed NY) das Libor-Problem bei der President's Working Group on Financial Markets (PWG) zur Sprache
  • Im Mai 2008 (Datum nicht angegeben) trafen sich Vertreter der Fed NY mit Vertretern der British Banking Association BBA, um deren Sorge zum Ausdruck zu bringen und die Fehler im Lobor-Meldesystem festzustellen.
  • Am 17.05.2008 traf sich Geithner mit dem Bank von England-Chef Mervyn King in Basel anlässlich der Basel III Verhandlungen und besprachen die Libor-Probleme
  • Am 29.05.2008 berichtet Jonathan Weil von Bloomberg "Libor Banks Misstated Rates, Bond at Barclays Says"
  • Am 01.06.2008 schrieb Geithner eine Email an King mit einen Bericht vom 27.05.2008 mit dem Titel "Recommendations for Enhancing the Creditablility of LIBOR"
  • In 2011 erhielt UBS erstmals Verfügungen von U.S. Aufsichtsbehörden. Investoren hatten dutzende Banken verklagt 
  • Im Dezember 2011 leitete die japanische Aufsichtsbehörde, Financial Services Agency FSA, gegen Citigroup ein Verfahren ein und schloss die Bank vom Libor-gebundenen Derivatehandel für die Zeit vom 10.-23.02.2012 aus. Einer der beiden beschuldigten Händler soll Christopher Ceceres gewesen sein, der den G10-Handel für ganz Asien unter sich hatte. Ceceres verlies die Bank mit einem Bonus, ohne von der FSA befragt zu werden. Der andere war Hayes.
  • Am 03.02.2012 teilte die Schweizer Wettbewerbskommission WEKO mit, dass sie gegen 12 Banken (UBS, Credit Suisse und 10 ausländische Banken, nämlich Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, JPMorgan Chase, Mizuho Financial Group, Rabobank Groep, Royal Bank of Scotland, SocGen und Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp) Ermittlungen wegen Manipulation des Libor und Tibor (Tokyo Interbanking Offered Rate) eingeleitet habe. Die Ermittlungen laufen parallel zu jenen der U.S.-, EU- und Britischen aufsichtsbehörden sowie dem U.S. Department of Justice und des EU-Wettbewerbsbehörde. Nicht von den schweizer Ermittlungen betroffen sind Barclays, WestLB und Bank of America, die Gegenstand anderer Ermittlungsverfahren sind. Auslöser der schweizer Ermittlungen sind 2 Klagen:
    • in 2011 verklagte eine europäischer Asset Manager ein dutzend U.S., europäische und japanische Banken, einschließlich Deutsche Bank, UBS und Credit Suisse wegen konspirativer Libor-Manipulation (ID:nN19278002)
    • später in 2012 reichte Charles Schwab Corp zwei ähnliche Klagen gegen 11 große Banken wegen konspirativer Libor-Manipulation ein (ID:nN1E77O1Fj)
  • Ferner meldete am 16.02.2012 finews.ch, dass UBS (parallel zu den internationalen Ermittlungen der Aufsichtsbehörden in USA, Europa und Japan) einen Großteil ihrer im Verdacht stehenden leitenden Händler freistellte. Darunter befanden sich damals Yvan Ducrot, Co-Leiter der UBS-Rates-Abteilung sowie Holger Seger, globaler Chef der Abteilung für kurzzeitige Zins-Geschäfte. 
  • Am 17.02.2012 meldete Wall Street Journal, dass die von Ermittlungen betroffene UBS dem kanadischen Competition Bureau mitgeteilt hat, dass eine Gruppe von Traders und Broker Schlüsselzinssätze wie den Yen-Libor manipuliert hätten. Weitere Beschuldigte sind Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, JPMorgan Chase und RBS. ferner wird gegen zwei Londoner Interdealer Broker, ICAP PLC und RP Martin Holdings Ltd.
  • Am 22.02.2012 schrieb Reuters, dass Citigroup und UBS einem kanadischen Gericht und zahlreichen anderen Staaten entscheidende Informationen über Zinsmanipulationen lieferten. Hintergrund sind Vorgägnge um einen einziger Trader, Thomas Hayes, der bei UBS von 2006-2009 und bei Citigroup von 2009-2010 arbeitete.

 

Hände in Unschuld waschen

Verschämt bietet der Chef von Barclays zunächst nur an, seinen Bonus vom letzten Jahr zurückzugeben. Ein paar Tage später am 03.07.2012 tritt er zurück. Am selben Tag taucht eine an den damaligen CEO Varley und Del Missier gerichtete Aktennotiz in den Barclays-Unterlagen für das TSC auf, die mit RED (Robert Edward Diamond) unterzeichnet ist und der Bank von England eine Schuld zuweist, Empfehlungen gegeben zu haben, die als Anweisungen verstanden wurden. In der Anhörung durch das Treasury Select Committee am 04.07.2012 verweist Diamond auf eine tadelswerte Gruppe von Händlern, die nur an ihren eigenen Profit gedacht hätten. Gespräche mit Labour-Ministern oder Aufsichtsbehörden habe er sonst nicht geführt bzw. keine Notizen gemacht und sie vergessen oder sein Vorgänger sei verantwortlich gewesen. Auch behauptete er erst 4-5 Tage vor den Geldstrafen der Aufsichtsbehörden erfahren zu haben. Diamond weist der Bank von England und der FSA Mitverantwortung zu. Diamond hatte Angst, dass Barclays in 2008 von der Labour-Regierung unter Gordon Brown verstaatlicht werden sollte.

 

Politische Hintergründe

Der Veröffentlichung müssen umfangreiche internationale Ermittlungen unter strengster Geheimhaltung vorausgegangen sein. Das U.S. DoJ unterlässt es am Schluss seiner Presseerklärung zu erwähnen, dass die Aufdeckung Teil von Obama's Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force ist.


Aufdeckung

Bereits am 03.02.2012 berichtete Andrea Tan von Bloomberg von einem Kündigungsprozess eines Händlers der Royal Bank of Scotland in Singapur berichtet. Der ehemalige Händler Tan Chi Min erhob bereits am 27. Dezember 2011 Klage gegen RBS auf Zahlung seines Bonusses über $1,5 Mio und 3,3 Mio RBS-Aktien, weil ihm wegen "gross misconduct" in der Zeit von 2007 bis 2011 gekündigt wurde. Tan behauptete, dass RBS-Mitarbeiter "'were not at any time forbidden from communicating input or requests' to have the bank's rate settters set rates at leverls to mximize profits". "Such requests and input were regularly made or given in order to maximize profit". RBS "was fully abware of this, condoned (duldete) such conduct and waived any right to terminate employees on the basis of this". Tan erklärte auch, dass er solche Einflussnahmen auf den Libor nicht allein hätte durchführen können. Nach Anfrage Europäischer Behörden (EU-Kommission) und U.S.-Behörden (CFTC) hat damals RBS interne Untersuchungen über die Art und Weise der Libor-Festlegung gestartet. Am 07.07.2012 schockierte die Financial Times mit der Veröffentlichung einer UBS-Note vom 01.11.2008. Darin werden dem Treasury Empfehlungen gegeben zur Bankenrekapitalisierung und zum Credit Guarantee Scheme CGS gegeben:

  1. "Reducing the cost of the CGS will allow £ Libor to fall quicker
  2. Libor is the cost of unsecured interbank deposits
  3. How could the CGS help reduce Libor?
  4. How large a reduction in the fee is required?
  5. What is the best way to reduce cost of the guarantee?
  6. Will this not lead to too great a use of CGS?
  7. What more can be done to improve lending conditions?
  8. In conclusion: Firstly getting Libor down is desirable and possible by tweaking the CGS, secondly this would create a level playing field with much of Europe and thirdly the introduction of a collateralised CGS will encourage lending to key parts of the economy by reducing the cost of a use at the samt time as reducing taxpayers risk."

 

Bekanntgabe

Am 28.06.2012 erliessen FSA, CFTC und U.S. DoJ Strafbescheide gegen Barclays, am 19.12.2012 gegen UBS und am 06.02.2013 gegen RBS. Siehe Unten.

 

Chronik

1991: Erste Manipulationen (Ex-Morgan Stanley Händler D. Keenan)

2005-2007: Barclaya Traders meldeten falsche Libor-Daten

2007-2009: Barclays Traders meldeten vereinzelt falsche Daten

08/2005-05/2008: Barclays Traders mit anderen Banken

08/2007-01/2009: Barclays Manager drückten $- und £-Libor

06/2010: Ende der Manipulationen bei Barclays

09/2010: Citigroup entlässt Hayes, informiert Aufsicht

03/2011: FBI verhört Hayes' Assistent

 

Fehler und Ursachen

  1. Manipulation: Die Händler nutzten Emails und Instant Messages, um sich zu sagen, ob sie einen höheren oder niedrigeren Yen-Libor sehen wollten, damit ihre Trading Positions unterstützt wurden. Dann schlossen sie Vereinbarungen, mit denen sie künstlich erhöhte oder gesenkte Meldungen versendeten. Nicht alle Versuche waren jedoch erfolgreich.
  2. Falsche Meldungen: Sogenannte "Submitters", Manager von Barclays, gaben unzutreffende Zinsdaten an das Libor-Setting Committee der British Bankers Association BBA. Barclays meldet somit stets zu niedrige Zinsen für die Interbanken-Finanzierung. Diese gemeldeten Zinsen lagen sogar unter den Zinsmeldungen aller anderen Banken. Verwunderlich ist, warum Niemand das untersucht hat. 
  3. Missverständnis mit Bank von England: Am 01.07.2012 berichtet Robert Peston von BBC, dass Barcays dachte, im Einvernehmen mit der Bank von England falsche Berichte abgegeben zu haben. Dies werde auf ein Telefonat von Bob Diamond mit Paul Tucker, dem Deputy Governor der Bank von England, im Jahr 2008 zurückgeführt. Darüber gebe es allerdings weder ein Protokoll noch stimmen die Erinnerungen beider Teilnehmer überein. Auf dieses Telefonat wird im FSA-Bescheid Bezug genommen. Anschliessend habe sogar Barclays Senior Management am 29.10.2008 eine ausdrücklich Anweisung herausgegeben, niedrigere Zinsen zu melden. Die Bank von England habe aber den FSA-Ermittlern versichert, eine solche Empfehlung nicht in jenem Telefonat gegeben zu haben. In seiner Befragung vor dem TSC erwähnte Dimon, dass Barclays damals fürchtete, von der Labour-Regierung verstaatlicht zu werden.
  4. Deregulierung: Unter der Labour-Regierung von Blair wurde die Bankenregulierung aufgeweicht.

 

Wirtschaftliche Konsequenzen

  1. Zinsbasierter Markt: Die manipulierte Zinsrate von LIBOR allein beeinflussen einen Markt von rund $800 Billionen Wertpapiere, Derivate und Darlehen, davon $363 Billionen Hypotheken, $300 Billionen Swaps und $10 Billionen Darlehen (auch Auto und Wohnhäuser). Ferner basieren fast alle internationalen Geschäftsverträge in Verzinsungsfragen auf Libor. Damit sind nicht nur die Interbankenzinsen falsch berechnet worden, sondern insbesondere auch sog. Transfer Pricing Agreements (Verrechnungspreisvereinbarungen) zwischen den Muttergesellschaften und des ausländischen Tochtergesellschaften betroffen. Die Bedeutung des EURIBOR ist weitgehend unbekannt. - Es werden Milliardenklagen auf Barclays und alle anderen Banken zukommen. - Genau im falschen Moment.
  2. London Financial City: Die City wird neben dem Imageschaden und nach dem London Whale Skandal unter starke Aufsicht und Regulierung geraten. Bereits jetzt hat die CFTC Derivate-Aufsicht die Anwendung von Dodd-Franck auf U.S.-Bankentöchter ausgedehnt. Es könnte aus der Spielwiese ausländischer Banken im dem vermeintlich rechts- und moralfreien Raum ein uninteressanter Finanzmarkt werden. Abwanderungen werden zunehmen. Der Beitrag am GDP wird deutlich zurückgehen.

 

Personelle Konsequenzen

  1. Marcus Agius: Er gilt allerdings als nicht direkt mit den Libor-Geschäfte befasst und als einer der "Guten". Andere behaupten, dass während seiner Amtszeit die Mitarbeiter zum Fälschen der Liborzahlen aufgefordert wurden. Er war zuvor von 1972-2006 bei Lazard zuletzt als Chairman und von 1995-2006 Chairman bei BAA. Allerdings kritisieren Insider Agius wegen Interessenkonflikten, weil er der einzige Non-Executive Director im Executive Board der BBC ist und dort kritische Berichterstattung verhindern hätte können. Agius soll durch Michael Rake, früherer Top-Wirtschaftsprüfer und jetziger Senior Independent Director im Board der Bank, werden. - RÜCKTRITT am 02.07.2012
  2. Bob Diamond: Der CEO von Barclays steht im Zentrum der Beschuldigungen. Er übernahm am 01.01.2011 das Amt von seinem Vorgänger John Varley. Bislang hat er nur angeboten, auf seinen Bonus von $4,2m des letzten Jahres zu verzichten. Er lehnt eine Rücktritt zunächst jedoch ab. Diamond ist als der typische Topbanker bekannt. Ihm wird nachgesagt, dass er die CS First Boston in New York verließ, weil im der Bonus von $8m für 1995 nicht ausreichen erschien (Martin Vander Weyer vom Spectator/Telegraph, 01.07.2012). Diamond war zur Zeit des Beginns der Manipulationen Chef der betroffenen Einheit. Am Mittwoch, den 04.07.2012 soll er vor einem Committee aussagen. - RÜCKTRITT am 03.07.2012 mit sofortiger Wirkung
  3. John Varley: Deputy-CEO seit 01.01.2004 und CEO von 01.09.2004-31.12.2010. Obwohl er die oberste Verantwortung in der Hauptzeit der Libor-Manipulationen war, wurde er noch nicht ins Rampenlicht gezogen.
  4. Jerry del Missier: Der Co-Chief Executive und Präsident der für die Zinsmanipulationen verantwortlichen Barclays Capital sowie Co-Chief Executive und Präsident der Barclays Corporate and Investment Bank tritt am 03.07.2012 zurück. Er wurde am 09.11.2011 für das Jahr 2012 zum Chair der SIFMA Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association gewählt, die Hunderte Wertpapierfirmen, Banken und Vermögensverwalter vertritt. Mit seinem Weggang erhält del Missier £7 Mio.
  5. Angela Knight: Die seit April 2007 amtierende Chief Executive bei der BBA trat am 01.04.2012 zurück, bot aber an, solange zu bleiben, bis ein Nachfolger gefunden werde. Sie gerät unter Druck durch die Email von 2008, in der Gouverneur King die CEO bat, mit der NY Fed die Entdeckungen der Libor-Manipulationen zu besprechen.
  6. John Ewan: Der bei der British Bankers Association BBA für den Libor zuständige Direktor hat schon im Februar 2012 seinen Rücktritt erklärt und sich bereit erklärt vorübergehend weiterzumachen. Er hat am 13.07.2012 die BBA verlassen. Sein posten soll solange nicht neu besetzt werden, bis die Ermittlungen abgeschlossen sind.
  7. Händler: Bereits Ende 2011 hat die RBS 4 Händler entlassen. Insgesamt seien nach Aussagen von Diamond 14 Händler Verfehlungen nachgewiesen worden. Schon im Februar 2012 wurden von UBS zwei ihrer Händler freigestellt. Am 10.07.2012 suspendiert die Mitubishi UFJ Financial Group zwei Londoner Händler, C. Schluep und P. Robson, wegen laufender Ermittlungen aus deren Zeit bei der Rabobank. 
  8. Händler-Netzwerk: Im Zentrum der Ermittlungen steht ein Netzwerk von Händlern bei Barclays, UBS und RBS. Einer der Händler soll von März 2006 bis Oktober 2009 bei Barclays und dann in einer ähnlichen Position bei UBS in den USA gearbeitet haben.
  9. Tom Hayes: Der 2013 33 Jahre alte Engländer war Händler bei RBS (ab 2001), Royal Bank of Canada, UBS Tokyo (Juli 2006 bis Sep 2009) und Citigroup (Dez 2009 bis Sep 2010) beschäftigt und galt als Star mit unbezahlbaren Verbindungen zu den Zinssettern von Libor, Euribor und Tibor. Am 19.12.2012 wird er vom U.S. DoJ angeklagt wegen "conspiracy in a criminal complaint" sowie "wire fraud, based on the same scheme, and a price fixing violation arising from his collusive activity with another bank to manipulate LIBOR benchmark rates". In den Ermittlungen wird er als "Senior Yen Trader" (CFTC-Akten) bzw. "Trader 1" (DoJ-Akten) anonymisiert. Unter Kollegen wurde er als "Rain Man" bezeichnet. Hayes Boss bei Citigroup war Chris Cecere, gegen den nicht ermittelt wird.
  10. Roger Darin: Der 2013 41 Jahre alte Schweizer war ebenfalls Händler bei UBS London. In den DoJ-Akten wird er als "Submitter-1" bezeichnet. Er arbeitete mit Hayes zusammen. Er war als Angestellter bei UBS Zürich seit Juni 2006 gelistet. - ENTLASSUNG am 14. August 2012. Am 11.08.2013 wird bekannt, dass er von einem Anleger wegen Betrugs, Urkundenfälschung und weiteren Delikten angezeigt wurde.

 

Firmeninterne Konsequenzen

  1. Neben Barclays werden weitere Banken in die Untersuchungen einbezogen: Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, JPMorgan Chase und RBS. (American Banker, 29.06.2012)
  2. Nach Angaben der FSA wollen Barclays, HSBC, RBS und Lloyds Banking Group Entschädigungen an Kunden zahlen, die Fehlkäufe von zinsgebunden Hedge-Produkten hatten.

 

Regulatorische Konsequenzen

  1. Unabhängige Expertenkommission: Alsbald soll eine über den ganzen Sommer andauernde Untersuchung bis Frühherbst Empfehlungen zur Änderung des Libor-Verfahrens abgeben. Dies könnte dazu führen, dass die Bank von England und nicht mehr die BBA den Libor festlegt. Die Änderungen könnten mit dem aktuell im Parlament befindlichen "Financial Services Bill" Anfang 2013 in Kraft treten. (Louisa Peacock, Telegraph, 30.06.2012)
  2. British Bankers Association: Die BBA will eigene Überlegungen über die Zukunft des Libors anstellen
  3. Euribor-European Banking Federation: Die EEBF bedauert das Weggehen von zahlreichen Banken Ende 2012 und Anfang 2013. Aus dem Euribor Panel haben sich bislang zurückgezogen: BayernLB, Raiffeisen Int., Erste Group, Citigroup, DekaBank, DZ-Bank, Helaba. Aus den anderen Indices Eonia und Eurepo: Rabobank, HSBC.
  4. EU-Kommission: Nachdem mehrere Bankeb sich aus den Interest Setting Boards zurückgezogen haben, droht am 08.02.2013 Wettbewerbskommissar Barnier den Banken, sie zu Pflichtmitgliedern im Euribor Panel zu machen.
  5. European Banking Authority, European Securities and Markets AuthorityAm 11.01.2013 stellen sie einen gemeinsamen Plan vor, der den Euribor retten soll, nachdem mehrere Banken aus dem Panel ausgetreten sind:
    1. Euribor Steering Committee ESC bankenunabhängiger
    2. ESC häufigere Treffen und Veröffentlichung der Protokolle
    3. Zinssätze nur bei häufigster Anwendung, nur 7 statt 15
    4. Neu-Definition von Prime Bank/Interbank Transactions
    5. EEBF soll Qualität sichern
    6. EEBF Governance und Code of Conduct verbessern
    7. EEBF interne Prüfungen, Bericht veröffentlichen
    8. EEBF Mindeststandards für Internal Procedures/Controls
    9. EEBF Calculation Agent mit eigenem Code of Contact
    10. EEBF und Calculation Agent sollen dokumentieren
    11. Internal Governance Processes für teilnehmende Banken

 

Juristische Konsequenzen

  1. Parliamentary Inquiry: Am 05.07. beschließt das britische Unterhaus die Errichtung einer parlamentarischen Untersuchungskommission, aber keine öffentliche, von einem Richter angeführte Kommission.
  2. Treasury Select Committee: Zunächst soll am Mittwoch, dem 04.07.2012, der Abgeordnete des House of Commons Andrew Tyrie im Auftrag des Committees Barclays CEO Bob Diamond und den Chairman Marcus Agius befragen. Ziel der Untersuchung ist es, das künftige Verfahren der Liborfestsetzung und die Möglichkeit der Einleitung von Strafverfahren zu überlegen. Die Befragung von Agius wird am 03.07.2012 um 1 Woche verschoben. Diamond beantwortete die Fragen im TSC nach Datum und Ministerverantwortung nicht.
  3. Serious Fraud Office: Am 07.07.2012 leitete das britische Betrugsamt SFO der Regierung ein Ermittlungsverfahren wegen Libor-Manipulationen ein
  4. Justizministerium: Der Justice Secretary Ken Clarke forderte am 30.06.2012 strafrechtliche Ermittlungen
  5. Canada Bureau of Competition: Am 08.07.2012 meldet Telegraph, dass RBS sich schon seit einem Jahr gegen eine richterliche Verfügung eines kanadischen Gerichts in Ottawa wehrt, mit einer internationalen Kriminalermittlung gegen eigene Mitarbeiter zu kooperieren. Das Verfahren begann 2011 nach Klagen gegen einige Großbanken und führte noch zu keiner Anklage.
  6. Schweiz: Am 08.07.2012 meldet die Handelszeitung, dass die Bankenaufsicht Finma Ermittlungen gegen UBS und Credit Suisse eingeleitet hat.
  7. Deutschland: Am 07.07.2012 wird bekannt, dass die BaFin eine Sonderprüfung bei der Deutschen Bank eingeleitet hat.
  8. Österreich: Am 09.07.2012 meldet die FMA, dass Ermittlungen gegen Erste Bank und Raiffeisen International eingeleitet werden.
  9. U.S. Financial Services Committee: Chairman Neugebauer des FSC (Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation) forderte sämtliche Korrenspondenz ziwschen der Federal Reserve Bank of New York und Barclays zwischen August 2007 und November 2009 an. Am 13.07.2012 veröffentlicht die  umfangreiches Korrespondenzmaterial aus den Jahren 2007 und 2008, in dem auf Ungereimtheiten im USD-Libor hingewiesen wird. 

 

Politische Konsequenzen

  1. Ann Pettifor startete am 28.06.2012 eine Twitter-Kampagne auf epetitions.direct.gov.uk für eine öffentliche Untersuchung des Libor Skandals: "Public Inquiry into Wrongdoing and Ethics of Bankers". Bereits am 01.07.2012 haben sich mehr als 10.000 Unterschriften gefunden.
  2. Turner: Der Chairman der Bankenaufsicht FSA Financial Services Authority hat es bisher unterlassen, personelle und regulatorische oder juristische Konsequenzen zu fordern. - Am 31.03.2013 wird die FSA geschlossen. Ihre Aufgaben übernimmt eine neue Verbraucherschutzbehörde und die Bank of England
  3. King: Der Gouverneur der Bank von England, Sir Mervyn King, prangert die Zinsmanipulationen scharf an. "Something had gone 'very wrong' with Britains's banks that needed to be put right". Er gerät aber immer mehr unter Druck, weil er davon gewusst haben könnte und nichts unternommen habe. Auch er forderte weder personellen Konsequenzen noch eine Untersuchungskommission. King fordert einen echten Kulturwandel. Nachdem bekannt wurde, dass die Federal Reserve schon 2008 in UK auf Reformen gedrängt hat, schreibt am 13.07.2012 der Telegraph: "It just gets worse. If Sir Mervyn King was up to his waist in Libor before, now he's drowning in it". King sagt am 26.07., dass die Politiker schwerwiegende Entscheidungen getroffen hätten, sieht aber nach wie vor keine Schuld bei sich. - AUSTRITT 30.06.2013
  4. Tucker: Der stellvertretende Gouverneur der Bank von England, Paul Tucker, gerät wegen eines Telefonats mit Diamond am 29. Oktober 2008 unter Druck. Am 04.07.2012 fordert er das Treasury Select Committee auf, ihn zu einer Anhörung einzuladen, um das Telefonat mit Diamond aufzuklären. - AUSTRITT Herbst 2013
  5. Osborne: Der Britische Schatzmeister bezeichnet den Skandal als "Epitaph (Gedenkstein) to an Age of Irresponsibility". Am 04.07.2012 lässt Osborne verlautbaren, dass 2 Labour-Minister der Vorgänger-Regierung in den Libor-Skandal verwickelt seien.
  6. Cameron: Der Britische Premier sagte, dass "cleaning up Britain's discredited and 'shodddy' banks is a priority for the Government on a par with cutting the country's debts." Er verweigert sich aber eine unabhängigen öffentlichen Untersuchung und wird dafür heftig kritisiert. Viele Fragen sich, warum er eine solche Untersuchung so fürchtet. Im Zusammenhang mit der geplanten engeren Bankenkontrolle in der Eurozone und vielleicht der EU, der sich Cameron kategorisch verweigert, tritt er die Flucht nach Vorne an und hält den Zeitpunkt über ein Referendum über den Austritt aus der EU für gekommen.
  7. Miliband: Der Labour-Parteichef und Oppositionsführer Ed Miliband fordert eine unabhängige Untersuchung. Am 04.07.2012 wünscht er zu Weihnachten 2012 den Start zweier Untersuchungskommissionen unter Vorsitz eines Richters. Die erste soll sich mit dem Libor-Skandal befassen und die zweite mit der Bankenkultur im weiteren Sinne. Der Abschlussbericht soll dann nach einem Jahr in 2014 vorliegen. Es kann vermutet werden, dass das für Labour hochbrisante Thema so weit wie möglich bis nach den nächsten Wahlen am 02.05.2015 hinausgeschoben werden soll.
  8. Ball: Der Staatssekretär im Finanzministerium Ed Ball unter der Labour-Regierung Blair und spätere Erziehungsminister fordert ebenso eine Untersuchungskommission. Ball setzte sich nach eigenen Angaben früher beim Finanzministerium für eine strengere Regulierung ein und wurde damals kritisiert. Er war ein aussichtsreicher Kandidat für das Amt des Schatzkanzlers.
  9. Romney: Der aussichtsreiche U.S.-Präsidentschaftskandidat soll nach einem Bericht vom Telegraph während der Olympischen Spiele in London an einem privaten Fundraising-Dinner teilnehmen, das von Bob Diamond veranstaltet wird.
  10. Blair: Am 22.07.2012 gesteht Tony Blair, ehemaliger Premier, ein, die Gefahr des britischen Finanzsektors für Großbritannien und die Welt verkannt zu haben und eine Teilverantwortung dafür zu tragen.



Offene Fragen

Am 29.06.2012 fragt Melanie Stern von BBC, warum die FSA-Strafe von £59,5m wesentlich geringer ausfiel als die von der CFTC ($200m) und dem U.S. DoJ ($160m). Die Summe der Strafen der FSA und der CFTC machen ungefähr die Hälfte der Dividende von Barclays im Jahr 2011 aus. Andererseits entspricht die FSA-Strafe nur einem Barclays-Gewinn von ungefähr 10 Tagen:

  1. How did the FSA calculate Barclays' Fine?

 

Am 01.07.2012 fasst Julia Kollewe vom Guardian folgende Fragen an Diamond zusammen, die er vor dem Treasury Select Committee beantworten sollte:

  1. When did you know about the attempts to manipulate the Libor rate at Barclays?
  2. What did you do about it when you found out?
  3. Have you considered resigning?
  4. How many people have you fired over the scandal? Are any of the people who were involved in the interest rate rigging still working at the bank?
  5. Are you going to give back the money you have earned since 2006 (the date of the now infamous emails between traders)?
  6. Do you stand by your statement to the Commons Treasury select committee in January 2011 that the "period of remorse and apology for banks … needs to be over"?
  7. Do you regret the hypocrisy of the BBC Today programme lecture last November when you urged bankers to be "good citizens"?

Am 01.07.2012 stellt Robert Peston von BBC folgende Fragen bezüglich des Telefonats zwischen Tucker und Diamond in 2008:

  1. Did he believe Mr Tucker was in some tacit or implicit way encouraging Barclays to understate its borrowing costs - even if he was not instructing them to do so?
  2. How did junior Barclays managers gain the false impression that Mr Tucker and the Bank of England had instructed them to understate Barclays' borrowing costs?

Beschuldigungen der CFTC an RBS

Am 06.02.2013 verfügt die U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission die RBS zu einer Zahlung von $325 Mio für die Beilegung von Anschuldigung der Manipulation, der versuchten manipulation und der Falschmeldung von Yen und Schweizer Franken Libor. Damit hat die CFTC insgesamt $1,2 Mrd Strafen wegen Libor- und anderen Zinsmanipulationen verhängt.

 

Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced an Order against The Royal Bank of Scotland plc and RBS Securities Japan Limited (collectively, RBS or the Bank), bringing and settling charges of successful manipulation, attempted manipulation, and false reporting relating to LIBOR for Yen and Swiss Franc, which are benchmark interest rates critical to financial markets and the public. The Order requires RBS to pay a $325 million civil monetary penalty, cease and desist from further violations as charged, and take specified steps to ensure the integrity and reliability of LIBOR and other benchmark interest rate submissions, including improving related internal controls.

“The integrity of LIBOR depends on truthful information provided by a select group of some of the world’s most important banks. The public is deprived of an honest benchmark interest rate when a group of traders sits around a desk for years falsely spinning their bank’s LIBOR submissions, trying to manufacture winning trades. That’s what happened at RBS,” said David Meister, the CFTC’s Director of Enforcement.

The Order finds that:

• As recently as 2010 and dating back to at least mid-2006, RBS made hundreds of attempts to manipulate Yen and Swiss Franc LIBOR, and made false LIBOR submissions to benefit its derivatives and money market trading positions; RBS succeeded at times in manipulating Yen and Swiss Franc LIBOR;

• At times, RBS aided and abetted other panel banks’ attempts to manipulate those same rates;

• The misconduct involved more than a dozen RBS derivatives and money market traders, one manager, and multiple offices around the world, including London, Singapore, and Tokyo; and

• The unlawful conduct continued even after RBS traders learned that a LIBOR investigation had been commenced by the CFTC.

With this Order, the CFTC has now imposed penalties of more than $1.2 billion on banks for manipulative conduct with respect to LIBOR submissions and other benchmark interest rates, and has required each bank to comply with undertakings specifying the factors upon which submissions should be made, including making the determination of submissions transactions focused, and requiring implementation of internal controls and policies needed to ensure the integrity and reliability of submissions. With the undertakings, each bank represents that its benchmark interest rate submissions “shall be based on a rigorous and honest assessment of information, and shall not be influenced by internal or external conflicts of interest, or other factors or information extraneous to any rules applicable to the setting of a [b]enchmark [i]nterest [r]ate,” according to the Order.

According to the CFTC’s Order against RBS, the various ways in which RBS conducted its manipulative scheme all followed a similar pattern. The profitability of RBS’s Yen and Swiss Franc derivatives positions, such as interest rate swaps, depended on Yen and Swiss Franc LIBOR, as did certain of RBS’s money market positions. RBS traders would ask their colleagues to make false LIBOR submissions that were beneficial to RBS’s trading positions. The traders’ requests were either for falsely high submissions or falsely low ones, whatever was needed to turn a profit. The submitters often accommodated those requests by making false submissions. Some of these submitters were even traders themselves, and skewed their LIBOR submissions to drive the profitability of their own money market and derivatives trading positions.

RBS created an environment for a number of years that eased the path to manipulation by placing derivatives traders and submitters together on the same desk, heightening the conflict of interest between the profit motives of the traders and the responsibility of submitters to make honest submissions. When derivatives traders and submitters eventually were separated (for business, not compliance reasons), the misconduct continued through Bloomberg chats and an internal instant messaging system.

According to the Order, RBS derivatives traders also unlawfully worked in concert with a trader from a UBS AG subsidiary (UBS), another LIBOR panel bank, in attempts to manipulate Yen LIBOR, and with a trader at another panel bank in attempts to manipulate Swiss Franc LIBOR. RBS also aided and abetted UBS’s attempts to manipulate Yen LIBOR by executing wash trades (trades that result in financial nullities) to generate extra brokerage commissions to compensate two interdealer brokers for assisting UBS in its unlawful manipulative conduct. On at least one occasion, RBS also requested the assistance of an interdealer broker to influence the submissions of multiple panel banks in an attempt to manipulate Yen LIBOR.

The Order finds that RBS attempted to manipulate Yen and Swiss Franc LIBOR even after questions arose in the media in 2007 and 2008 about the integrity of banks’ LIBOR submissions, LIBOR reviews and guidance by the British Banker’s Association in 2008 and 2009, and the CFTC’s request in April 2010 that RBS conduct an internal investigation relating to its U.S. Dollar LIBOR practices. In fact, certain RBS employees involved in the misconduct were aware of the LIBOR investigation, yet continued their manipulative conduct and tried to conceal the conduct by minimizing their use of written messages to conduct the scheme.

The Order further finds that RBS’s traders were able to carry out their many attempts to manipulate Yen and Swiss Franc LIBOR for years because RBS lacked internal controls, procedures and policies concerning its LIBOR submission processes, and failed to adequately supervise its trading desks and traders. RBS did not institute any meaningful controls, procedures or policies concerning LIBOR submissions until on or about June 2011. During this time, RBS was experiencing significant growth on its Yen and Swiss Franc trading desks, generating revenues for RBS that were multiplying over the years.

The CFTC Order also recognizes the cooperation of RBS with the Division of Enforcement in its investigation.

In related actions by the U.S. Department of Justice, RBS Securities Japan Limited agreed to plead guilty to a criminal charge of wire fraud, The Royal Bank of Scotland plc entered into a deferred prosecution agreement whereby it would continue to cooperate with the U.S. Department of Justice in exchange for the deferral of criminal wire fraud and antitrust charges, and RBS collectively accepted a penalty of $150 million. In addition, the United Kingdom Financial Services Authority (FSA) issued a Final Notice regarding its enforcement action against The Royal Bank of Scotland plc and imposed a penalty of £87.5 million, the equivalent of approximately $137 million.

The CFTC thanks and acknowledges the valuable assistance of the FSA, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Washington Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the Monetary Authority of Singapore, the Financial Services Agency of the Government of Japan, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, and the Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this case are Jonathan K. Huth, Aimée Latimer-Zayets, Brian G. Mulherin, Maura M. Viehmeyer, Rishi K. Gupta, Timothy M. Kirby, Terry Mayo, Elizabeth Padgett, Anne M. Termine, Philip P. Tumminio, Jason T. Wright, Gretchen L. Lowe, and Vincent A. McGonagle. CFTC Staff from the Division of Market Oversight and Office of the Chief Economist also assisted with the investigation of this matter.

 

EXAMPLES OF MISCONDUCT

Yen LIBOR Manipulative Conduct Within RBS:

August 20, 2007: (Emphasis added.) (RBS Order pp. 17-18.)

Yen Trader 4: where’s young [Yen Trader 1] thinking of setting it?

Yen Trader 1: where would you like it[,] libor that is[,] same as yesterday is call

Yen Trader 4: haha, glad you clarified ! mixed feelings but mostly I’d like it all lower so the world starts to make a little more sense.

Senior Yen Trader: the whole HF [hedge fund] world will be kissing you instead of calling me if libor move lower

Yen Trader 1: ok, i will move the curve down[,] 1bp[,] maybe more[,] if I can

Senior Yen Trader: maybe after tomorrow fixing hehehe

Yen Trader 1: fine[,] will go with same as yesterday then

Senior Yen Trader: cool

Yen Trader 1: maybe a touch higher tomorrow

August 20, 2007: (Emphasis added.) (Reflecting awareness of UBS conduct.) (RBS Order pp. 14-15.)

Senior Yen Trader: this libor setting is getting nutss

[…]

Bank A Trader: im puzzled as to why 3m libor fixing not coming off after the FED action

[…]

Bank B Trader: [UBS] is lending dolls through my currencies in 3 month do u see him doing the same in urs

[…]

Senior Yen Trader: yes[,] he always led usd in my mkt[,] the jpy libor is a cartel now

[…]

Senior Yen Trader: its just amazing how libor fixing can make you that much money

[…]

Senior Yen Trader: its a cartel now in london[.] they smack all the 1yr irs ..and fix it very high or low

December 5, 2007: (Emphasis added.) (RBS Order p. 15.)

Yen Trader 2: FYI libors higher again today

[…]

Yen Trader 4: ‘ucksake. keep ours low if poss. don’t understand why needs to go up in yen

Yen Trader 2: no reason dude[,] [Bank C] and [Bank D] went high yest

Yen Trader 4: send the boys round

[…]

Yen Manager: pure manipulation going on

April 2, 2008: (Emphasis added.) (RBS Order p. 10.)

Senior Yen Trader: nice libor[.] our 6m fixing move the entire fixing[.] hahahah

Yen Trader 1: the BBA called to ask me about that today

Senior Yen Trader: really?

Yen Trader 1: yes

Senior Yen Trader: they complain?

Yen Trader 1: asked to speak to me about the low 6m rate

Yen Trader 1: no[,] just to make sure i was happy with it

[…]

Senior Yen Trader: i think some banks must have complain

Yen Trader 1: he called b4 any of the other banks saw our data[,] at about 11.15[,] to check it was ok

Senior Yen Trader: oh then its fine

Yen Trader 1: before publishing

Senior Yen Trader: i am sure some HF [hedge fund] will complain tomorrow ..

Yen Trader 1: tough

Senior Yen Trader: we will say we lower every tenor ..1m 3m 6m ..we feel rbs name has very good credit ..no problem getting money in

Senior Yen Trader: good way to boost share price!

Senior Yen Trader: our 3m libor is at top end …6m at bottom end …just the ideal level!

September 3, 2009: (RBS Order p. 9.)

Senior Yen Trader: [Yen Trader 6], can you ask [Primary Submitter] to drop 3m Libor by 1 bps? hold 6m libor unchange [sic] thanks

Yen Trader 6: Yes[,] going over to his desk now[,] yup, 6s going unch, 3s will drop by 1

Senior Yen Trader: domo

September 14 and 15, 2009: (Emphasis added.) (Primary Submitter agrees to switch direction of submissions over two consecutive days.) (RBS Order p. 16.)

September 14:

Yen Trader 1: high 3s and 6s please

Primary Submitter: ok

September 15:

Yen Trader 1: can we lower our fixings today please [Primary Submitter]

Primary Submitter: make your mind up[,] haha , yes no probs

Yen Trader 1: im like a whores drawers

Yen Manager’s Participation

August 22, 2007: (RBS Order pp. 10-11, 18.)

Yen Manager: Hi Mate, where are u calling the 6m and 3s Libor today ?

Yen Trader 1: i put in 1.05 and 1.15

Yen Manager: ok cool...is that close to consensus ?

Yen Trader 1: i think my 3s are too high[,] 6s will prob be 1.13 too[,] but i wanted high fixes today

Yen Manager: ok cool[,] its all a random variable for us at this stage it is just we have some small fixings

Yen Trader 1: well let me know if you have any preferencves [sic][,] each day

Yen Manager: thx will do

December 3, 2007: (RBS Order p. 11.)

Yen Manager: for choice we want lower libors...let the [Money Market] guys know pls

Yen Trader 2: sure i am setting today as [Yen Trader 1] and cash guy off [Primary Submitter]

Yen Manager: great set it nice and low

Yen Trader 2: 1.02 in 6m or lower

Yen Manager: yeh lower

Yen Trader 2: 1.01 then cant really go much lower than that

Yen Manager: ok

Yen Trader 2: u care for 1m and 3m too[?] looks to me like fra map pretty flat

Yen Manager: lower generally dude

Yen Trader 2: cool

Yen Manager: within the acceptable bounds

Yen LIBOR Collusion With UBS:

February 15, 2007: (RBS Order p. 20.)

Yen Trader 2: how many people can u get to put this 1m libor low

UBS Yen Trader: well us[,] [Bank E,] and a few others i think

February 21, 2007: (RBS Order p. 20.)

Yen Trader 2: what ur guys calling 3s libor[?] we need to get some low fixes

UBS Yen Trader: .64[,] yes will ask for low low high[,] 1m 3m 6m

Yen Trader 2: our guy agrees but reckons it will be 67[,] not good

UBS Yen Trader: no way!

[…]

UBS Yen Trader: […] make sure your boys set low 1m and 3m

Yen Trader 2: will try though [Yen Trader 1/backup Yen LIBOR submitter] wants high 3s and 6s

UBS Yen Trader: we want high 6’s too? don’t let [Yen Trader 1] keep 3m high to help [Senior Yen Trader][,] i hate that guy

May 7, 2008: (RBS Order p. 21.)

UBS Yen Trader: Hi [Sterling Cash Trader] if this is you can you pls ask for a low 6m in jpy for the next few days[.] Hope you are ok, was good seeing you last week[.] Cheers [UBS Yen Trader]

Sterling Cash Trader: Hi mate, I mentioned it to our guy on Friday and he seemed to have no problem with it, so fingers crossed.

Swiss Franc LIBOR Manipulative Conduct Within RBS:

December 4, 2008: (Emphasis added.) (RBS Order p. 25-26.)

Swiss Franc Trader: can u put 6m swiss libor in low pls?

Primary Submitter: NO

Swiss Franc Trader: should have pushed the door harder

Primary Submitter: Whats it worth

Swiss Franc Trader: ive got some sushi rolls from yesterday?

[…]

Primary Submitter: ok low 6m , just for u

Swiss Franc Trader: wooooooohooooooo[,] 0.01%? thatd be awesome

Primary Submitter: 1.33

Swiss Franc Trader: perfect[.] u r a nice man

January 30, 2009: (RBS Order p. 26-27.)

Swiss Franc Trader: high 3m libors pls!!!!!!

Primary Submitter: 0.50??

Primary Submitter: 0.51

Primary Submitter: 0.52

Primary Submitter: 0.53

Swiss Franc Trader: 0.54

Swiss Franc Trader: 0.54

Swiss Franc Trader: 0.54

Swiss Franc Trader: 0.54

Swiss Franc Trader: 0.54

Swiss Franc Trader: 0.54

Swiss Franc Trader: 0.54

Swiss Franc Trader: 0.54

Swiss Franc Trader: and low 6m

Primary Submitter: Ok i get ya

Swiss Franc Trader: 0.65

Swiss Franc Trader: 0.65

Swiss Franc Trader: 0.65

Swiss Franc Trader: 0.65

Primary Submitter: ok

Primary Submitter: libors as requested

Swiss Franc Trader: you a top dog

May 5, 2009: (RBS Order p. 27.)

Swiss Franc Trader: can we get high 3m, low 6m pls!

Primary Submitter: maybe

Swiss Franc Trader: PPPPLLLLLEEEEEAAAAASSSSEEEEEE

Primary Submitter: ok 41 52

Swiss Franc Trader: perfect perfect

May 14, 2009: (Emphasis added.) (RBS Order p. 28-29.)

Swiss Franc Trader: [Primary Submitter] pls can we get super high 3m[,] super low 6m

Swiss Franc Trader: PRETTY PLEASE!

Primary Submitter: 41 & 51

Swiss Franc Trader: if u did that[,] i would lvoe [sic] u forever

Primary Submitter: 41 & 55 then …

Swiss Franc Trader: if u did that i would come over there and make love to you[,] your choice

Primary Submitter: 41+51 it is

Swiss Franc Trader: thouht [sic] so

Primary Submitter: so shallow

RBS Collusion With Interdealer Brokers:

June 26, 2009: (Emphasis added.) (RBS Order p. 24.)

Interdealer Broker B: Hello mate, [Yen Trader 1]? You all set?

Yen Trader 1: Yeah.

Interdealer Broker B: Right listen we’ve had a couple of words with them, you want them lower right?

Yen Trader 1: Yeah.

Interdealer Broker B: Alright okay, alright listen, we’ve had a couple words with them. You want them lower, right?

Yen Trader 1: Yeah.

Interdealer Broker B: Alright okay, alright, no we’re okay just confirming it. We’ve, so far we’ve spoke to [Bank F]. We’ve spoke to a couple of people so we’ll see where they come in alright. We’ve spoke, basically one second, basically we spoke to [Bank F], [Bank G], [Bank H], who else did I speak to? [Bank I]. There’s a couple of other people that the boys have spoke to but as a team we’ve basically said we want a bit lower so we’ll see where they come in alright?

Yen Trader 1: Cheers.

Interdealer Broker B: Cheers no worries mate.

March 3, 2010: (Emphasis added.) (Former Sterling Cash Trader now employed by Interdealer Broker A.) (RBS Order p. 22.)

Former Sterling Cash Trader: can i pick ur brain?

Primary Submitter: yeah

Former Sterling Cash Trader: u see 3m jpy libor going anywhere btween now and imm?

Primary Submitter: looks fairly static to be honest , poss more pressure on upside , but not alot

Former Sterling Cash Trader: oh[,] we hve a mutual friend who’d love to see it go down, no chance at all?

Primary Submitter: haha [former UBS Yen Trader at Bank C] by chance

Former Sterling Cash Trader: shhh

Primary Submitter: hehehe , mine should remain flat , always suits me if anything to go lower as i rcve funds

Former Sterling Cash Trader: gotcha, thanks, and, if u cud see ur way to a small drop there might be a steak in it for ya, haha

Primary Submitter: noted ;-)

Former Sterling Cash Trader: 8-)

RBS Yen Trader Engaged In Wash Trades to Compensate Brokers

September 19, 2008: (RBS Order p. 23.)

Interdealer Broker B: can you do me a favour … you’re not going to get paid any bro for this and we’ll send you lunch around for the whole desk. Can you flat…can you switch two years semi at 5 3/4 , 100 yards [meaning 100 billion] … between UBS. Just get … take it from UBS, give it back to UBS. He wants to pay some bro. We won’t bro you…

Yen Trader 1: Yeah, yeah

[…]

Interdealer Broker B: Yeah. Yeah. 100 yards … actually can you make it 150 and I’ll send lunch around for everybody?

Yen Trader 1: Yeah.

Interdealer Broker B: Thanks very much. Cheers. Cheers, mate and you choose lunch.

Continuing Conduct after Commencement of Investigation:

November 22, 2010: (Emphasis added.) (RBS Order p. 30.)

Senior Yen Trader: hey ...you think we be able to convince [Primary Submitter] to change the libor today?

Yen Trader 1: i can try

Senior Yen Trader: need to drop 3mth Libor and hike 6m Libor he dropped 6m by 2 bps last Friday

Yen Trader 1: at the moment the FED are all over us about libors

Senior Yen Trader: thats for the USD?

Yen Trader 1: ye[]s

Senior Yen Trader: dun think anyone cares the JPY libor

Yen Trader 1: not yet[,] i will walk over ot [sic] them

November 24, 2010: (Reflecting feigned refusal over Bloomberg Chat, immediately followed by agreement in telephone conversation.) (RBS Order pp. 30-31.)

Bloomberg Chat:

Senior Yen Trader: was wondering if it suits you guys on hiking up 1bp on the 6mth Libor in JPY ... it will help our position tremendously

Primary Submitter: how you doing with all the volatilities these days? ... to be honest happy with levels we see at the moment

Senior Yen Trader: ok no prob ... wouldn’t want to cause any problem ... thanks mate

Telephone Conversation:

Senior Yen Trader: Hello?

Primary Submitter: Morning, [Senior Yen Trader]? Hi, [Primary Submitter].

Senior Yen Trader: Yeah, how are you?

Primary Submitter: I’m pretty good sir. Very Good. We’re just not, we’re not allowed to have those conversations on [instant messages].

Senior Yen Trader: Oh, sorry about that. I didn’t know.

Primary Submitter: (laughter)

Senior Yen Trader: (laughter) Oh because of the, the BBA thing?

Primary Submitter: Yes, exactly.

Senior Yen Trader: Ah, ok ok.

Primary Submitter: So yeah, leave it with me, and uh, it won’t be a problem.

Senior Yen Trader: Ok, great.

CFTC vs. RBS Enforcement Order - 06.02.2013
CFTC vs. RBS Enforcement Order 020613.pd[...]
PDF-Dokument [2.4 MB]

Beschuldigungen des U.S. Department of Justice an RBS

Am 06.02.2013 beschuldigt verkündet das DoJ, dass sich mit RBS Securities Japan Limited das zweite Finanzinstitut des Libor-Betrugs für schuldig erklärt und zur Zahlung von $50 Mio Criminal Penalties verpflichtet hat und dass die RBS Parent Company ebenfalls Fehlverhalten in einem Deferred Prosecution Agreement zugegeben und sich zur Zahlung von $100 Mio verpflichtet hat: (In Englisch)

 

RBS Securities Japan Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of The Royal Bank of Scotland plc (RBS), has agreed to plead guilty to felony wire fraud and admit its role in manipulating the Japanese Yen London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), a leading benchmark used in financial products and transactions around the world, Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Scott D. Hammond of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division and Special Agent in Charge Timothy A. Gallagher of the FBI’s Washington Field Office Criminal Division announced today. 

A criminal information, being filed in U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, charges RBS Securities Japan with one count of wire fraud for engaging in a scheme to defraud counterparties to interest rate derivatives trades by secretly manipulating Yen LIBOR benchmark interest rates.  RBS Securities Japan has signed a plea agreement with the government admitting its criminal conduct, and has agreed to pay a $50 million fine.

In addition, the government is filing a criminal information in the District of Connecticut which charges parent company RBS as part of a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA).  The information charges RBS with wire fraud for its role in manipulating LIBOR benchmark interest rates, and with participation in a price-fixing conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act by rigging the Yen LIBOR benchmark interest rate with other banks.  The DPA requires the bank to admit and accept responsibility for its misconduct as described in an extensive statement of facts, to continue cooperating with the Justice Department in its ongoing investigation and to pay a $100 million penalty beyond the fine imposed upon RBS Securities Japan.  

Together with approximately $462 million in regulatory penalties and disgorgement – $325 million as a result of a Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) action and approximately $137 million as a result of a U.K. Financial Services Authority (FSA) action – the Justice Department’s criminal penalties bring the total amount of the resolution with RBS and RBS Securities Japan to approximately $612 million.

“As we have done with Barclays and UBS, we are today holding RBS accountable for a stunning abuse of trust,” said Assistant Attorney General Breuer.  “The bank has admitted to manipulating one of the cornerstone benchmark interest rates in our global financial system, and its Japanese subsidiary has agreed to plead guilty to felony wire fraud.  The department’s ongoing investigation has now yielded two guilty pleas by significant financial institutions.  These are extraordinary results, and our investigation is far from finished.  Our message is clear:  no financial institution is above the law.”

“RBS secretly rigged the benchmark interest rates upon which many transactions and consumer financial products are based,” said Deputy Assistant Attorney General Hammond. “RBS’ conduct not only harmed its unsuspecting counterparties, it undermined the integrity and the competitiveness of financial markets everywhere.”

“The manipulation of LIBOR by RBS and its subsidiary directly affected the rates referenced by financial products held by and on behalf of American companies and investors. The FBI works to uncover wrongdoing such as this in order to protect American consumers and the integrity of financial markets,” said Special Agent in Charge Gallagher.  “Today’s announcement is the result of the hard work of the FBI special agents, financial analysts, and forensic accountants as well as the prosecutors who dedicated significant time and resources to investigating this case.”

According to court documents, LIBOR is an average interest rate, calculated based upon submissions from leading banks around the world, reflecting the rates those banks believe they would be charged if borrowing from other banks.  LIBOR serves as the primary benchmark for short-term interest rates globally, and is used as a reference rate for many interest rate contracts, mortgages, credit cards, student loans and other consumer lending products.  The Bank of International Settlements estimated that as of the second half of 2009, outstanding interest rate contracts were valued at approximately $450 trillion. 

LIBOR, published by the British Bankers’ Association (BBA), a trade association based in London, is calculated for 10 currencies at 15 borrowing periods, known as maturities, ranging from overnight to one year.  The LIBOR for a given currency at a specific maturity is the result of a calculation based upon submissions from a panel of banks for that currency (the Contributor Panel) selected by the BBA.  From at least 2006 through 2010, RBS has been a member of the Contributor Panel for a number of currencies, including Yen LIBOR and Swiss Franc LIBOR, which are the focus of the plea agreement and DPA.

According to the DPA, at various times from at least 2006 through 2010, certain RBS Yen and Swiss Franc derivatives traders – whose compensation was directly connected to their success in trading financial products tied to LIBOR – engaged in efforts to move LIBOR in a direction favorable to their trading positions.  Through these schemes, RBS allegedly defrauded counterparties who were unaware of the manipulation affecting financial products referencing Yen and Swiss Franc LIBOR.  The alleged schemes included hundreds of instances in which RBS employees sought to influence LIBOR submissions in a manner favorable to their trading positions in two principal ways: internally at RBS through requests by derivatives traders for Yen and Swiss Franc LIBOR submissions, and externally through an agreement with a separately charged derivatives trader to request Yen LIBOR submissions.  The trader, Tom Alexander William Hayes, was formerly employed by a Japanese subsidiary of another Contributor Panel bank, UBS AG (UBS).

According to the DPA, RBS employees engaged in this conduct through electronic communications, which included both emails and electronic chats.  For example, in an electronic chat on March 16, 2009, an RBS Swiss Franc derivatives trader, (Trader-7), sought to benefit his trading book by asking the RBS LIBOR submitter (Submitter-1), “can we pls get a very very very low 3m [3 month] and 6m [6 month] fix today [please]” because “we have rather large fixings!”  Submitter-1 responded, “perfect, if that’s what u want.”  After thanking Submitter-1, Trader-7 informed Submitter-1 that “from tomorrow . . .  we need them thru the roof!!!!!” 

In another electronic chat on May 20, 2009, involving an RBS Yen derivatives trader, (“Trader-2”), Submitter-1, and others, the following exchange occurred:

 Trader-2: high 3s and low 6s pls [Submitter-1]

 Submitter-1: no problems

 Trader-2: grazias amigo . . . where will you lower 6s to?

 Submitter-1: 70

That day, RBS’s 6-month Yen LIBOR submission dropped two basis points from .72 to .70, before reverting to .72 the following two days.
 
RBS employees also allegedly furthered their collusive scheme with Hayes to fix the price of derivative instruments tied to Yen LIBOR through electronic communications.  For instance, in an electronic chat on April 20, 2007, Hayes requested that an RBS derivatives trader, (“Trader-3”), ask Submitter-1 for a low 3 month Yen LIBOR submission: 

Hayes: . . . if you could ask your guys to keep 3m low wd be massive help as long as it doesn’t interfere with your stuff . . . tx in adavance.

Approximately 30 minutes later, Hayes and Trader-3 had the following exchange:

Hayes:   mate did you manage to spk to your cash boys?

Trader-3:  yes u owe me they are going 65 and 71

Hayes:  thx mate yes i do . . . in fact i owe you big time

Approximately 45 minutes later, Hayes sent the following message to Trader-3:

Hayes:  mater they set 64! . . . thats beyond the call of duty!

* * * *
 Trader-3: no worries

By entering into a DPA with RBS, the Justice Department credits RBS’ cooperation in disclosing LIBOR misconduct within the financial institution, recognizes the significant remedial measures undertaken by RBS’ management to enhance internal controls, and acknowledges the additional reporting, disclosure and cooperation requirements undertaken by the bank.  The DPA does not prevent the Justice Department from prosecuting individuals for related conduct. 

The pending charges against Hayes are merely accusations and he is considered innocent unless and until proven guilty.

The prosecution of RBS is being handled by Deputy Chief Patrick Stokes and Trial Attorney Gary Winters of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section, and New York Field Office Assistant Chief Elizabeth Prewitt and Trial Attorneys Eric Schleef and Richard Powers of the Antitrust Division.  Deputy Chiefs Daniel Braun and William Stellmach, Assistant Chief Rebecca Rohr and Trial Attorneys Luke Marsh and Alex Berlin of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section, Trial Attorneys Daniel Tracer and Kristina Srica of the Antitrust Division, Jeremy Verlinda of the Antitrust Division’s Economic Analysis Group, Assistant U.S. Attorneys Eric Glover and Liam Brennan of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Connecticut and the Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs have also provided valuable assistance in this matter.  The investigation is being conducted by special agents, forensic accountants and intelligence analysts of the FBI’s Washington Field Office. 
 
The investigation leading to these cases has required, and has greatly benefited from, a diligent and wide-ranging cooperative effort among various enforcement agencies both in the United States and abroad.  The Justice Department acknowledges and expresses its deep appreciation for this assistance.  In particular, the CFTC’s Division of Enforcement referred this matter to the department and, along with the FSA, has played a major role in the investigation.  The Securities and Exchange Commission has also played a significant role in the LIBOR series of investigations.  Various agencies and enforcement authorities from other nations are also participating in different aspects of the broader investigation relating to LIBOR and other benchmark rates, and the department is grateful for their cooperation and assistance.

This prosecution is part of efforts underway by President Barack Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force.  President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes.  The task force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources.  The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch, and with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes. For more information about the task force visit: www.stopfraud.gov.
 

US DOJ - RBS Deferred Prosecution Agreement - 06.02.2013
US DOJ vs. RBS - Deferred Prosecution Ag[...]
PDF-Dokument [5.4 MB]
DoJ vs. RBS Plea Agreement and Statement of Facts - 06.02.2013
DoJ vs. RBS Plea and Statement of Facts [...]
PDF-Dokument [2.4 MB]

Beschuldigungen von FSA, CFTC, U.S. DoJ, Finma an UBS

Beschuldigungen der FSA an UBS

Am 19.12.2012 bestraft die FSA UBS mit £160 Mio für Fehlverhalten im Zusammenhang mit Libor und Euribor. Dies ist die größte jemals verfügte Strafe der FSA.

 

UBS’s breaches of the FSA’s requirements encompassed a number of issues, involved a significant number of employees and occurred over a period of years in a number of countries.  Between 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2010 the misconduct included:

  • UBS’s traders routinely making requests to the individuals at UBS responsible for determining its LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions to adjust their submissions to benefit the traders’ trading positions. 
  • Giving the roles of determining its LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions to traders whose positions made a profit or loss depending on the LIBOR / EURIBOR fixes. This combination of roles was a fundamental flaw in organisational structure given the inherent conflict of interest between these two roles. 
  • Colluding with interdealer brokers in co-ordinated attempts to influence Japanese Yen (JPY) LIBOR submissions made by other panel banks.  Corrupt brokerage payments were made to reward brokers for their efforts to manipulate the LIBOR submissions of panel banks. 
  • Colluding with individuals at other panel banks to get them to make JPY LIBOR submissions that benefited UBS’s trading positions. 
  • Adopting LIBOR submissions directives whose primary purpose was to protect the bank’s reputation by avoiding negative media attention about its submissions and speculation about its creditworthiness.  

The misconduct was extensive and widespread.  At least 2,000 requests for inappropriate submissions were documented – an unquantifiable number of oral requests, which by their nature would not be documented, were also made.  Manipulation was also discussed in internal open chat forums and group emails, and was widely known.  At least 45 individuals including traders, managers and senior managers were involved in, or aware of, the practice of attempting to influence submissions.  The routine and widespread manipulation of the submissions was not detected by Compliance or by Group Internal Audit, which undertook five audits of the relevant business area during the relevant period.

Even when the trading and submitting roles were split in Autumn 2009, UBS’s systems and controls did not prevent traders from camouflaging their requests as “market colour”.   Given the widespread and routine nature of the requests to change LIBOR and EURIBOR and the nature of the control failures, the FSA found that every LIBOR and EURIBOR submission, in currencies and tenors in which UBS traded during the relevant period, was at risk of having been improperly influenced to benefit derivatives trading positions.

The misconduct occurred in various locations around the world including Japan, Switzerland, the UK and the USA. 

Tracey McDermott, FSA director of enforcement and financial crime, said:

“The findings we have set out in our notice today do not make for pretty reading.  The integrity of benchmarks such as LIBOR and EURIBOR are of fundamental importance to both UK and international financial markets.  UBS traders and managers ignored this.  They manipulated UBS’s submissions in order to benefit their own positions and to protect UBS’s reputation, showing a total disregard for the millions of market participants around the world who were also affected by LIBOR and EURIBOR.  UBS’s misconduct was all the more serious because of the orchestrated attempts to manipulate the JPY LIBOR submissions of other banks as well as its own and the collusion with interdealer brokers and other panel banks in coordinated efforts to manipulate the fix. 

“Over an extended period UBS allowed this to happen through its failure to control its business appropriately to ensure that LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions properly reflected the relevant requirements.  There should be no doubt about how seriously the FSA views these failings.  This is our largest penalty to date and demonstrates our commitment to ensuring that those in the wholesale markets do not put their own interests above those of the markets as a whole.”

The FSA continues to pursue a number of other significant cross-border investigations in relation to LIBOR and EURIBOR.

UBS did not qualify for the full 30% discount available for early settlement under the FSA’s settlement discount scheme (known as “Stage One”).  Because settlement was reached in the second phase of the discount scheme (known as “Stage Two”), UBS received a reduced discount of 20%.  Without the discount the fine would have been £200 million.

This was a significant cross-border investigation and, in particular, the FSA would like to thank the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) (together with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)), the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for their co-operation. 

FSA vs. UBS Final Notice - 19.12.2012
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Beschuldigungen der CFTC an UBS

Am 19.12.2012 verfügt die CFTC eine $700 Mio Zivilstrafe für UBS AG und UBS Securities Japan Co. Ltd. wegen der Vergehen der Manipulation, versuchte Manipulation und falschmeldung der Libor- und anderer Referenzzinsätze.

 

Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) announced an Order today against UBS AG and UBS Securities Japan Co., Ltd. (together “UBS” or the “Bank”), bringing and settling charges of manipulation, attempted manipulation and false reporting of certain global benchmark interest rates. These benchmarks, which are enormously significant to the American public and to financial markets, are the basis for hundreds of trillions of dollars of swaps transactions, commercial and consumer loans, futures contracts, and other financial derivatives products traded in over-the-counter markets and exchanges around the world. The Order requires UBS to pay a $700 million civil monetary penalty, cease and desist from further violations as charged, and take specified steps to ensure the integrity and reliability of its LIBOR and other benchmark interest rate submissions and improve related internal controls.

In summary, CFTC’s Order finds:

• For at least six years UBS regularly tried to manipulate multiple benchmark interest rates for profit, and at times succeeded in manipulating the official fixing of Yen LIBOR;

• More than 2,000 instances of unlawful conduct involving dozens of UBS employees, colluding with other panel banks, and inducing interdealer brokers to spread false information and influence other banks; and

• UBS made false U.S. Dollar LIBOR and other submissions to protect its reputation during the global financial crisis.

“As our action today makes clear, when a major bank brazenly games some of the world’s most important financial benchmarks, the CFTC will respond with the full force of its authority,” said David Meister, the CFTC’s Director of Enforcement. “The American public, as well as people and companies around the globe, rely on interest rate benchmarks every day for mortgages, loans and other transactions, trusting that the underlying benchmark rates are honest. Market integrity is seriously compromised where, as here, a bank spins its rate submissions to boost trading profits, pays off a network of brokers to disseminate false rate information, or makes false submissions to protect its reputation.”

According to the Order, from at least 2005 to at least 2010, UBS engaged in two overarching courses of unlawful conduct that undermined the integrity of the London Interbank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”), the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (“Euribor”), the Euroyen Tokyo Interbank Offered Rate (“Euroyen TIBOR”), and other interest rate benchmarks.Each of these benchmarks is supposed to reflect or relate to the true costs of borrowing unsecured funds in the relevant interbank market, and as demonstrated by the CFTC’s Order, during the relevant period, UBS’s submissions for these benchmark interest rates often did not.

Specifically, today’s enforcement action states:

• From at least January 2005 to at least June 2010, acting through more than three dozen employees around the world including a number of senior managers, UBS attempted to manipulate these benchmarks in UBS’s favor, to enhance the profits the Bank earned from trading benchmark-based derivatives. UBS regularly, and for certain benchmarks sometimes daily, made false rate submissions. Moreover, with respect to Yen LIBOR and Euroyen TIBOR, UBS colluded with at least four other panel banks to make false submissions, and induced at least five interdealer brokers to disseminate false information or otherwise influence other panel banks’ submissions. The Order also finds that UBS sometimes successfully manipulated the official fixing of Yen LIBOR.

• From August 2007 through mid-2009, during the global financial crisis, UBS managers directed that the Bank’s U.S. Dollar LIBOR and certain other submissions be tailored to protect the Bank’s reputation and avoid what it perceived to be unfair speculation about its fundraising ability and creditworthiness. The first wrongful direction was for the submissions to “err on the low side.” Later, the directions were revised to place UBS in “the middle of the pack” of panel bank submissions. According to the Order, these directions, at times, caused UBS’s U.S. Dollar LIBOR and other benchmark submissions to be knowingly false.

UBS engaged in all of this misconduct even after it was on notice in October 2008 of the CFTC’s investigation of UBS. The Order finds that the conduct came to light only after UBS began an internal inquiry upon the request of the CFTC in April 2010. The unlawful conduct by UBS is described in more detail below. Attached to this release are excerpts of quotations from the numerous UBS communications evidencing the unlawful conduct.

Manipulative Conduct For Profit

As detailed in the Order, from at least January 2005 through at least June 2010, UBS routinely skewed its submissions for Yen, Swiss Franc, Sterling and Euro LIBOR, Euribor, and, at times, Euroyen TIBOR, to benefit UBS’s derivatives trading positions that were tied to those particular benchmarks. This unlawful conduct involved more than three dozen traders and submitters located in many offices, from London to Zurich to Tokyo, and elsewhere. Several UBS managers participated in or knew that this was a routine practice of the traders, and did nothing to stop it.

According to the Order, UBS’s interest rate submissions were determined by inherently conflicted UBS derivatives traders, who, not only determined the rates to submit, but also traded derivatives for UBS’s profit based on the same benchmarks. The Order finds that, in deciding what rates to submit, these traders often took into consideration how their trading positions might benefit, and also routinely accommodated requests of other UBS derivatives traders to make similarly beneficial submissions.

The Senior Yen Trader and Interdealer Brokers

The Order sets forth the particularly extensive unlawful activity of one UBS senior Yen trader (“Senior Yen Trader”), known as one of the most significant traders in the Yen market, who generated hundreds of millions of dollars in trading revenue for UBS. The Senior Yen Trader orchestrated a massive, multi-year course of conduct to manipulate Yen LIBOR almost daily at times, and Euroyen TIBOR less frequently. In three years, the Senior Yen Trader, along with other UBS employees made approximately 2000 requests by email or in written chats alone, to manipulate Yen LIBOR, accounting for 75% of the days in which Yen LIBOR submissions were made by UBS during that period. At times, the Senior Yen Trader conducted sustained manipulative operations for weeks to move Yen LIBOR in the direction he needed; these operations were given names such as “the Turn Campaign” and “Operation 6m.”

The Senior Yen Trader used at least three manipulative strategies: (i) he wrongfully induced at least five interdealer brokers to assist with his manipulative scheme; (ii) he had UBS submitters make submissions reflecting his preferred rates; and (iii) he cultivated prior working relationships and friendships with derivatives traders from at least four other banks and had them make requests of their banks’ own Yen LIBOR submitters based on his preferred rates.

With respect to interdealer brokers, who act as intermediates to cash and derivatives transactions for their bank clients, the Order finds that the Senior Yen Trader induced such brokers to employ various unlawful methods tailored to drive the submissions of other panel banks to achieve the rates that would benefit the Senior Yen Trader’s derivatives positions. Thus, from late 2006 to late 2009, he made requests of interdealer brokers to: (i) disseminate false “run-throughs” of suggested Yen LIBOR to panel bank submitters, whom a broker once referred to as “sheep” following the information; (ii) contact other panel bank submitters to influence their submissions; (iii) publish false market cash rates on dedicated electronic screens available to the brokers’ bank clients; and (iv) “spoof,” i.e., make fake bids and offers, to influence submissions of other panel bank submitters. To secure the cooperation of interdealer brokers, the Senior Yen Trader took steps to make sure the brokers were compensated, or sometimes threatened to steer his business away from them. The compensation took the form of additional trades or even wash trades that generated broker commissions, and certain individuals at one broker received approximately $216,000 from UBS in paid fees/bonuses, which were shared over approximately two years in return for their unlawful assistance.

According to the Order, in making requests of UBS submitters for beneficial submissions, the Senior Yen Trader was sometimes careful not to cause a conflict with trading positions held by the UBS Yen submitters who were helping him. He sometimes reconciled conflicts by executing transactions to offset any negative impact on the submitters’ positions. This was all to make sure that the UBS employees involved with the scheme, as one submitter commented, were “one happy family.”

Management Directions to Protect UBS’s Reputation Caused False Submissions

As set forth in the Order, with the onset of the global financial crisis, the media focused on the financial well-being of the world’s major financial institutions and analyzed LIBOR submissions, among other market indicators, to ascertain a panel bank’s strength and ability to borrow funds. Questions arose in the media about the integrity of the panel banks’ submissions. In response, from early August 2007 to at least mid-2009, certain managers in UBS Group Treasury and Asset and Liability Management (“ALM”) issued directions to UBS’s submitters to tailor UBS benchmark interest rate submissions to ward off negative public and media perceptions about UBS. These directions, at times, resulted in false submissions for U.S. Dollar LIBOR, LIBORs for other currencies, Euribor, and Euroyen TIBOR, because the submissions did not solely reflect UBS’s assessment of the borrowing costs of unsecured funds in the relevant interbank markets, as required.

At first, in August 2007, the management directions were to “err on the low side” of panel bank submissions. UBS’s U.S. Dollar LIBOR submissions immediately moved to the lowest quartile of panel submissions and remained there for a sustained period. UBS continued to make low submissions that suggested it could borrow at such low rates even though at the same time it was suffering from negative credit events such as reporting negative revenues in October 2007, a significant write down of assets in December 2007, losses in the first quarter of 2008, and a credit rating downgrade. As one senior UBS employee commented at the time, “senior management want to show the world we are the strongest bank with loads of liquidity.”

In April 2008, after the Wall Street Journal questioned the integrity of low submissions by the panel banks, such as UBS, managers in Group Treasury and ALM directed that UBS’s submissions be made “in the middle of the pack” of panel banks submissions. That direction was followed and, at times, enforced, notwithstanding disagreement or resistance on some occasions by the submitters. From June 2008 through at least the first half of 2009, UBS’s submissions were in the “middle of the pack” virtually every day, even after events suggesting that the submissions should have been higher, such as UBS’s receipt of more than $125 billion in infusions and loans from the Swiss government and the Swiss National Bank, and from liquidity programs of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, and the Bank’s $7.59 billion loss in the fourth quarter of 2008.

UBS’s Obligations to Ensure Integrity and Reliability of Benchmark Interest Rates

In addition to the $700 million penalty, the CFTC Order requires UBS to implement measures to ensure that its submissions are transaction-focused, based upon a rigorous and honest assessment of information, and not influenced by conflicts of interest. See pages 60-73 of the CFTC’s Order. Among other things, the Order requires UBS to:

• Make its submissions based on certain specified factors, with UBS’s transactions being given the greatest weight, subject to certain specified adjustments and considerations;

• Implement firewalls to prevent improper communications including between traders and submitters;

• Prepare and retain certain documents concerning submissions, and retain relevant communications;

• Implement auditing, monitoring and training measures concerning its submissions and related processes;

• Make regular reports to the CFTC concerning compliance with the terms of the Order;

• Use best efforts to encourage the development of rigorous standards for benchmark interest rates; and

• Continue to cooperate with the CFTC.

* * * *

The CFTC Order also recognizes the cooperation of UBS with the Division of Enforcement in its investigation, as of late December 2010.

In related matters concerning the U.S. Justice Department, UBS Securities Japan Co., Ltd., agreed to plead guilty to a criminal charge of wire fraud, UBS AG agreed pursuant to a non-prosecution agreement to continue to cooperate with the Justice Department, and UBS AG and UBS Securities Japan Co., Ltd. agreed to make payments that when combined total $500 million. In addition, the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority (“FSA”) issued a Final Notice regarding its enforcement action against UBS AG and has imposed a penalty of £160 million, the equivalent of $259.2 million, against the Bank; the Swiss Financial Market Authority (“FINMA”) issued an order resolving proceedings against UBS AG and requiring disgorgement of 59 million Swiss Francs, the equivalent of $64.3 million.

The CFTC thanks and acknowledges the valuable assistance of U.S. law enforcement and regulatory authorities, the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Washington Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as well as the CFTC’s foreign counterparts in this matter ─ the FSA, FINMA, and the Japanese Financial Services Agency.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this case are Philip P. Tumminio, Anne M. Termine, Rishi K. Gupta, Jonathan K. Huth, Timothy M. Kirby, Aimée Latimer-Zayets, Terry Mayo, Brian G. Mulherin, Elizabeth Padgett, Maura M. Viehmeyer, Jason Wright, Gretchen L. Lowe, and Vincent A. McGonagle. CFTC Staff from the Division of Market Oversight and Office of the Chief Economist also assisted with the investigation of this matter.

CFTC vs. UBS Enforcement Order - 19.12.2012
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CFTC vs. UBS Examples of Misconduct - 19.12.2013
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Beschuldigungen des U.S. DoJ an UBS

Am 19.12.2012 verfügt das U.S. Department of Justice eine $100 Mio Kriminalstrafe gegen UBS Securities Japan Co. Ltd. wegen schwerem Überweisungsbetrug für andauernden Manipulation von Libor. Ferner werden zwei frühere UBS-Händler angeklagt.

 

UBS Securities Japan Co. Ltd. (UBS Japan), an investment bank, financial advisory securities firm and wholly-owned subsidiary of UBS AG, has agreed to plead guilty to felony wire fraud and admit its role in manipulating the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), a leading benchmark used in financial products and transactions around the world, Attorney General Eric Holder announced today. The criminal information, filed today in U.S. District Court in the District of Connecticut, charges UBS Japan with one count of engaging in a scheme to defraud counterparties to interest rate derivatives trades by secretly manipulating LIBOR benchmark interest rates.

 

As part of the ongoing criminal investigation by the Criminal and Antitrust Divisions of the Justice Department and the FBI into LIBOR manipulation, two former senior UBS traders also are charged. Tom Alexander William Hayes, 33, of England, and Roger Darin, 41, of Switzerland, were both charged with conspiracy in a criminal complaint unsealed in Manhattan federal court earlier today. Hayes is also charged with wire fraud, based on the same scheme, and a price fixing violation arising from his collusive activity with another bank to manipulate LIBOR benchmark rates.

 

UBS Japan has signed a plea agreement with the government admitting its criminal conduct, and has agreed to pay a $100 million fine. In addition, UBS AG, the parent company of UBS Japan headquartered in Zurich, has entered into a non-prosecution agreement (NPA) with the government requiring UBS AG to pay an additional $400 million penalty, to admit and accept responsibility for its misconduct as set forth in an extensive statement of facts and to continue cooperating with the Justice Department in its ongoing investigation. The NPA reflects UBS AG’s substantial cooperation in discovering and disclosing LIBOR misconduct within the financial institution and recognizes the significant remedial measures undertaken by new management to enhance internal controls.

 

Together with approximately $1 billion in regulatory penalties and disgorgement – $700 million as a result of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) action; $259.2 million as a result of the U.K. Financial Services Authority (FSA) action; and $64.3 million as a result of the Swiss Financial Markets Authority (FINMA) action – the Justice Department’s criminal penalties bring the total amount of the resolution to more than $1.5 billion.

 

“By causing UBS and other financial institutions to spread false and misleading information about LIBOR, the alleged conspirators we’ve charged – along with others at UBS – manipulated the benchmark interest rate upon which many transactions and consumer financial products are based. They defrauded the company’s counterparties of millions of dollars. And they did so primarily to reap increased profits, and secure bigger bonuses, for themselves,” said Attorney General Holder. “Today’s announcement – and $1.5 billion global resolution – underscores the Justice Department’s firm commitment to investigating and prosecuting such conduct, and to holding the perpetrators of these crimes accountable for their actions.”

 

“UBS manipulated one of the cornerstone interest rates in our global financial system,” said Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “The scheme alleged is epic in scale, involving people who have walked the halls of some of the most powerful banks in the world. Today’s agreement by UBS Japan to plead guilty, the charges against individual alleged perpetrators of these crimes, and our agreement recognizing the steps being taken by UBS AG to right itself demonstrate the Justice Department’s determination to hold accountable those in the financial marketplace who break the law. We cannot, and we will not, tolerate misconduct on Wall Street of the kind admitted to by UBS today, and by Barclays last June. We will continue to follow the facts and the law wherever they lead us in this matter, as we do in every case.”

 

“The criminal complaint charges two senior UBS traders with colluding to manipulate Yen LIBOR interest rates for the purpose of improving trading positions held by Hayes and UBS,” said Deputy Assistant Attorney General Scott D. Hammond of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. “Coordinating the movement of interest rates even by a very small margin meant higher profits and bigger bonuses for the conspirators at the expense of those that relied on LIBOR as a reference rate.”

 

“The manipulation of LIBOR affects financial products including mortgages, credit cards, student loans and many other interest rate products,” said FBI Associate Deputy Director Kevin L. Perkins. “This practice further erodes Main Street’s confidence in Wall Street. The public expects our financial institutions to maintain proper oversight of their businesses and to ensure the public is not harmed by criminal activity within these institutions. In this case, UBS acknowledged its failures and cooperated with our investigation. The FBI would like to thank its federal partners in this investigation – the Department of Justice Criminal Division’s Fraud Section and Antitrust Division, Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s Division of Enforcement and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of Enforcement whose joint efforts brought a successful resolution to this matter.”

According to documents filed in these cases, LIBOR is an average interest rate, calculated based on submissions from leading banks around the world, reflecting the rates those banks believe they would be charged if borrowing from other banks. LIBOR serves as the primary benchmark for short-term interest rates globally, and is used as a reference rate for many interest rate contracts, mortgages, credit cards, student loans and other consumer lending products. The Bank of International Settlements estimated that as of the second half of 2009, outstanding interest rate contracts were estimated at approximately $450 trillion.

 

LIBOR, published by the British Bankers’ Association (BBA), a trade association based in London, is calculated for 10 currencies at 15 borrowing periods, known as maturities, ranging from overnight to one year. The LIBOR for a given currency at a specific maturity is the result of a calculation based upon submissions from a panel of banks.

 

Between July 2006 and September 2009, Hayes was a senior trader employed in the Tokyo office of UBS Japan, which then operated under the name UBS Securities Japan Ltd. Among other financial products, Hayes traded in interest rate derivatives that essentially consisted of bets against other traders on the direction in which Yen LIBOR would move. UBS was a member of the Yen LIBOR panel, and Darin was, at certain times relevant to the criminal complaint, a trader responsible for making and supervising LIBOR submissions to the BBA on behalf of the bank. In a statement of facts attached to the NPA and plea agreement, Hayes is referred to as “Trader-1” and Darin is referred to as “Submitter-1.”

 

Beginning in September 2006, UBS Japan and Hayes orchestrated a sustained, wide-ranging and systematic scheme to move Yen LIBOR in a direction favorable to Hayes’ trading positions, defrauding UBS’ counterparties and harming others with financial products referencing Yen LIBOR who were unaware of the manipulation. Between November 2006 and August 2009, Hayes or one of his colleagues endeavored to manipulate Yen LIBOR on at least 335 of the 738 trading days in that period, and during some periods on almost a daily basis. Because of the large size of Hayes’ trading positions, even slight moves of a fraction of a percent in Yen LIBOR could generate large profits. For example, Hayes once estimated that a 0.01 percent movement in the final Yen LIBOR fixing on a specific date could result in a $2 million profit for UBS.

 

According to the charging documents, UBS Japan and Hayes employed three strategies to execute the scheme: from November 2006 through September 2009, Hayes conspired with Darin and others within UBS to cause the bank to make false and misleading Yen LIBOR submissions to the BBA; also, Hayes caused cash brokerage firms, which purported to provide market information regarding LIBOR to panel banks, to disseminate false and misleading information about short-term interest rates for Yen, which those banks could and did rely upon in formulating their own LIBOR submissions to the BBA; and Hayes communicated with interest rate derivatives traders employed at three other Yen LIBOR panel banks in an effort to cause them to make false and misleading Yen LIBOR submissions to the BBA.

 

As alleged in the charging documents, Hayes, Darin and other co-conspirators often executed their scheme through electronic chats. On Nov. 20, 2006, for example, Hayes asked a UBS Yen LIBOR submitter who was substituting for Darin, “hi . . . [Darin] and I generally coordinate ie sometimes trade if ity [sic] suits, otherwise skew the libors a bit.” Hayes went on to request, “really need high 6m [6-month] fixes till Thursday.” The submitter responded, “yep we on the case there . . . will def[initely] be on the high side.” The day before this request, UBS’s 6-month Yen LIBOR submission had been tied with the lowest submissions included in the calculation of the LIBOR fix. Immediately after this request for high submissions, however, UBS’s 6-monthYen LIBOR submissions rose to the highest submission of any bank in the contributor panel and remained tied for the highest, precisely as Hayes had requested.

 

Another example of such an alleged accommodation occurred on March 29, 2007, when Hayes asked Darin, “can we go low 3[month] and 6[month] pls? . . . 3[month] esp.” Darin responded “ok”, and the two had the following exchange:

 

Hayes: what are we going to set?

 

Darin: too early to say yet . . . prob[ably] .69 would be our unbiased contribution

 

Hayes: ok wd really help if we cld keep 3m low pls

 

Darin: as i said before - i [don’t] mind helping on your fixings, but i'm not setting libor 7bp away from the truth. . . i'll get ubs banned if i do that, no interest in that.

 

Hayes: ok obviousl;y [sic] no int[erest] in that happening either . . . not asking for it to be 7bp from reality anyway any help appreciated[.]

 

Hayes received the help he requested.

 

In addition, the criminal complaint charges Hayes with colluding with a trader employed at another LIBOR panel bank in May 2009, in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Hayes allegedly engaged in the collusive scheme to fix the price of derivative instruments whose price was based on Yen LIBOR. In electronic chats, Hayes asked the trader to move 6-month Yen LIBOR up due to a “gigantic” position Hayes had taken. For the trade in question, UBS trading records confirmed that each 0.01 percent movement in LIBOR would generate profits of approximately $459,000 for Hayes’ book. The trader at the other bank responded that he would comply, and his bank’s submission moved by 0.06 percent compared to its submission the previous day, for which Hayes thanked him.

 

In entering into the NPA with UBS AG, the Justice Department considered information from UBS, and from regulatory agencies in Switzerland and Japan, demonstrating that in the last two years UBS has made important and positive changes in its management, compliance and training to ensure adherence to the law. T he department received favorable reports from the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) and the Japan Financial Services Authority (JFSA) describing, respectively, progress that UBS has made in its approach to compliance and enforcement and UBS Japan’s effective implementation of the remedial measures the JFSA imposed based on findings relating to the attempted manipulation of Yen benchmarks.

 

The investigation is being handled by Deputy Chiefs William Stellmach and Daniel Braun and Trial Attorney Luke Marsh of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section, and Assistant Chief Elizabeth Prewitt and Trial Attorney Richard Powers of the Antitrust Division, New York Field Office. Assistant Chief Rebecca Rohr and Trial Attorneys Alexander Berlin and Thomas Hall of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section, Trial Attorneys Portia Brown and Wendy Norman of the Antitrust Division, and Assistant U.S. Attorneys Eric Glover and Liam Brennan of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Connecticut have also provided valuable assistance. The Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs also provided assistance in this matter. The investigation is being conducted by the FBI’s Washington Field Office.

 

The investigation leading to these cases has required, and has greatly benefited from, a diligent and wide-ranging cooperative effort among various enforcement agencies both in the United States and abroad. The Justice Department acknowledges and expresses its deep appreciation for this assistance. In particular, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s Division of Enforcement referred this matter to the Department and, along with the FSA, has played a major role in the investigation. The Securities and Exchange Commission has also played a significant role in the LIBOR series of investigations and, among other efforts, has made an invaluable contribution to the investigation relating to UBS. The Department of Justice also wishes to acknowledge and thank FINMA, the Japanese Ministry of Justice, and the JFSA. Various agencies and enforcement authorities from other nations are also participating in different aspects of the broader investigation relating to LIBOR and other benchmark rates, and the Department is grateful for their cooperation and assistance.

This prosecution is part of efforts underway by President Barack Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force. President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. The task force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources. The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch, and with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes. For more information about the task force visit: www.stopfraud.gov . 

DoJ vs. UBS Agreement - 19.12.2012
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DoJ vs. UBS Statement of Facts - 19.12.2012
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DoJ vs. UBS Plea Agreement - 19.12.2012
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DoJ vs. Hayes and Darin Complaint - 19.12.2012
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DoJ vs. Hayes et al Complaint Exhibits - 19.12.2012
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Beschuldigungen der Schweizer Finma an UBS

Am 19.12.2012 beendet die Eidgenössische Finanzmarktaufsicht FINMA ihr Verfahren gegen die UBS AG im Zusammenhang mit der Eingabe von Zinssätzen, insbesondere für den London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). Die FINMA stellt fest, dass die UBS in schwerer Weise gegen schweizerische Finanzmarktgesetze verstossen hat und ordnet Massnahmen zur Verbesserung der entsprechenden Prozesse an. Die FINMA ordnet die Einziehung von Gewinnen zugunsten des Bundes in der Höhe von CHF 59 Millionen an.

 

Nach eingehenden Vorabklärungen untersuchte die FINMA in einem Enforcementverfahren, ob die UBS bei der Eingabe von Zinssätzen in der Schweiz oder im Ausland schweizerisches Aufsichtsrecht verletzt hatte. Dies geschah in enger Abstimmung und Zusammenarbeit mit verschiedenen ausländischen Behörden. Die FINMA konzentrierte sich in ihrem Verfahren auf den Zeitraum von 2006 bis 2010 und namentlich auf drei Bereiche:

  • Einflussnahmen auf die Eingabe von Zinssätzen zur Begünstigung eigener Handelspositionen
  • Richtungsvorgaben zur Eingabe von Zinssätzen aus Reputationsüberlegungen während der Finanzkrise
  • Kontrollsysteme der UBS im Zusammenhang mit der Eingabe von Zinssätzen

Gravierende Fälle von Einflussnahme zur Begünstigung eigener Handelspositionen
 Im untersuchten Zeitraum ersuchten UBS-Händler die Mitarbeitenden der Bank, die für die Eingabe der Zinssätze verantwortlich waren, in zahlreichen Fällen um die Eingabe höherer oder tieferer Werte. Damit versuchten die Händler die Eingaben so zu beeinflussen, dass UBS-Eigenhandelspositionen begünstigt wurden. Zudem verfolgten die Händler selbst beträchtliche Eigeninteressen. Belegt ist, dass ein grosser Teil solcher Anfragen von den für die Libor-Eingaben verantwortlichen Mitarbeitenden in Zürich und London akzeptiert wurde; nur in Einzelfällen kam es nachweisbar zur Ablehnung solcher Anfragen. Ein Grossteil dieser Anfragen geht auf einen einzelnen Händler zurück, der von 2006 bis 2009 in Tokio tätig war. Derselbe Händler fragte auch Mitarbeitende von Drittbanken und unabhängige Makler an, um damit die LIBOR-Eingaben von Drittbanken zu beeinflussen.

Unangebrachte Richtungsvorgaben während der Finanzkrise
Zu verschiedenen Zeitpunkten in den Jahren 2007 und 2008 erteilten Kadermitarbeitende der UBS den bankintern für die Eingabe von Zinssätzen verantwortlichen Mitarbeitenden unangemessene Richtungsvorgaben. Damit wurde bezweckt, die Wahrnehmung der Kreditwürdigkeit der UBS positiv zu beeinflussen.

Mängel in den Kontrollsystemen
Erhebliche Mängel im Bereich der Systeme und Kontrollen bei LIBOR-Submissionen innerhalb der UBS verhinderten, dass die unzulässigen Einflussnahmen aufgedeckt wurden und die Bank angemessen reagieren konnte. So waren interne Richtlinien, sofern sie überhaupt existierten, entweder mangelhaft oder wurden nicht konsequent umgesetzt. Zudem kontrollierten die zuständigen Vorgesetzten den Eingabeprozess ungenügend. Schliesslich deckten auch interne Überprüfungen durch die Compliance-Abteilung und die interne Revision das Fehlverhalten nicht auf.

Verfahren und Massnahmen der FINMA
In das geschilderte Fehlverhalten waren zahlreiche Mitarbeitende und eine begrenzte Anzahl von Führungskräften involviert. Die FINMA fand keine Hinweise, dass das damalige Topmanagement der UBS vom Fehlverhalten bei Händleranfragen oder von der Einflussnahme aus Reputationsgründen Kenntnis hatte.
Die FINMA stellt eine schwere Verletzung des Gewährs- und des Organisationserfordernisses durch die UBS fest. Ausgehend von ihrer Zuständigkeit für die konsolidierte Aufsicht der UBS-Gruppe weist die FINMA die Bank an, eine Reihe von Massnahmen umzusetzen, welche die Prozesse und Kontrollen für die Eingabe von Zinssätzen verbessern. Die FINMA wird die konkrete Umsetzung der von ihr angeordneten Massnahmen bei der UBS eng begleiten. Die Bank hat in diesem Zusammenhang bereits zahlreiche organisatorische und personelle Massnahmen ergriffen. Die FINMA ordnet zudem die Einziehung von Gewinnen zugunsten des Bundes in der Höhe von CHF 59 Millionen an. Der Entscheid der FINMA kann beim Bundesverwaltungsgericht angefochten werden.
Die Verantwortung für das Verfahren und die vorangehenden Vorabklärungen lag beim General Counsel der FINMA. Mark Branson, Leiter Geschäftsbereich Banken, befand sich angesichts seiner leitenden Stellung bei UBS in Japan in den Jahren 2006/2007 während der gesamten Verfahrensdauer in einem strikten Ausstand. Er war nicht über den Gang der aufsichtsrechtlichen Untersuchung informiert und war auch nicht an den diesbezüglichen Entscheidungen der FINMA beteiligt. Damit trägt die FINMA der Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichts Rechnung, wonach bereits jeder Anschein von Befangenheit zu vermeiden ist.

Weitere Verfahren im Zusammenhang mit LIBOR und anderen Referenzzinssätzen
Zeitgleich mit dem Verfahren der FINMA erfolgten auch Untersuchungen der britischen Aufsichts-behörde Financial Services Authority (FSA), der amerikanischen Wertpapieraufsichtsbehörde Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) sowie des U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ). Die FINMA tauschte sich mit ausländischen Behörden über die etablierten Amtshilfekanäle aus.
Der LIBOR gilt als weltweit wichtigster Referenzzinssatz für Zinsen in unterschiedlichen Währungen. Er wird durch die British Bankers’ Association (BBA) verwaltet. Gewinne oder Verluste von vielen Zinsprodukten hängen von Veränderungen des LIBOR ab. Seit 2008 wurden Banken, die zur Berechnung von LIBOR und anderen Referenzzinssätzen beitrugen, Falscheingaben vorgeworfen. Zurzeit ermitteln Aufsichts-, Straf- und Wettbewerbsbehörden in mehreren Ländern gegen mehr als ein Dutzend Banken im Zusammenhang mit mutmasslichen Manipulationen von Referenzzinssätzen.

Finma vs. UBS Summary Report UBS Libor - 19.12.2012
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PDF-Dokument [195.5 KB]

Beschuldigungen von FSA, CFTC und U.S. DoJ an Barclays

Beschuldigungen der FSA

Barclays wird des Vergehens ("Misconduct") in Bezug auf die London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) und den Euro Inberbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR) beschuldigt: (In Englisch)

  

Barclays’ breaches of the FSA’s requirements encompassed a number of issues, involved a significant number of employees and occurred over a number of years.  Barclays’ misconduct included:

  • making submissions which formed part of the LIBOR and EURIBOR setting process that took into account requests from Barclays’ interest rate derivatives traders.  These traders were motivated by profit and sought to benefit Barclays’ trading positions;
  • seeking to influence the EURIBOR submissions of other banks contributing to the rate setting process; and
  • reducing its LIBOR submissions during the financial crisis as a result of senior management’s concerns over negative media comment.

In addition, Barclays failed to have adequate systems and controls in place relating to its LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions processes until June 2010 and failed to review its systems and controls at a number of appropriate points.

Barclays also failed to deal with issues relating to its LIBOR submissions when these were escalated to Barclays’ Investment Banking compliance function in 2007 and 2008. 

Tracey McDermott, acting director of enforcement and financial crime, said:

“Barclays’ misconduct was serious, widespread and extended over a number of years.  The integrity of benchmark reference rates such as LIBOR and EURIBOR is of fundamental importance to both UK and international financial markets.  Firms making submissions must not use those submissions as tools to promote their own interests.”

“Making submissions to try to benefit trading positions is wholly unacceptable.  This was possible because Barclays failed to ensure it had proper controls in place.  Barclays’ behaviour threatened the integrity of the rates with the risk of serious harm to other market participants.”

“The FSA continues to pursue a number of other significant cross-border investigations in this area and the action we have taken against Barclays should leave firms in no doubt about the serious consequences of this type of failure.” 

The BBA is currently undertaking a review of the way LIBOR is set and will publish its findings shortly.  The FSA, along with the other tripartite authorities, is working to support market-led reviews of existing arrangements, with the goal of ensuring such arrangements continue to command the confidence of all stakeholders. 

Barclays co-operated fully during the FSA’s investigation and agreed to settle at an early stage.  The firm qualified for a 30% discount under the FSA’s settlement discount scheme.  Without the discount the fine would have been £85 million.

This was a significant cross-border investigation and the FSA would like to thank the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) (together with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for their co-operation. 

The CFTC brought attempted manipulation and false reporting charges against Barclays for similar failings, which the bank agreed to settle.  The CFTC imposed a penalty of US$200 million.  In addition, as part of an agreement with the DOJ, Barclays admitted to its misconduct and agreed to pay a penalty of US$160 million

 

Beschuldigungen der CFTC

Die CFTC beschuldigt Barclays versucht zu haben, die Zinssätze zu manipulieren und falsche damit zusammenhängende Berichte veröffentlicht zu haben, um ihre Derivatepositionen zu begünstigten. Ferner wird Barclays belastet, falsche LIBOR-Berichte an das Senior Management (der CFTC?) abgegeben zu haben, um ihre Reputation während der Finanzkrise zu schützen. CFTC dankt der FSA, dem DoJ, dem FBI und der SEC für ihre Unterstützung. Der Wortlaut der Order in Englisch:

 

The Order finds that Barclays attempted to manipulate interest rates and made related false reports to benefit its derivatives trading positions

The Order also finds that Barclays made false LIBOR reports at the direction of members of senior management to protect its reputation during the global financial crisis

Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) issued an Order today filing and settling charges against Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC (Barclays Bank) and Barclays Capital Inc. (Barclays Capital) (collectively Barclays or the Bank). The Order finds that Barclays attempted to manipulate and made false reports concerning two global benchmark interest rates, LIBOR and Euribor, on numerous occasions and sometimes on a daily basis over a four-year period, commencing as early as 2005.

According to the Order, Barclays, through its traders and employees responsible for determining the Bank’s LIBOR and Euribor submissions (submitters), attempted to manipulate and made false reports concerning both benchmark interest rates to benefit the Bank’s derivatives trading positions by either increasing its profits or minimizing its losses. This conduct occurred regularly and was pervasive. In addition, the attempts to manipulate included Barclays’ traders asking other banks to assist in manipulating Euribor, as well as Barclays aiding attempts by other banks to manipulate U.S. Dollar LIBOR and Euribor.

The Order also finds that throughout the global financial crisis in late August 2007 through early 2009, as a result of instructions from Barclays’ senior management, the Bank routinely made artificially low LIBOR submissions to protect Barclays’ reputation from negative market and media perceptions concerning Barclays’ financial condition.

The CFTC Order requires Barclays to pay a $200 million civil monetary penalty, cease and desist from further violations as charged, and take specified steps, such as making the determinations of benchmark submissions transaction-focused (as set forth in the Order), to ensure the integrity and reliability of its LIBOR and Euribor submissions and improve related internal controls.

“The American public and our markets rely upon the integrity of benchmark interest rates like LIBOR and Euribor because they form the basis for hundreds of trillions of dollars of transactions and affect nearly every corner of the global economy,” said David Meister, the CFTC’s Director of Enforcement. “Banks that contribute information to those benchmarks must do so honestly. When a bank acts in its own self-interest by attempting to manipulate these rates for profit, or by submitting false reports that result from senior management orders to lower submissions to guard the bank’s reputation, the integrity of benchmark interest rates is undermined. The CFTC launched this investigation to protect the markets and the public from such illegal conduct, and today’s action demonstrates that we will bring the full force of our authority to bear as we carry out that mission.”

LIBOR and Euribor

LIBOR – the London Interbank Offered Rate – is among the most important benchmark interest rates in the world’s economy, and is a key rate in the United States. LIBOR is based on rate submissions from a relatively small and select panel of major banks, including Barclays, and is calculated and published daily for several different currencies by the British Banker’s Association (BBA). Each panel bank’s submission is also made public, and the market can therefore see each bank’s independent assessment of its own borrowing costs. LIBOR is supposed to reflect the cost of borrowing unsecured funds in the London interbank market.

Euribor, which is calculated in a similar fashion by the European Banking Federation (EBF), is another globally important rate that measures the cost of borrowing in the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union.

LIBOR impacts enormous volumes of swaps and futures contracts, commercial and personal consumer loans, home mortgages and other transactions. For example, U.S. Dollar LIBOR is the basis for the settlement of the three-month Eurodollar futures contract traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), which had a traded volume in 2011 with a notional value exceeding $564 trillion. In addition, according to the BBA, swaps with a notional value of approximately $350 trillion and loans amounting to $10 trillion are indexed to LIBOR. Euribor is also used internationally in derivatives contracts. In 2011, over-the-counter interest rate derivatives referenced to Euro rates had a notional value in excess of $220 trillion, according to the Bank for International Settlements. LIBOR and Euribor are relied upon by countless large and small businesses and individuals who trust that the rates are derived from candid and reliable submissions made by each of the banks on the panels.

Barclays’ Unlawful Conduct to Benefit Derivatives Trading Positions

As the Order shows, Barclays, in pursuit of its own self-interest, disregarded the fundamental principle that LIBOR and Euribor are supposed to reflect the costs of borrowing funds in certain markets. Barclays’ traders located at least in New York, London and Tokyo asked Barclays’ submitters to submit particular rates to benefit their derivatives trading positions, such as swaps or futures positions, which were priced on LIBOR and Euribor. Barclays’ traders made these unlawful requests routinely, and sometimes daily, from at least mid-2005 through at least the fall of 2007, and sporadically thereafter into 2009. The Order relates that, for example, one trader stated in an email to a submitter: “We have another big fixing tom[orrow] and with the market move I was hoping we could set [certain] Libors as high as possible.”

In addition, certain Barclays Euro swaps traders, led at the time by a senior trader, coordinated with and aided and abetted traders at other banks in each other’s attempts to manipulate Euribor, even scheming to impact Euribor on key standardized dates when many derivatives contracts are settled or reset.

The traders’ requests were frequently accepted by Barclays’ submitters, who emailed responses such as “always happy to help,” “for you, anything,” or “Done…for you big boy,” resulting in false submissions by Barclays to the BBA and EBF. The traders and submitters also engaged in similar conduct on fewer occasions with respect to Yen and Sterling LIBOR.

Barclays’ Unlawful Conduct at the Direction of Senior Management

The CFTC Order also finds that Barclays, acting at the direction of senior management, engaged in other serious unlawful conduct concerning LIBOR. In late 2007, Barclays was the subject of negative press reports raising questions such as, “So what the hell is happening at Barclays and its Barclays Capital securities unit that is prompting its peers to charge it premium interest in the money market?” Such negative media speculation caused significant concern within Barclays and was discussed among high levels of management within Barclays Bank. As a result, certain senior managers within Barclays instructed the U.S. Dollar LIBOR submitters and their supervisor to lower Barclays’ LIBOR submissions to be closer to the rates submitted by other banks and not so high as to attract media attention.

According to the Order, senior managers even coined the phrase “head above the parapet” to describe high LIBOR submissions relative to other banks. Barclays’ LIBOR submitters were told not to submit at levels where Barclays was “sticking its head above the parapet.” The directive was intended to fend off negative public perceptions about Barclays’ financial condition arising from its high LIBOR submissions relative to the submissions of other panel banks, which Barclays believed were too low given the market conditions.

Despite concerns being raised by the submitters that Barclays and other banks were, for example, “being dishonest by definition” and that they were submitting “patently false” rates, the submitters followed the directive and submitted artificially lower rates. The senior management directive for low U.S. Dollar LIBOR submissions occurred on a regular basis during the global financial crisis from August 2007 through early 2009, and, at limited times, for Yen and Sterling LIBOR during the same period. As the U.S. Dollar senior submitter said in October 2008 to his supervisor at the time, “following on from my conversation with you I will reluctantly, gradually and artificially get my libors in line with the rest of the contributors as requested. I disagree with this approach as you are well aware. I will be contributing rates which are nowhere near the clearing rates for unsecured cash and therefore will not be posting honest prices.”

Barclays’ Obligations to Ensure Integrity and Reliability of Benchmark Interest Rates

In addition to the $200 million penalty, the CFTC Order requires Barclays to implement measures to ensure that its submissions are transaction-focused, based upon a rigorous and honest assessment of information and not influenced by conflicts of interest. See pages 31-44 of the CFTC’s Order. Among other things, the Order requires Barclays to:

  • Make its submissions based on certain specified factors, with Barclays’ transactions being given the greatest weight, subject to certain specified adjustments and considerations;
  • Implement firewalls to prevent improper communications including between traders and submitters;
  • Prepare and retain certain documents concerning submissions, and retain relevant communications;
  • Implement auditing, monitoring and training measures concerning its submissions and related processes;
  • Make regular reports to the CFTC concerning compliance with the terms of the Order;
  • Use best efforts to encourage the development of rigorous standards for benchmark interest rates; and
  • Continue to cooperate with the CFTC.

* * * *

The Order recognizes Barclays’ significant cooperation with the CFTC during the investigation of this matter.

In a related matter, as part of an agreement with the Fraud Section of the U.S. Justice Department’s Criminal Division, Barclays agreed to pay a $160 million penalty and to continue to cooperate with the Department. Furthermore, the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) issued a Final Notice regarding its enforcement action against Barclays Bank PLC, and has imposed a penalty of £59.5 million against the Bank.

The CFTC thanks the FSA, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Washington Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for their assistance in the CFTC’s investigation.

 

Beschuldigung des Department of Justice

Das U.S-Jusitzministerium beschuldigt Barclays des Vergehens in Bezug auf Veröffentlichungen für die LIBOR und EURIBOR:

 

WASHINGTON – Barclays Bank PLC, a financial institution headquartered in London, has entered into an agreement with the Department of Justice to pay a $160 million penalty to resolve violations arising from Barclays’s submissions for the London InterBank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR), which are benchmark interest rates used in financial markets around the world, announced Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division and Assistant Director in Charge James W. McJunkin of the FBI’s Washington Field Office.

As part of the agreement with the Department of Justice, Barclays has admitted and accepted responsibility for its misconduct set forth in a statement of facts that is incorporated into the agreement.  According to the agreement, Barclays provided LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions that, at various times, were false because they improperly took into account the trading positions of its derivative traders, or reputational concerns about negative media attention relating to its LIBOR submissions.  The Justice Department’s criminal investigation into the manipulation of LIBOR and EURIBOR by other financial institutions and individuals is ongoing.  The agreement requires Barclays to continue cooperating with the department in its ongoing investigation.

“LIBOR and EURIBOR are critically important benchmark interest rates,” said Assistant Attorney General Breuer. “Because mortgages, student loans, financial derivatives, and other financial products rely on LIBOR and EURIBOR as reference rates, the manipulation of submissions used to calculate those rates can have significant negative effects on consumers and financial markets worldwide.  For years, traders at Barclays encouraged the manipulation of LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions in order to benefit their financial positions; and, in the midst of the financial crisis, Barclays management directed that U.S. Dollar LIBOR submissions be artificially lowered.  For this illegal conduct, Barclays is paying a significant price.  To the bank’s credit, Barclays also took a significant step toward accepting responsibility for its conduct by being the first institution to provide extensive and meaningful cooperation to the government.  Its efforts have substantially assisted the Criminal Division in our ongoing investigation of individuals and other financial institutions in this matter.”

“Barclays Bank’s illegal activity involved manipulating its submissions for benchmark interest rates in order to benefit its trading positions and the media’s perception of the bank’s financial health,” said Assistant Director in Charge McJunkin.  “Today’s announcement is the result of the hard work of the FBI Special Agents, financial analysts and forensic accountants as well as the prosecutors who dedicated significant time and resources to investigating this case.”

Barclays was one of the financial institutions that contributed rates used in the calculation of LIBOR and EURIBOR.  The contributed rates are generally meant to reflect each bank’s assessment of the rates at which it could borrow unsecured interbank funds.  For LIBOR, the highest and lowest 25% of contributed rates are excluded from the calculation and the remaining rates are averaged to calculate the fixed rates.  For EURIBOR, the highest and lowest 15% are excluded and the remaining 70% are averaged to calculate the fixed rates. 

Futures, options, swaps, and other derivative financial instruments traded in the over-the-counter market and on exchanges worldwide are settled based on LIBOR.  Further, mortgages, credit cards, student loans and other consumer lending products often use LIBOR as a reference rate.  According to the agreement, an individual bank’s LIBOR or EURIBOR submission cannot appropriately be influenced by the financial positions of its derivatives traders or the bank’s concerns about public perception of its financial health due to its LIBOR submissions.

According to the agreement, between 2005 and 2007, and then occasionally thereafter through 2009, certain Barclays traders requested that the Barclays LIBOR and EURIBOR submitters contribute rates that would benefit the financial positions held by those traders.  The requests were made by traders in New York and London, via electronic messages, telephone conversations and in-person conversations.  The employees responsible for the LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions accommodated those requests on numerous occasions in submitting the bank’s contributions.  On some occasions, Barclays’s submissions affected the fixed rates.

In addition, between August 2005 and May 2008, certain Barclays traders communicated with traders at other financial institutions, including other banks on the LIBOR and EURIBOR panels, to request LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions that would be favorable to their or their counterparts’ trading positions, according to the agreement. 

When the requests of traders for favorable LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions were taken into account by the rate submitters, Barclays’s rate submissions were false and misleading. 

Further, according to the agreement, between approximately August 2007 and January 2009, in response to initial and ongoing press speculation that Barclays’s high U.S. Dollar LIBOR submissions at the time might reflect liquidity problems at Barclays, members of Barclays management directed that Barclays’s Dollar LIBOR submissions be lowered.  This management instruction often resulted in Barclays’s submission of false rates that did not reflect its perceived cost of obtaining interbank funds.  While the purpose of this particular conduct was to influence Barclays’s rate submissions, as opposed to the resulting fixes, there were some occasions when Barclays’s submissions affected the fixed rates.

The agreement and monetary penalty recognize Barclays’s extraordinary cooperation.  Barclays made timely, voluntary and complete disclosure of its misconduct.  After government authorities began investigating allegations that banks had engaged in manipulation of benchmark interest rates, Barclays was the first bank to cooperate in a meaningful way in disclosing its conduct relating to LIBOR and EURIBOR.  Barclays’s disclosure included relevant facts that at the time were not known to the government.  Barclays’s cooperation has been extensive, in terms of the quality and type of information and assistance provided, and has been of substantial value in furthering the department’s ongoing criminal investigation.  Barclays has made a commitment to future cooperation with the department and other government authorities in the United States and the United Kingdom.  

Assistant Attorney General Breuer further stated, “As today’s agreement reflects, we are committed to holding companies accountable for their misconduct while, at the same time, giving meaningful credit to companies that provide full and valuable cooperation in our investigations.”

In addition, Barclays has implemented a series of compliance measures and will implement additional internal controls regarding its submission of LIBOR and EURIBOR contributions, as required by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).  Barclays will also continue to be supervised and monitored by the FSA.

The agreement and monetary penalty further recognize certain mitigating factors to Barclays’s misconduct.  At times, Barclays employees raised concerns with the British Bankers’ Association, the United Kingdom Financial Services Authority (FSA), the Bank of England, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in late 2007 and in 2008 that the Dollar LIBOR rates submitted by contributing banks, including Barclays, were too low and did not accurately reflect the market.  Further, during this time, notwithstanding Barclays’s improperly low Dollar LIBOR submissions, those submissions were often higher than the contributions used in the calculation of the fixed rates.

As a result of Barclays’s admission of its misconduct, its extraordinary cooperation, its remediation efforts and certain mitigating and other factors, the department agreed not to prosecute Barclays for providing false LIBOR and EURIBOR contributions, provided that Barclays satisfies its ongoing obligations under the agreement for a period of two years.  The non-prosecution agreement applies only to Barclays and not to any employees or officers of Barclays or any other individuals. 

In a related matter, the CFTC brought attempted manipulation and false reporting charges against Barclays, which the bank agreed to settle. The CFTC imposed a $200 million penalty and required Barclays to implement detailed measures designed to ensure the integrity and reliability of its benchmark interest rate submissions.

The FSA issued a Final Notice regarding its enforcement action against Barclays, and has imposed a penalty of £59.5 million against it.

The case is being handled by Deputy Chief Daniel Braun, Assistant Chiefs Rebecca Rohr and Robertson Park, Trial Attorney Alexander Berlin, and Special Trial Attorney Luke Marsh of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section.  The investigation is being conducted by the FBI’s Washington Field Office, jointly with the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. 

The Department acknowledges and expresses its appreciation for the significant assistance provided by the CFTC’s Division of Enforcement, which referred the conduct to the Department, as well as the FSA’s Enforcement and Financial Crime Division.



This agreement is part of efforts underway by President Barack Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force.  President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes.  The task force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources.  The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch, and with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets, and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes. For more information about the task force visit: www.stopfraud.gov.

CFTC vs. Barclays Enforcement Order - 27.06.2012
CFTC vs. Barclays Enforcement Order enfb[...]
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DoJ vs. Barclays Agreement 26.06.2012
DoJ vs. Barclays Agreement 3372012710173[...]
PDF-Dokument [309.6 KB]
DoJ vs. Barclays Agreement - Appendix Statement of Facts - 26.06.2012
DoJ vs. Barclays Agreement Appendix Stat[...]
PDF-Dokument [43.3 KB]

Dokumente

Salz Review

Unabhängige Untersuchung von Barclays' Geschäftspraktiken

Am 03.04.2013 wurde ein Untersuchungsbericht vorgelegt, der ein Fehlverhalten von Barclays aufdecken soll. Nach Ausbruch der Finanzkrise wird in dem Bericht Folgendes bemängelt (Seite 163):

 

"... When the financial crisis broke, all this changed. The disproportionate sharing of risk between employees and shareholders became apparent. Barclays continued to serve many customers and clients well. But serious shortcomings had developed: the absence of a common purpose or set of values; cultural inconsistencies across the Group; insufficiently strong controls; and a performance system that reflected financial performance at the expense of other behaviours and failed to focus sufficiently on the development of its people. These shortcomings led to significant conduct problems involving breaches of regulation, investigations and litigation, with reputational damage and the loss of public trust. These problems were not confined to any one part of the bank. And Barclays was by no means alone. The public tend to see this as an industry problem. But Barclays must not take comfort from this."



Salz Review on Barclays' Business Practices - 03.04.2013
Salz Review_Final Report.pdf
PDF-Dokument [3.2 MB]

Treasury

Das Finanzministerium veröffentlicht den Untersuchugnsbericht von Wheatley, der den Weg zur Reform des Libor aufzeigt.

Press Notice 28.09.2012:

Today the Wheatley Review of LIBOR published its final report.

Recent revelations have demonstrated that the current system of LIBOR is broken and needs a complete overhaul. It is clear that wholesale reform is required to restore credibility in the benchmark.
 
The Wheatley Review sets out a clear a 10-point plan for reform, which includes:

  • new and robust regulation;
  • a fundamental overhaul of the way LIBOR is run, including taking responsibility away from the BBA;
  • a requirement for banks to back up their submissions with evidence of relevant transactions; and
  • detailed technical changes to refine the way LIBOR is put together, to make it much harder to manipulate.

Mr. Wheatley said:

“Trust in a vital part of the financial system has been badly damaged. Today’s report sets out my plans for reforming what has become a broken system and to help restore the trust that has been lost. LIBOR needs to get back to doing what it is supposed to do, rather than what unscrupulous traders and individuals in banks wanted it to do.

“I have concluded that LIBOR can be rehabilitated through a comprehensive and far-reaching programme of reform.  Although the current system is broken, it is not beyond repair, and it is up to regulators and market participants to work together towards a lasting and sustainable solution”

Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Greg Clark, said:

“Today’s independent report is very clear – the self-regulation of LIBOR has failed. It’s yet another example of the broken regulatory system that this Government is committed to fixing.

“LIBOR is a hugely important international benchmark and this report makes a series of comprehensive and practical recommendations designed to restore its credibility. The Government will respond, in full, once Parliament returns.”

The Government set up an independent review on the regulation of Libor in July and asked Mr Wheatley (CEO designate of the Financial Conduct Authority) to be chair.   It will report to the Cabinet Committee on Banking Reform, chaired by the Chancellor with the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills as Vice-Chair, by the end of the summer.

Any necessary legislative changes will be considered for inclusion in the Financial Services Bill or the Banking Reform Bill. 

Wheatley Review into LIBOR - 28.09.2012
wheatley_review_libor_finalreport_280912[...]
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House of Commons - Treasury Select Committee:

Im Rahmen der Anhörungen vor dem Treasury Select Committee wurden von den Befragten folgende Dokumente vorgelegt und vom TSC veröffentlicht:

LIBOR, Public Inquiries & FSA Disciplinary Powers - House of Commons Library, Standard Note - 03.07.2012
Commons Library SN06376.pdf
PDF-Dokument [155.6 KB]
Barclays' Submission to TSC - 03.07.2012
3-July---Treasury-Select-Committee--Writ[...]
PDF-Dokument [837.3 KB]
Transcript of Diamonds File Note to Varley and del Missier re Tucker Call - 29.10.2008
Barclays File Note RED 29th October 2012[...]
PDF-Dokument [26.5 KB]
Diamond File Note 29th October 2008 Original
Diamonds File Note 29th October 2008 Ori[...]
PDF-Dokument [66.1 KB]
FSA Final Notice to Barclays - 27.06.2012
FSA Final Notice on Barclays 27 Jun 2012[...]
PDF-Dokument [241.2 KB]
UBS Note on Bank Recapitalisation - 07.07.2012
UBS note on bank recapitalisation.pdf
PDF-Dokument [75.7 KB]
Tucker-Diamond Mails 2008 Part I - 09.07.2012
Tucker-Diamond 2008 db7076a8-a122-9224-b[...]
PDF-Dokument [132.0 KB]
Tucker-Diamond Mails 2008 Part II - 09.07.2012
Tucker-Diamond 2008 42c26a53-9349-23a4-e[...]
PDF-Dokument [215.8 KB]
Agius-Tyrie/TSC Letter - 09.07.2012
Agius-TSC Ketter 9July2012.pdf
PDF-Dokument [88.0 KB]
FSA-Agius Letter 15.10.2010 - (09.07.2012)
FSA-Agius Letter 15September2010.pdf
PDF-Dokument [51.2 KB]
FSA-Agius Letter 10.04.2012 - (09.07.2012)
FSA-Agius 10April2012.pdf
PDF-Dokument [73.1 KB]
Agius-FSA Letter 18.04.2012 - (09.07.2012)
Agius-FSA Letter 18April2012.pdf
PDF-Dokument [65.4 KB]
Oral Evidence Diamond TSC Transcript - 04.07.2012
oral evidence Bob Diamond 04.07.2012 unc[...]
PDF-Dokument [394.1 KB]
Oral Evidence Tucker TSC Transcript - 09.07.2012
oral evidence Paul Tucker 09.07.2012 unc[...]
PDF-Dokument [176.1 KB]
Oral Evidence Agius TSC Transcript - 10.07.2012
Oral Evidence Marcus Agius 10.07.2012 un[...]
PDF-Dokument [253.8 KB]
Oral Evidence Del Missier TSC Transcript - 16.07.2012
Libor Del Missier before TSC 16.07.2012 [...]
PDF-Dokument [422.9 KB]
Oral Evidence King, Tucker, Turner TSC - 17.07.2012
Libor BoE King Tucker FSA Turner before [...]
PDF-Dokument [361.4 KB]
Vorläufiger Bericht des TSC-Untersuchungsausschusses - 18.08.2012
Fixing LIBOR_ some preliminary findings [...]
PDF-Dokument [713.1 KB]
Oral Evidence Banking Standards Committee UBS and FSA - 10.01.2013
Oral Evidence UBS FSA.pdf
PDF-Dokument [417.4 KB]

Federal Reserve of New York

Am 13.07.2012 hat die Fed NY eine Reihe von Korrespondenzen aus den Jahren 2007 und 2008 veröffentlicht, die eine Kenntnis der Libor-Manipulationen schon spätestens in 2007 nahelegen. Diese Dokumente wurden vom Financial Services Committee (Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations) des Repräsentantenhauses zur Vorbereitung der Befragungen angefordert. Zur Fed NY Seite

NY Fed response to Congress re Barclays - 13.07.2012
New York Fed Responds to Congressional R[...]
PDF-Dokument [60.5 KB]
Fed NY Market Review, Page 3 "questions over the accuracy of the BBA's LIBOR fixing rate" - 11.04.2012
Libor April_11_2008_Internal_FRBNY_Weekl[...]
PDF-Dokument [322.5 KB]
Fed NY MarketSource Report - 20.05.2008
Libor MarketSource_Report_May202008.pdf
PDF-Dokument [78.5 KB]
Mail Geithner to King with Recommendations - 01.06.2008
Libor June_1_2008_LIBOR_recommendations.[...]
PDF-Dokument [50.3 KB]
Mail King to Geithner with Task for Tucker - 03.06.2008
Libor June_3_2008_email_from_Mervyn_King[...]
PDF-Dokument [17.5 KB]
Fed NY Slides "Market Concerns Regarding LIBOR" - 05.06.2008
Libor June_5_2008_presentation_to_IFMGM.[...]
PDF-Dokument [296.8 KB]

Bank von England

Unter dem Druck der Öffentlichkeit hat die Bank von England am 20.07.2012 eine Reihe von Dokumenten über 80 Seiten veröffentlicht "Further information and correspondence in relation to the BBA Libor Review 2008":

BoE Press Release BBA Libor 2008 - 20.07.2012
BoE _ News Release - Further information[...]
PDF-Dokument [29.5 KB]
BoE Timeline BBA Libor 2008 - 20.07.2012
BoE Timeline BBA Libor 2008 from 20.07.2[...]
PDF-Dokument [110.1 KB]
BoE Emailchain BBA Libor 2008 - 20.07.2012
BoE Emailchain BBA Libor 2008 from 20.07[...]
PDF-Dokument [2.6 MB]