Money Laundering Skandal
Das Thema Geldwäsche ist nicht unbedingt interessant. Werden doch Dinge dem kriminellen Gewerbe zugerechnet, womit niemand in Berührung kommen möchte. Dafür sind ja schließlich die Behörden da. Doch nach tagelanger Ignoranz des Themas kommt man gar nicht umhin, sich mit dem Thema zu beschäftigen. Zum einen betrifft es bisher hoch angesehene Banken, HSBC und Standard Chartered. Zum anderen scheint die Dimension doch gewaltig zu sein. Schließlich drängt sich auch noch die Frage auf, ob jetzt endlich Gefängnisstrafen gegen die verantwortlichen Executives verhängt werden oder deren Arbeitgeber mit steuerlich abziehbaren Geldbußen weiterhin freikaufen können.
- Fehler und Ursachen
- Wirtschaftliche Konsequenzen
- Personelle Konsequenzen
- Firmeninterne Konsequenzen
- Regulatorische Konsequenzen
- Juristische Konsequenzen
- Politische Konsequenzen
- Offene Fragen
16.07. HSBC: U.S.-Senat beschuldigt in Bericht der Geldwäsche
17.07. HSBC hat $7 Mrd Bargeld von Mexico nach USA verschafft
17.07. HSBC: Compliance-Chef Bagle tritt während Anhörung zurück
18.07. HSBC: Ex-Vorstand Green, jetziger Handelsminister, unter Druck
18.07. HSBC: Mexikanische Aufsicht CNBV hat hingewiesen
24.07. HSBC: Ex-Chef Wirtschaftsminister Green schweigt weiter
29.07. HSBC: Handelsminister Green und £200 Mio Steuerbetrug?
06.08. StanChart droht in NY Lizenzentzug w $250 Iran-Verstoß
07.08. StanChart bestreitet Anschuldigungen; Kurse stürzen ab
07.08. StanChart: US-Finanzministerium und Fed verärgert über SEC
08.08. StanChart: Strafe könnte $700 Mio betragen
12.08. HSBC: Indien schaltet
Steuerbehörde in Ermittlungen ein
12.08. US-Behörden: Verhandlungen über Vergleich mit UK-Banken
12.08. Geldwäsche: USA verhandeln mit britischen Banken
13.08. StanChart: Osborne setzt sich bei Geithner ein
13.08. StanChart: Deloitte-CEO Echevarria verteidigt seine Arbeit
14.08. StanChart: Lächerliche Strafe $340 Mio für $250 Mrd Verstoß
15.08. StanChart: Lizenz sicher, jedoch insgesamt bis $1 Mrd Strafe
18.08. Deloitte: Pirron-Selbstmord habe nichts mit StanChart zu tun
18.08. StanChart: Zuständiger Partner bei Deloitte beging Selbstmord
18.08. Deutsche Bank wird in USA untersucht wegen Iran-Geschäften
20.08. StanChart: AG Lawsky, NYSD FinServ, verweigert Interviews
22.08. RBS: US-Behörden ermitteln w Iran-Geschäften
23.08. HSBC in Verhandlungen mit U.S. w Geldwäsche
26.08. HypoVereinsbank: US-Ermittlungen w Iran-Geschäften
01.09. Money Laundering: Neue Ermittlungen des US-DOJ
15.09. JPM, Bank of America: Ermittlungen wegen Geldwäsche
04.11. HSBC erwartet £937 Mio Strafe w US-Geldwäscheskandal
10.12. StanChart zahlt weitere $327 Mio Strafe
w Geldwäsche in Sudan, Iran, Libyen, Burma
HSBC zahlt $1,92 Mio w Geldwäsche in Mexico
14.01. JPMorgan kann Strafe w Geldwäsche gerade noch verhindern
04.04. HSH Nordbank: Auflagen durch SEC für Geldwäsche-Prävention
05.04. Fitch erwartet weitere Verfahren, z.B. JPMorgan, Citigroup
DoFS: Deloitte Strafe $10 Mio, 1 J. Verbot w StanChart
Money Laundering bei HSBC
Beschuldigungen des U.S.-Senats
Anlässlich eines Hearings vor dem Permanent Subcommittee On Investigations wurde ein 340-seitiger Bericht (Siehe unten "Dokumente") mit umfangreichen 530 Seiten Anlagen über die Geldwäsche bei HSBC vorgelegt. Darin werden folgende Vergehen vorgeworfen:
- Longstanding Severe AML Deficiencies
- Taking on High Risk Affiliates
- Circumventing OFAC Prohibitions
- Disregarding Terrorist Links
- Clearing Suspicious Bulk Travelers Cheques
- Offering Bearer Share Accounts
- Allowing AML Problems to Fester
Das Hearing ist auf der Website als Video anzuschauen und die Aussagen sind in zahlreichen Testimonies verfügbar. Die Fülle an Material und die Transparenz ist in einem noch nie gesehen Ausmaß verfügbar. Man wundert sich sehr, warum dies nicht in all den vorangegangenen Skandalen so gehandhabt wurde. Es vermittelt den Eindruck eines Schauprozesses.
PSI REPORT-HSBC CASE HISTORY (July 17 20[...]
PDF-Dokument [2.4 MB]
EXHIBITS 1-99 for July 17 2012 HSBC Hear[...]
PDF-Dokument [67.9 MB]
OPENING STMT - Tom Coburn (July 17 2012)[...]
PDF-Dokument [33.7 KB]
STMT - COHEN-David (Treasury).pdf
PDF-Dokument [32.7 KB]
STMT - WINCHELL-Leigh (ICE).pdf
PDF-Dokument [68.7 KB]
STMT - BAGLEY-David (HSBC).pdf
PDF-Dokument [17.1 KB]
STMT - THURSTON-Paul (HSBC).pdf
PDF-Dokument [22.3 KB]
STMT - GALLAGHER-Michael (Former HSBC).p[...]
PDF-Dokument [11.6 KB]
STMT - LOK-Christopher (Former HSBC).pdf
PDF-Dokument [10.9 KB]
STMT - DORNER-Irene (HSBC).pdf
PDF-Dokument [21.7 KB]
STMT - LEVEY-Stuart (HSBC).pdf
PDF-Dokument [38.6 KB]
STMT - OCC (Comptroller of the Currency)[...]
PDF-Dokument [117.0 KB]
Iran-Sanktionen-Verstoß der Standard Chartered Bank SCB
Beschuldigungen der NYSD Financial Services
Am 06.08.2012 erlässt Superintendent Ben Lawsky des New York State Department of Financial Services eine Order gegen Standard Chartered Bank mit folgenden Vorwürfen:
- For almost ten years, SCB schemed with the Government of Iran and hid from regulators roughly 60,000 secret transactions, involving at least $250 billion, and reaping SCB hundreds of millions of dollars in fees. SCB’s actions left the U.S. financial system vulnerable to terrorists, weapons dealers, drug kingpins and corrupt regimes, and deprived law enforcement investigators of crucial information used to track all manner of criminal activity.
- For nearly a decade, SCB programmatically engaged in deceptive and fraudulent misconduct in order to move at least $250 billion through its New York branch on behalf of client Iranian financial institutions (“Iranian Clients”) that were subject to U.S. economic sanctions, and then covered up its transgressions. These institutions included no less than the Central Bank of Iran/Markazi (“CBI/Markazi”), as well as Bank Saderat and Bank Melli, both of which are also Iranian State-owned institutions.
- In its evident zeal to make hundreds of millions of dollars at almost any cost, SCB undertook a course of conduct that included:
- falsifying business records; offering false instruments for filing; failing to maintain accurate books and records of all transactions effected and all actions taken on behalf of SCB; obstructing governmental administration; failing to report misconduct to the Department in a timely manner; evading Federal sanctions; and numerous other violations of law that, as with the above, have an impact upon the safety and soundness of SCB’s New York branch and the Department’s confidence in SCB’s character, credibility and fitness as a financial institution licensed to conduct business under the laws of this State.
- From January 2001 through 2007, SCB conspired with its Iranian Clients to route nearly 60,000 different U.S. dollar payments through SCB‟s New York branch after first stripping information from wire transfer messages used to identify sanctioned countries, individuals and entities (“wire stripping”).
- Specifically, SCB ensured the anonymity of Iranian U.S. dollar clearing activities through SCB‟s New York branch by falsifying SWIFT wire payment directions.3 When SCB employees determined that it was necessary to “repair” unadulterated payment directives,4 they did so by stripping the message of unwanted data, replacing it with false entries or by returning the payment message to the Iranian Client for wire stripping and resubmission. Thus, SCB developed various ploys that were all designed to generate a new payment message for the New York branch that was devoid of any reference to Iranian Clients.
- SCB utilized such schemes to cloak the dollar clearing activities of Iranian Clients and thereby shield those transactions from regulatory scrutiny. During the relevant period, the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) required U.S. financial institutions to filter all dollar clearing transactions so as to identify those involving sanctioned entities, and then to freeze suspect transactions pending investigation. This system could (a) significantly delay transaction processing; (b) require that OFAC be advised of information surrounding a transaction; and (c) ultimately result in the rejection of a transaction. SCB therefore wire-stripped to ensure the automatic and unobstructed clearance of Iranian transactions in New York.
- SCB intentionally withheld material information from New York and Federal regulators in its effort to service Iranian Clients. SCB carefully planned its deception and was apparently aided by its consultant Deloitte & Touche, LLP (“D&T”), which intentionally omitted critical information in its “independent report” to regulators. This ongoing misconduct was especially egregious because – during a key period between 2004 and 2007 – SCB‟s New York branch was subject to a formal supervisory action by the Department and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“FRBNY”) for other regulatory compliance failures involving the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA”), anti-money laundering policies and procedures (“AML”), and OFAC regulations.
- In short, SCB operated as a rogue institution. By 2006, even the New York branch was acutely concerned about the bank’s Iran dollar-clearing program. In October 2006, SCB’s CEO for the Americas sent a panicked message to the Group Executive Director in London. “Firstly,” he wrote, “we believe [the Iranian business] needs urgent reviewing at the Group level to evaluate if its returns and strategic benefits are . . . still commensurate with the potential to cause very serious or even catastrophic reputational damage to the Group.” His plea to the home office continued: “secondly, there is equally importantly potential of risk of subjecting management in US and London (e.g. you and I) and elsewhere to personal reputational damages and/or serious criminal liability.” (emphasis added)
- Lest there be any doubt, SCB‟s obvious contempt for U.S. banking regulations was succinctly and unambiguously communicated by SCB‟s Group Executive Director in response. As quoted by an SCB New York branch officer, the Group Director caustically replied: “You f---ing Americans. Who are you to tell us, the rest of the world, that we‟re not going to deal with Iranians.
NYSD Financial Services Order ea120806.p[...]
PDF-Dokument [281.0 KB]
Deloitte's Anti Money Laundering Beratung bei StanChart
Am 18.06.2013 erlässt die New York State Department of Financial Services des durch den Gouverneur Cuomo eine $10 Mio Strafe und 1 Jahr Beratungsverbot für Deloitte Financial Services im Zusammenhang mit der mangelhaften Beratung zur Geldwäscheverhinderung:
CUOMO ADMINISTRATION REACHES REFORM AGREEMENT WITH DELOITTE OVER STANDARD CHARTERED CONSULTING FLAWS
Deloitte Agrees to One-year Suspension from Consulting Work at DFS-Regulated Institutions, Makes $10 Million Payment to New York State
Reforms at Deloitte Will Serve as Standard for All Independent Consulting Firms Appearing Before DFS, Could Serve as National Model for Reform
Governor Andrew M. Cuomo today announced that the Administration has reached an agreement with Deloitte Financial Advisory Services (“Deloitte”) regarding the company’s misconduct, violations of law, and lack of autonomy during its consulting work at Standard Chartered on anti-money laundering issues. Under the agreement, Deloitte agrees to a one-year, voluntary suspension from consulting work at financial institutions regulated by the New York State Department of Financial Services (“DFS”), will make a $10 million payment to the State of New York, and will implement a set of reforms designed to help address conflicts of interest in the consulting industry.
DFS intends to use the reforms Deloitte has agreed to today as a model that will govern all independent consulting firms that seek to be retained or approved by DFS. These reforms could also potentially serve as a template for other government agencies that retain independent consultants in regulatory work.
“The State’s agreement with Deloitte will serve as a new model for reforming the financial services consulting industry in New York as well as across the country,” Governor Cuomo said. “When tasked by government agencies to undertake regulatory work at financial institutions, it is critical for these consultants to remain autonomous and avoid conflicts of interest. Our homeowners, investors and economy are protected when independent consultants are truly ‘independent.”
Benjamin M. Lawsky, Superintendent of Financial Services, said, “At times, the consulting industry has been infected by an 'I'll scratch your back if you scratch mine' culture and a stunning lack of independence. Today, we are taking an important step in helping ensure that consultants are independent voices – rather than beholden to the large institutions that pay their fees. Our aggressive work investigating and reforming the consulting industry is far from over and will continue in the days, weeks, and months ahead.”
DFS’s Investigation into Deloitte's Work at Standard Chartered
In 2004, Standard Chartered executed a joint written agreement with the New York State Banking Department (“the Department” – a DFS predecessor agency) and Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“FRBNY”), which identified several compliance and risk management deficiencies in the anti-money laundering and Bank Secrecy Act controls at Standard Chartered's New York branch. The agreement required Standard Chartered to retain a qualified independent consulting firm to review anti-money laundering issues at the bank. Standard Chartered engaged Deloitte to conduct that review.
DFS’s investigation into Deloitte’s conduct during its consultant work at Standard Chartered found that the company:
- Did not demonstrate the necessary autonomy required of consultants performing regulatory work. Based primarily on Standard Chartered's objection, Deloitte removed a recommendation aimed at rooting out money laundering from its written final report on the matter to the Department. The recommendation discussed how wire messages or “cover payments” on transactions could be manipulated by banks to evade money laundering controls on U.S. dollar clearing activities.
- Violated New York Banking Law § 36.10 by disclosing confidential information of other Deloitte clients to Standard Chartered. A senior Deloitte employee sent emails to Standard Chartered employees containing two reports on anti-money laundering issues at other Deloitte client banks. Both reports contained confidential supervisory information, which Deloitte FAS was legally barred by New York Banking Law § 36.10 from disclosing to third parties.
To resolve the misconduct, lack of autonomy, and violations of law at Deloitte uncovered during DFS's investigation, Deloitte has agreed to:
- A voluntary, one year suspension from conducting consulting work at firms regulated by DFS;
- Make a $10 million payment to the State of New York;
- Establish and implement a new set of safeguards to address conflicts of interest in the consulting industry. DFS intends to use these standards as a new model that will govern independent consulting firms that seek to be retained or approved by DFS. When a financial institution engages an independent consultant pursuant to an agreement or order by DFS, the following code of conduct will apply:
o Disclosure of Past Work that Could Represent Potential Conflicts of Interest. The financial institution and the consultant will disclose to DFS all prior work by the consultant for the financial institution in the previous three years.
o Declaration of Independence Provision. The engagement letter between the consultant and the financial institution shall require that the consultant's ultimate conclusions and judgments during its work will be based upon the exercise of its own independent judgment – rather than that of the financial institution.
o Anti-tampering Provisions. The consultant's final report shall contain a listing of all of the personnel from the financial institution who substantively reviewed or commented on drafts of the findings, conclusions, and recommendations to be included in the final report. The consultant will also bring any disagreement over a material matter between itself and the financial institution to DFS's attention.
o Records of Recommendations Financial Institutions Failed to Implement ('Anti-Sweeping-Under-the-Rug' Provision). The consultant and financial institution shall maintain records of recommendations to the financial institution that the financial institution did not adopt, and provide such records to DFS.
o Monitoring the Monitor, Independent Lines of Communication. DFS will meet regularly – at least monthly – with the independent consultant. The financial institution will consent that contacts between the Consultant and DFS may occur outside of the presence of the financial institution.
o Protecting Confidential Information. The consultant shall have in place policies and procedures designed specifically to maintain the confidentiality of bank supervisory material.
Provisions Regarding a Breach of this Agreement
If Deloitte breaches this agreement, DFS may employ any and all remedies available to it, including but not limited to an order pursuant to New York Banking Law § 36.10 barring regulated financial institutions from sharing confidential supervisory information with Deloitte.
Under New York Banking Law § 36.10, DFS can revoke a consultant's access to confidential supervisory information if continued access to that information would not serve “the ends of justice and the public advantage.” Virtually all consulting and monitoring work at regulated financial institutions requires access to confidential supervisory information.