Von Finanzkrise spricht man nicht mehr. Aber hat sich wirklich alles gelöst?
Sind die Staatsverschuldungen gesenkt worden? Sind Banken ausreichend mit Kapital versorgt und von den Altlasten befreit? Erhalten Unternehmen so "leicht" neue Kredite wie vor der Finanzkrise? Was
haben die Reformen gebracht? Müssen wir uns vor einer neuen noch viele katastrophaleren Finanzkrise fürchten?
Chronik: (unten in umgekehrter Reihenfolge angeordnet)
- Euro unter Druck - 01/2015
- Griechenland kündigt Zusammenarbeit auf - 02/2015
- Deutsche Bank zahlt für Libor/Forex-Manipulation - 04/2015
- Griechenland auf dem Weg zum Grexit - 05/2015
- Griechische Regierung torpediert Einigung - 06/2015
- OXI, Griechenland wendet sich ab - 07/2015
- Eurozone beschließt 3. Hilfspaket - 08/2015
- Tsipras gewinnt erneut Parlamentswahl - 09/2015
- Terroranschläge in Paris - 11/2015
- Griechisches Referendum: Angebote - 07/2015
- US DoJ: Deutsche Bank Libor/Forex - 04/2015
- EuGH billigt Anleihenkaufprogramm - 01/2015
- EZB startet €1,14 Billionen Staatsanleihenankauf - 01/2015
21.07. Volcker Rule bindend
16.07., 05.08., 03.09., 16.-17.09., 07.10., 22.10., 04.11., 18.11., 03.12., 16.-17.12.
Federal Reserve FOMC Meetings
28.-29.07., 16.-17.09., 27.-28.10., 15.-16.12.
Cameron: "Britisches EU-Referendum nach einer Phase der EU-Verhandlungen, falls die Konservativen Tories die absolute Mehrheit bei den Wahlen am 07. Mai 2015
gewinnen" - Bedingung eingetreten
31.12. FDIC: 8 US-Banken in 2015 geschlossen
Terroranschläge erschüttern Frankreich
13.11. Paris: Terroranschläge fordern 132 Tote und 350 Verletzte
10.10. Ankara: Terroranschläge fordern 128 Tote, über 500 Verletzte
19.10. HSH Nordbank: EU-Kommission genehmigt Rettungsplan
Verkauf von 8 Mrd Schiffspapiere an Markt und Hamburg und SH
Hamburg und Schleswig-Holstein dürfen 6,2 Mrd übernehmen
Aufspaltung in Holding und bis 2018 privatisierende Operativbank
Falls Priatisierung scheitert, dann Abwicklung
13.09. Flüchtlingskrise: Deutschland führt Grenzkontrollen zu Österr. ein
20.09. Griechenland: Syriza 35% 145 von 300 Sitzen ND 28% 75 Sitze
19.08. Griechenland: Eurozone beschließt 3. Paket 86 Mrd bis 08/2018
20.08. Griechenland: Tsipras tritt zurück; Neuwahlen
Griechenland wendet sich ab
01.07. EU erwarten heute neue Vorschläge aus Athen
01.07. Tsipras: Ja oder Nein betrifft nicht Verbleib in Eurozone
01.07. Tsipras will alle Sparauflagen akzeptieren
01.07. Merkel: Tür für Verhandlungen offen, aber erst nach Referendum
01.07. Varoufakis: Griechische Banken haben noch €1b Liquidität
01.07. Dombrovskis (VizeEU-Kom):
Neues Programm noch Juli möglich
01.07. Eurogruppe: "Machen bis Referendum gar nichts"
01.07. EZB belässt ELA auf €90b
01.07. Wagenknecht (Linke-ParlGF) fordert Euroabstimmung in DE
02.07. Griechische Banken öffnen für Rentner an 2 Tagen
02.07. Europarat: "Referendum entspricht nicht unseren Standards"
(1) Fragen lagen nicht 2 Wochen vor Abstimmung vor
(2) Fragen sind nicht klar und verständlich formuliert
(3) Zu kurz, um internationale Beobachter zu schicken
02.07. Tsipras will bei Nein zurücktreten
02.07. Varoufakis will bei Ja zurücktreten, aber weiter verhandeln
02.07. Varoufakis schneidet sich lieber Arm ab, als zu unterschreiben
02.07. Kammenos (VMin): "Wir sind im Krieg" zu Parteiabweichlern
02.07. IWF: GR braucht zusätzlich €50b bis 2018 und Schuldenschnitt
02.07. Griechische Banken: noch €500m Bard, nehmen Einzahlungen an
03.07. Tsakalotos (stv. AMin): Referendum weil Sparpaket nicht
durch das Parlamentgekommen wäre
03.07. ESFS erklärt
GR für insolvent, fordert aber nicht sofort ein
03.07. Varoufakis: Einigung "mehr oder weniger" gemacht,
unabhängig vom Ausgang des Referendums
03.07. Griechenland: Staatsrat (Obersteres Verwaltunggericht)
bestätigt Referendum. Klage, dass über öffentliche Finanzen kein Referendum abgehalten werden darf, abgelehnt. Kein
Verfassungsverstoß. Urteilstext wird erst später veröffentlicht.
03.07. Tsipras ruft zum "Oxi"
(Nein) auf ...
gegen Ultimaten und "diejenigen, die Euch terrorisieren"
Ein Nein eröffne die Chance "in Würde in Europa zu leben"
weicht Rücktrittsfrage bei Ja nun doch aus
03.07. Juncker: Nein wird GR-Position schwächen
03.07. Schäuble dämpft Hoffnung auf schnelle Hilfe nach Referendum
03.07. Linke bis Referendum in GR: Gysi, Wagenknecht,
04.07. Varoufakis wirft Gläubigern
05.07. Varoufakis: Abstimmung über Austerity Ultimatum
05.07. Varoufakis: Bei Nein Deal innerhalb von 24 Stunden
05.07. Papandreou (Ex-PM) gibt Merkel und Schäuble die Schuld
05.07. Griechenland: Referendum
“Should the plan of agreement, which was submitted by the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the Eurogroup of
25.06.2015 and is comprised of two parts that constitute their unified proposal be accepted?
The first document is entitled “Reforms For The Completion Of The Current Program And Beyond” and the second “Preliminary Debt Sustainability Analysis.”
"Muss der Entwurf einer Vereinbarung von Europäischer Kommission, Europäischer Zentralbank und Internationalem Währungsfonds akzeptiert werden, welcher am 25.06.2015
eingereicht wurde und aus zwei Teilen besteht, die in einem einzigen Vorschlag zusammengefasst sind?"
(Das erste Dokument heißt auf Englisch "Reforms for the Completion of the Current Program and Beyond" und das zweite "Preliminary Debt Sustainability Analysis" - auf
Deutsch: "Reformen, um das laufende (Rettungs-)Programm abzuschließen und darüber hinaus" und das zweite "vorläufige Schuldentragfähigkeitsanalyse".)
(Anmerkung: Beide Dokumente sind aber nicht mehr auf dem Verhandlungstisch)
05.07. Griechen stimmen mit 61,31% NEIN (38%
06.07. Varoufakis tritt zurück: Gläubiger wollen ihn nicht mehr sehen
06.07. Tsipras tritt mit Oppositionsparteien und Präsident zusammen
06.07. Tsipras unterbricht
Parteien-Konferenz, als Putin anruft
06.07. GR: Banken bleiben bis Mittwoch 08.07. geschlossen
08.07. IWF: Lagarde fordert Umschuldung für GR
08.07. China: Börsen brechen ein, Shanghai -6,27%, HongKong -5,84%
08.07. Hauck-Aufhäuser: chinesisches Investment Fosun übernimmt
09.07. GR: Banken bleiben bis Montag 13.07. geschlossen
09.07. GR soll bis Mitternacht Reform- und Sparprogramm vorlegen
09.07. GR: Handelsdefizit im Mai um 24% gefallen, Importeinbruch
09.07. China pumpt Geld in staatliche Kreditanstalt
09.07. Französische Experten helfen in Athen mit Formulierung aus
09.07. 21.30 GR schickt Sparprogramm nach Brüssel
10.07. Hollande: Reformliste seriös, glaubhaft, zeigt Verbleib im Euro
10.07. Syriza geht in Klausur: Dramatischer Appell von Tsipras
11.07. Varoufakis in Urlaub, fehlt im Parlament, wirft Schäuble Grexit vor
11.07. 02.38 GR-Parlament bewilligt mit 250:32, 8 Enth., 10 fehlen
11.07. Troika mit Reformliste einverstanden
11.07. Schäuble: Papier über 5 Jahre Grexit kursiert
11.07. GR: EuroFin brechen um Mitternacht Verhandlungen ab
12.07. Papier löst Entrüstung aus, angeblich abgest. mit Merkel, Gabriel
12.07. GR: EuroFin nehmen um 10:00 wieder Verhandlungen auf
12.07. EuroFin ohne Einigung, überlassen alles dem Euro-Gipfel
12.07. EU-Gipfel 28 wird abgesagt, Eurogipfel 19 ab 16.00
12.07. Slowakischer FinMin Kazimir schließt heutige Einigung aus
12.07. Hollande: Heute Einigung zwingend, es geht um Europa
12.07. GR erhält 3 Tage mehr Zeit für Reformen
15.07. GR: Banken bleiben bis Ende der Woche geschlossen
15.07. GR: stv. FinMin Nadja Valavani's Mutter soll 200k vor
Einführung der Kapitalkontrollen abgehoben haben, tritt zurück
15.07. GR: Parlamentsdebatte beginnt
15.07. Varoufakis: "neuer Versailler Vertrag"
15.07. GR Parlamentspräsidentin Konstantopoulou (Syriza) verzögert
Abstimmung in den Abend. "Putsch gegen Demokratie", "sozialer
Völkermord" gibt Sitzungsleitung entnervt auf, stimmt mit Nein
15.07. Tsipras droht mit Rücktritt. Deal die einzige Option
16.07. 00.59 Reform angenommen: 229 Ja, 64 Nein, 6 Enthaltungen
32 Abweichler in Syriza (u.a. Varoufakis, EnMin Panagiotis)
16.07. Parlamente Frankreich, Finnland stimmen Einigung zu
16.07. Schäuble fordert erneut Grexit
16.07. Dijsselbloem kritisiert Grexitäußerungen: mit Einigung abfinden
16.07. EuroFin: EFSM 7b Brückenfinanzierung, DE haftet mit 532m
16.07. EZB erhöht ELA für GR um 900m für 1 Woche
16.07. GR Vize-FinMin Mardas: Banken öffnen Montag
17.07. Tusk: zur Sachlichkeit zurückkehren
Von GR-Regierung vorgelegtes neues Reformpaket 09.07.2015
Griechische Regierung torpediert Einigung
03.06. EZB: keine Beschlüsse
07.06. Türkei: Erdogans Partei AKP verliert absolute Mehrheit
17.06. Fed FOMC: Keine Beschlüsse
23.06. Schäuble nicht optimistisch, dass Lösung schon am 24.06.
23.06. Syriza kündigt Tsipras die Ablehnung im Parlament an
26.06. Tsipras bricht 17:49 Verhandlungen kurz vor Einigung ab
26.06. Tsipras kündigt überraschend Referendum an
27.06. Euro-Finanzminister-Gipfel abgesagt
28.06. Varoufakis: keine Kapitalverkehrsbeschränkungen
29.06. Griechische Banken und Börse bis Referendum geschlossen
29.06. Bankautomaten: täglich max. €60 pro Konto abhebbar
30.06. Juncker bietet Tsipras Einigung in letzter Minute an
30.06. Eurogruppe lehnt kurzfristige Verlängerung des Hilfsprogramms ab
30.06. Athen bittet um Verlängerung der Rückzahlungsfrist
30.06. Varoufakis: Ja-Empfehlung, wenn Gläubiger Vorschlag zustimmen
30.06. IWF: Griechenland überweist €1,6b nicht
30.06. Regierung zahlt auch €470m Kredit nicht an Notenbank zurück
Von GR-Regierung zur Abstimmung vorgelegte Dokumente vom 25.06.2015
(1) Reforms for Completion of Current Program
(2) Greece Financing Needs
(3) P.S.A. Preliminary Debt Sustainability Analysis for Greece
Von EU-Kommission ins Netz gestellte Angebote vom 08., 14., 22. und 25.06.2015, zusammengefasst nach Themen
(Stand 26.06.2015, 20:00 Uhr)
(1) Supplementary Budget and 2016-19 MTFS
(2) VAT Reform
(3) Fiscal Structural Measures
(4) Pension Reform
(5) Public Administration, Justice and Anti Corruption
(6) Tax Administration
(7) Financial Sector
(8) Labour market
(9) Product market
Griechenland vor dem Grexit
07.05. UK: Cameron gewinnt 330 zu real 315 Sitze (absolute Mehrheit)
08.05. dx11710 ex3650 dw18191 sp2116 vx13 bc$241 €1,122 ö60 g1188
15.05. dx11447 ex3573 dw18273 sp2123 vx12 bc$239 €1,139 ö61 g1224
19.05. EZB Direktor Coeuré kündigt Vorziehen der Anleihenkäufe an
22.05. dx11815 ex3679 dw18232 sp2126 vx12 bc$238 €1,101 ö60 g1206
29.05. Griechenland: Energie-Min Panagiotis in Moskau wegen Pipeline
29.05. Griechenland: IWF Lagarde hält Grexit für möglich
29.05. Brexit: Cameron in Berlin, Merkel wünscht Referendum in 2016
29.05. dx11414 ex3571 dw18011 sp2107 vx14 bc$238 €1,091 ö60 g1191
30.05. Griechenland: US-FinMin Brew mahnt pragmatische Lösung an
Deutsche Bank zahlt $2,5b für Libor/Forex
02.04. dx11976 ex3715 dw17763 sp2067 vx15 bc$249 €1,088 ö50 g1195
07.04. Griechenland: Tsipras kündigt Reise nach Moskau an
07.04. Russland: Kurs erstmals wieder unter $60
08.04. Griechenland: Tsipras in Moskau - Priatisierung, Energie, Kredite
09.04. Griechenland: EZB erhöht ELA-Kredite um €1,2b
09.04. Griechenland zahlt IWF-Rate €450m zurück
10.04. dx12375 ex3817 dw17959 sp2103 vx13 bc$239 €1,059 ö54 g1209
13.04. EZB: 09.03.-10.04. Anleihekäufe €61,7b
17.04. dx11689 ex3674 dw17826 sp2081 vx14 bc$225 €1,081 ö58 g1205
23.04. Libor und Forex: Deutsche Bank $2,5b Geldstrafe, davon
US-DoJ $775m, CFTC $800m, NY DFS $600m, UK-FCA £227m
24.04. Deutsche Bank kündigt Verkauf der Postbank an
24.04. dx11811 ex3714 dw18080 sp2118 vx12 bc$233 €1,088 ö57 g1180
27.04. Flash-Crash 2010: Navinder Sarao (36) in London verhaftet
01.03. Russland: Oppositionsführer Nemzov erschossen
30.04. dx11454 ex3616 dw17841 sp2086 vx15 bc$233 €1,121 ö60 g1187
06.03. dx11551 ex3618 dw17857 sp2072 vx15 bc$274 €1,084 ö50 g1169
11.03. Russland kündigt Vertrag über konventionelle Streitkräfte KSE
13.03. dx11902 ex3656 dw17749 sp2053 vx16 bc$292 €1,050 ö47 g1159
16.03. dx mit 12168 erstmals über 12000
20.03. dx12039 ex3726 dw18128 sp2108 vx13 bc$262 €1,082 ö46 g1183
27.03. dx11868 ex3679 dw17713 sp2061 vx15 bc$248 €1,089 ö49 g1199
31.03. dx10966 ex3697 dw17776 sp2068 vx15 bc$246 €1,074 ö48 g1184
Griechenland spielt auf Zeit
04.02. Griechenland: EZB hebt Sonderregeln für Staatsanleihen auf
06.02. dx10846 ex3398 dw17824 sp2055 vx17 bc$221 €1,132 ö52 g1234
07.02. Griechenland: S&P senkt von B auf B-
12.02. Ukraine: Abkommen Minsk II vereinbart
13.02. dx10963 ex3448 dw18019 sp2097 vx15 bc$232 €1,139 ö53 g1229
19.02. Griechenland: Antrag auf 6-monatige Verlängerung geht ein
19.02. dx mit 11002 erstmals über 11000
20.02. Griechenland: EU einigt sich auf Verlängerung um 4 Monate
20.02. dx11051 ex3491 dw18140 sp2110 vx14 bc$244 €1,139 ö51 g1203
24.02. Griechenland: Athen legt mit 1 Tag Verspätung offizielle Liste vor
25.02. Russland: Rubel wieder knapp unter $70
27.02. Griechenland: Bundestag beschließt Verlängerung Hilfspaket
27.02. dx11402 ex3599 dw18133 sp2105 vx13 bc$251 €1,120 ö49 g1214
Euro unter Druck von EZB, Schweiz und Griechenland
01.01. Litauen führt als 19. Land den Euro ein
01.01. Lettland übernimmt die EU-Präsidentschaft von Italien
01.01. Italien: Staatspräsident Napolitano will bald aufhören
01.01. Griechenland: Stopp der Hilfenrückzahlung und Reformen?
02.01. dx9765 ex3177 dw17833 sp2058 vx18 bc$276 €1,210 ö53 g1190
02.01. Russland: Rubel bei $59
03.01. Griechenland: Schäuble hält Euroaaustritt für verkraftbar
04.01. Griechenland: SPD Gabriel "Wir sind nicht erpressbar"
05.01. Griechenland: EU-Komm. "Euromitgliedschaft ist unwiderruflich"
05.01. dx9473 ex3023 dw17502 sp2054 vx20 bc$272 €1,193 ö50 g1210
07.01. Frankreich: 11:30 Anschlag auf Charlie Hebdo Redaktion, 12 tot
07.01. dx9518 ex3027 dw17585 sp2026 vx18 bc$289 €1,184 ö49 g1213
08.01. StanChart kürzt weltweit über 4200 Stellen
08.01. Credit Suisse: Razzia der Büros in Italien Ende Dezember
09.01. HRE: Verfahren gg 3 FMSManager w Griechenland eingestellt
09.01. Russland: Fitch stuft von BBB auf BBB- herab
09.01. dx9649 ex3023 dw17737 sp2045 vx18 bc$285 €1,184 ö49 g1223
10.01. BCGE Genfer Kantonalbank: Erpresser veröffentlicht Kundenmails
12.01. Griechenland: Tsipras will keinen Euroaustritt
13.01. Schäuble erreicht schon in 2014 ausgeglichenen Haushalt
13.01. S&P zahlt $1b ab USA w faschen Ratings
14.01. Italien: Staatspräsident Napolitano tritt zurück
14.01. EZB: EuGH-Gutachter gibt Anleihekauf frei
14.01. dx9811 ex3090 dw17427 sp2011 vx23 $bc199 €1,179 ö49 g1229
15.01. Schweiz: SNB gibt Eurounterschranke €1,20 frei, Sturz auf €0,994
16.01. dx10168 ex3202 dw17512 sp2019 vx21 $bc209 €1,156 ö49 g1279
19.01. Österreich mit Franken-Krediten am stärksten in EU betroffen
21.01. dx10299 ex3270 dw17554 sp2032 x19 bc$228 €1,154 ö48 g1293
22.01. EZB: €1,14 Billionen monatlich €60 Milliarden Staatsanleihenkauf
22.01. Schweiz: SNB Bilanzsumme bis zu CHF3 Billionen nötig gewesen
22.01. dx10436 ex3323 dw17814 sp2063 vx18 bc$229 €1,132 ö47 g1302
25.01. Griechenland: Tsipras gewinnt Wahl ohne absolute Nehrheit
Syriza 36% 149 Sitze, Neue Demokratie 28%, Golden Dawn 6%,
Pasok 5%, Unabhängige Griechen 5%
26.01. Griechenland: Tsipras vereidigt, Koalition mit Unabh. Griechen
27.01. Russland: S&P stuft auf Ramsch herab
28.01. Griechenland: Neue Regierung stoppt Privatisierungen
30.01. Russland: Rubel bei $79 (niedrigster Kurs seit 16.12.2014)
30.01. dx10694 ex3351 dw17165 sp1995 vx21 bc$232 €1,129 ö48 g1284
31.01. Griechenland: Tsipras kündigt Zusammenarbeit mit Troika auf
US Department of Justice
23. April 2015
Deutsche Bank's London Subsidiary Agrees to Plead Guilty in Connection with Long-Running Manipulation of LIBOR
DB Group Services (UK) Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of Deutsche Bank AG (Deutsche Bank), has agreed to plead guilty to wire fraud for its role in manipulating the London Interbank Offered
Rate (LIBOR), a leading benchmark interest rate used in financial products and transactions around the world. In addition, Deutsche Bank entered into a deferred prosecution agreement to resolve
wire fraud and antitrust charges in connection with its role in both manipulating U.S. Dollar LIBOR and engaging in a price-fixing conspiracy to rig Yen LIBOR. Together, Deutsche Bank and its
subsidiary will pay $775 million in criminal penalties to the Justice Department.
Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, Assistant Attorney General Bill Baer of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division and Assistant
Director in Charge Andrew G. McCabe of the FBI’s Washington Field Office made the announcement.
DB Group Services (UK) Limited has agreed to plead guilty to one count of wire fraud, and to pay a $150 million fine, for engaging in a scheme to defraud counterparties to interest rate
derivatives trades by secretly manipulating U.S. Dollar LIBOR contributions.
In addition, Deutsche Bank entered into a deferred prosecution agreement today and admitted its role in manipulating LIBOR and participating in a price-fixing conspiracy in violation of the
Sherman Act by rigging Yen LIBOR contributions with other banks. The agreement requires the bank to continue cooperating with the Justice Department in its ongoing investigation, to pay a $625
million penalty beyond the fine imposed upon DB Group Services (UK) Limited and to retain a corporate monitor for the three-year term of the agreement.
Together with approximately $1.744 billion in regulatory penalties and disgorgement—$800 million as a result of a Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) action, $600 million as a result of a
New York Department of Financial Services (DFS) action, and $344 million as a result of a U.K. Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) action—the Justice Department’s criminal penalties bring the total
amount of penalties to approximately $2.519 billion.
“For years, employees at Deutsche Bank illegally manipulated interest rates around the globe – including LIBORs for U.S. Dollar, Yen, Swiss Franc and Pound Sterling, as well as EURIBOR – in the
hopes of fraudulently moving the market to generate profits for their traders at the expense of the bank’s counterparties,” said Assistant Attorney General Caldwell. “Deutsche Bank is the sixth
major financial institution that has admitted its misconduct in this wide-ranging criminal investigation, and today’s criminal resolution represents the largest penalty to date in the LIBOR
“Deutsche Bank secretly conspired with its competitors to rig the benchmark interest rates at the heart of the global financial system,” said Assistant Attorney General Baer. “Deutsche
Bank’s misconduct not only harmed its unsuspecting counterparties, it undermined the integrity and the competitiveness of financial markets everywhere.”
“Deutsche Bank admitted to manipulating benchmark interest rates in currencies around the globe in order to benefit trading positions,” said Assistant Director in Charge McCabe. “This wide
reaching investigation represents yet another step in the FBI’s ongoing effort to find and stop those who deliberately participate in complex financial crimes to further their own bottom line.”
Deutsche Bank was a member of the panel of banks whose submissions were used to calculate the LIBORs for a number of currencies, including U.S. Dollar, Yen, Pound Sterling and Swiss Franc LIBOR,
as well as EURIBOR (the Euro Interbank Offered Rate).
According to the agreements, from at least 2003 through early 2011, numerous Deutsche Bank derivatives traders—whose compensation was directly connected to their success in trading financial
products tied to LIBOR—engaged in efforts to move these benchmark rates in a direction favorable to their trading positions. Specifically, the derivatives traders requested that LIBOR
submitters at Deutsche Bank and other banks submit contributions favorable to trading positions, rather than rates that complied with the definition of LIBOR. Through these schemes, Deutsche
Bank defrauded counterparties who were unaware of the manipulation. Deutsche Bank admitted that the conduct affected the resulting LIBOR fix on various occasions.
Deutsche Bank further admitted that its employees engaged in this misconduct through face-to-face requests, electronic communications, which included both emails and electronic chats, and
telephone calls. For example, in an electronic chat on March 22, 2005, a Deutsche Bank U.S. Dollar LIBOR submitter explained how he would manipulate the rate for a trader in New York, stating,
“if you need something in particular in the libors i.e. you have an interest in a high or a low fix let me know and there’s a high chance i’ll be able to go in a different level. Just give me a
shout the day before or send an email from your blackberry first thing.”
In another example described in the statement of facts, on May 17, 2006, the supervisor of LIBOR submissions in London received a request from a trader in New York asking, “If you can help we can
use a high 3m fix tom.” The supervisor replied to the trader and a U.S. Dollar LIBOR submitter, “I’m off but [submitter] is your libor man  [submitter] could you take a look at 3s libor in
the morning for [trader].” The submitter agreed to accommodate the request, replying, “Will do chaps.” The following morning, after he submitted the bank’s contribution, the submitter
wrote to the trader, “I went in at 19+ for the 3m libor, as you’ll see it almost manage to reach 19.”
In an example from March 2007, a trader thanked one of Deutsche Bank’s EURIBOR submitters for his help in successfully manipulating EURIBOR, saying in an electronic chat: “Great job on this
[Submitter], we can do more of this stuff,” to which the submitter replied, “WE CAN MY FRIEND. WE CAN….” Later that day, the submitter bragged about Deutsche Bank’s manipulation by offices
in Frankfurt and London in an email to the head of Deutsche Bank’s Global Finance Unit: “HAVE U SEEN THE 3MK FIXING TODAY? THAT WAS AN EXCELLENT CONCERTED ACTION FFT/LDN. CHEERS.”
Deutsche Bank also admitted to working with other banks to manipulate LIBOR contributions. For instance, in a May 2009 electronic chat exchange, a UBS trader asked a Deutsche Bank trader,
“cld you do me a favour would you mind moving you 6m libor up a bit today, i have a gigantic fix. . .” The Deutsche Bank trader agreed. The next day, the Deutsche Bank trader confirmed
that the Yen LIBOR submission had been beneficial to the UBS trader, asking “u happy with me yesterday?” The UBS trader acknowledged, “thx.”
By entering into a deferred prosecution agreement with Deutsche Bank, the Justice Department took several factors into consideration, including that Deutsche Bank’s cooperation with the
government’s investigation was often helpful but also fell short in some important respects. The department also considered the extensive remedial measures undertaken by Deutsche Bank’s
management and its enhanced compliance program. Deutsche Bank has agreed to continue cooperating with the government’s investigation, and the agreement does not prevent the Justice Department
from prosecuting culpable individuals for related misconduct. The documents will be filed in federal court in the District of Connecticut.
The Justice Department has previously announced resolutions with five other banks for their roles in manipulation of benchmark interest rates, including Barclays Bank PLC, UBS AG, The Royal Bank
of Scotland plc, Coöperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank B.A. (Rabobank) and Lloyds Banking Group plc. The department has also charged 12 individuals as a result of this investigation,
and three of those individuals have pleaded guilty. The pending charges are merely accusations, and the defendants are considered innocent unless and until proven guilty.
This ongoing investigation is being conducted by special agents, forensic accountants and intelligence analysts of the FBI’s Washington Field Office. The prosecution of Deutsche Bank is
being handled by Assistant Chief Jennifer L. Saulino and Trial Attorney Alison L. Anderson of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section and Trial Attorney Richard A. Powers of the Antitrust Division’s
New York Field Office. Deputy Chief Benjamin D. Singer and Assistant Chief Sandra Moser of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section, Trial Attorney Daniel Tracer of the Antitrust Division’s New
York Office, Assistant U.S. Attorneys Liam Brennan and Christopher Mattei of the District of Connecticut and the Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs have also provided valuable
assistance in this matter.
The investigation leading to these cases has required, and has greatly benefited from, a diligent and wide-ranging cooperative effort among various enforcement agencies both in the United States
and abroad. The Justice Department acknowledges and expresses its deep appreciation for this assistance. In particular, the CFTC’s Division of Enforcement referred this matter to the
department and, along with the FCA, has played a major role in the investigation. The Securities and Exchange Commission has also played a significant role in the LIBOR series of
investigations. Various agencies and enforcement authorities in the United States and from other nations, including the United Kingdom’s Serious Fraud Office, BaFIN and the European Central
Bank, are also participating in different aspects of the broader investigation relating to LIBOR and other benchmark rates, and the department is grateful for their cooperation and assistance.
This prosecution is part of efforts underway by President Barack Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force. President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task
Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. The task force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies,
regulatory authorities, inspectors general and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources. The task force
is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch, and with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment
for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes. For more information about the task
force visit: www.stopfraud.gov.
22 January 2015 - ECB announces a modification to the interest rate applicable to future targeted longer-term refinancing operations
The Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) decided today that the interest rate for the remaining six targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) would be equal to the rate
on the Eurosystem’s main refinancing operations (MROs) prevailing at the time when each TLTRO is conducted.
With this decision, the 10 basis point spread over the MRO rate which was applied in the first two TLTROs is eliminated for the TLTROs to be conducted between March 2015 and June 2016. This
decision supports the effectiveness of the operations by reflecting the reduction in term premia on market-based funding instruments for banks that has been observed since the announcement of the
TLTROs on 5 June 2014.
Today’s decision confirms the intention of the Governing Council to underpin the effectiveness of the TLTROs as key instruments supporting lending to the non-financial private sector, thereby
enhancing monetary policy transmission and reinforcing the accommodative monetary policy stance.
The change will be implemented in an amendment to the Decision of the ECB of 29 July 2014 on measures relating to targeted longer-term refinancing operations (ECB/2014/34) which will be published
before the next TLTRO operation in March 2015.
22 January 2015 - ECB announces expanded asset purchase programme
ECB expands purchases to include bonds issued by euro area central governments, agencies and European institutions
Combined monthly asset purchases to amount to €60 billion
Purchases intended to be carried out until at least September 2016
Programme designed to fulfil price stability mandate
The Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) today announced an expanded asset purchase programme. Aimed at fulfilling the ECB’s price stability mandate, this programme will see the
ECB add the purchase of sovereign bonds to its existing private sector asset purchase programmes in order to address the risks of a too prolonged period of low inflation.
The Governing Council took this decision in a situation in which most indicators of actual and expected inflation in the euro area had drifted towards their historical lows. As potential
second-round effects on wage and price-setting threatened to adversely affect medium-term price developments, this situation required a forceful monetary policy response.
Asset purchases provide monetary stimulus to the economy in a context where key ECB interest rates are at their lower bound. They further ease monetary and financial conditions, making access to
finance cheaper for firms and households. This tends to support investment and consumption, and ultimately contributes to a return of inflation rates towards 2%.
The programme will encompass the asset-backed securities purchase programme (ABSPP) and the covered bond purchase programme (CBPP3), which were both launched late last year. Combined monthly
purchases will amount to €60 billion. They are intended to be carried out until at least September 2016 and in any case until the Governing Council sees a sustained adjustment in the path of
inflation that is consistent with its aim of achieving inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term.
The ECB will buy bonds issued by euro area central governments, agencies and European institutions in the secondary market against central bank money, which the institutions that sold the
securities can use to buy other assets and extend credit to the real economy. In both cases, this contributes to an easing of financial conditions.
The programme signals the Governing Council’s resolve to meet its objective of price stability in an unprecedented economic and financial environment. The instruments deployed are appropriate in
the current circumstances and in full compliance with the EU Treaties.
As regards the additional asset purchases, the Governing Council retains control over all the design features of the programme and the ECB will coordinate the purchases, thereby safeguarding the
singleness of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy. The Eurosystem will make use of decentralised implementation to mobilise its resources.
With regard to the sharing of hypothetical losses, the Governing Council decided that purchases of securities of European institutions (which will be 12% of the additional asset purchases, and
which will be purchased by NCBs) will be subject to loss sharing. The rest of the NCBs’ additional asset purchases will not be subject to loss sharing. The ECB will hold 8% of the additional asset
purchases. This implies that 20% of the additional asset purchases will be subject to a regime of risk sharing.
A technical annex is published alongside this press release with further operational details.
ECB ANNOUNCES OPERATIONAL MODALITIES OF THE EXPANDED ASSET PURCHASE PROGRAMME
The expanded asset purchase programme will comprise the ongoing purchase programmes for asset-backed securities (ABSPP) and covered bonds (CBPP3), and, as a new element, purchases of
additional euro-denominated securities that meet the following eligibility criteria:
They fulfil the collateral eligibility criteria for marketable assets in order to participate in Eurosystem monetary policy operations, as specified in Guideline ECB/2011/14, as amended, subject
to the fulfilment of the additional criteria listed in points 2-4 below.
They are issued by an entity established in the euro area classified in one of the following categories: central government, certain agencies established in the euro area or certain international
or supranational institutions located in the euro area.
They have a first-best credit assessment from an external credit assessment institution of at least CQS3 for the issuer or the guarantor, provided the guarantee is eligible in accordance with
Guideline ECB/2011/14, as amended.
Securities that do not achieve the CQS3 rating will be eligible, as long as the Eurosystem’s minimum credit quality threshold is not applied for the purpose of their collateral eligibility.
Moreover, during reviews in the context of financial assistance programmes for a euro area Member State, eligibility would be suspended and would resume only in the event of a positive outcome of the
Inflation-linked and floating rate securities issued by central governments, certain agencies established in the euro area and certain international or supranational institutions located in the
euro area are eligible for purchase under the expanded asset purchase programme.
All eligibility criteria and other modalities of the ABSPP and CBPP3 remain unaltered under the programme. In addition it was decided that:
Securities purchased under the expanded asset purchase programme that are not covered by the ABSPP or CBPP3 must have a minimum remaining maturity of 2 years and a maximum remaining maturity of 30
years at the time of purchase.
Securities purchased under the expanded asset purchase programme that are not covered by the ABSPP or CBPP3 will be subject to an issue limit, an aggregate holding limit and other operational
modalities specified, in particular, with the aim of preserving market functioning and allowing the formation of a market price on a given security. Moreover, the limits ensure that the application
of collective action clauses for a bondholder decision is not obstructed.
Regarding creditor treatment, the Eurosystem accepts the same (pari passu) treatment as private investors with respect to securities purchased by the Eurosystem, in accordance with the terms of
Purchases of securities under the expanded asset purchase programme that are not covered by the ABSPP or CBPP3 will be allocated across issuers from the various euro area countries on the basis of
the ECB’s capital key.
Holdings of securities issued by central governments, certain agencies established in the euro area and certain international or supranational institutions located in the euro area will be valued
at amortised cost, in line with Guideline ECB/2010/20 on the legal framework for accounting and financial reporting in the ESCB, as amended.
The eligible counterparties for purchases shall be those eligible for the Eurosystem’s monetary policy instruments, together with any other counterparties used by the Eurosystem for the investment
of its euro-denominated portfolios.
Holdings of securities issued by central governments, certain agencies established in the euro area and certain international or supranational institutions located in the euro area purchased under
the expanded asset purchase programme will be eligible for securities lending.
Transactions in securities purchased under the programme will be published in a weekly report which will list holdings at amortised cost by asset type. In addition, for securities purchased under
the expanded asset purchase programme that are not covered by the ABSPP or CBPP3, a report of the amounts held, valued at amortised cost, and the weighted average remaining maturity by issuer
residence will be released on a monthly basis.
Introductory statement to the press conference (with Q&A)
Mario Draghi, President of the ECB,
Frankfurt am Main, 22 January 2015
Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice-President and I are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. Let me wish you all a Happy New Year. I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome
Lithuania as the nineteenth country to adopt the euro as its currency. Accordingly, Mr Vasiliauskas, the Chairman of the Board of Lietuvos bankas, became a member of the Governing Council on 1
January 2015. The accession of Lithuania to the euro area on 1 January 2015 triggered a system under which NCB governors take turns holding voting rights on the Governing Council. The details on
this rotation system are available on the ECB’s website. We will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the Governing Council, which was also attended by the Commission Vice-President, Mr
Based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we conducted a thorough reassessment of the outlook for price developments and of the monetary stimulus achieved. As a result, the Governing
Council took the following decisions:
First, it decided to launch an expanded asset purchase programme, encompassing the existing purchase programmes for asset-backed securities and covered bonds. Under this expanded
programme, the combined monthly purchases of public and private sector securities will amount to €60 billion. They are intended to be carried out until end-September 2016 and will in any case be
conducted until we see a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation which is consistent with our aim of achieving inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. In March 2015 the
Eurosystem will start to purchase euro-denominated investment-grade securities issued by euro area governments and agencies and European institutions in the secondary market. The purchases of
securities issued by euro area governments and agencies will be based on the Eurosystem NCBs’ shares in the ECB’s capital key. Some additional eligibility criteria will be applied in the case of
countries under an EU/IMF adjustment programme.
Second, the Governing Council decided to change the pricing of the six remaining targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs). Accordingly , the interest
rate applicable to future TLTRO operations will be equal to the rate on the Eurosystem’s main refinancing operations prevailing at the time when each TLTRO is conducted, thereby removing the 10 basis
point spread over the MRO rate that applied to the first two TLTROs.
Third, in line with our forward guidance, we decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged.
As regards the additional asset purchases, the Governing Council retains control over all the design features of the programme and the ECB will coordinate the purchases, thereby safeguarding the
singleness of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy. The Eurosystem will make use of decentralised implementation to mobilise its resources. With regard to the sharing of hypothetical losses, the
Governing Council decided that purchases of securities of European institutions (which will be 12% of the additional asset purchases, and which will be purchased by NCBs) will be subject to loss
sharing. The rest of the NCBs’ additional asset purchases will not be subject to loss sharing. The ECB will hold 8% of the additional asset purchases. This implies that 20% of the additional asset
purchases will be subject to a regime of risk sharing.
Separate press releases with more detailed information on the expanded asset purchase programme and the pricing of the TLTROs will be published this afternoon at 3.30 p.m.
Today’s monetary policy decision on additional asset purchases was taken to counter two unfavourable developments. First, inflation dynamics have continued to be weaker than expected. While the
sharp fall in oil prices over recent months remains the dominant factor driving current headline inflation, the potential for second-round effects on wage and price-setting has increased and could
adversely affect medium-term price developments. This assessment is underpinned by a further fall in market-based measures of inflation expectations over all horizons and the fact that most
indicators of actual or expected inflation stand at, or close to, their historical lows. At the same time, economic slack in the euro area remains sizeable and money and credit developments continue
to be subdued. Second, while the monetary policy measures adopted between June and September last year resulted in a material improvement in terms of financial market prices, this was not the case
for the quantitative results. As a consequence, the prevailing degree of monetary accommodation was insufficient to adequately address heightened risks of too prolonged a period of low inflation.
Thus, today the adoption of further balance sheet measures has become warranted to achieve our price stability objective, given that the key ECB interest rates have reached their lower bound.
Looking ahead, today’s measures will decisively underpin the firm anchoring of medium to long-term inflation expectations. The sizeable increase in our balance sheet will further ease the monetary
policy stance. In particular, financing conditions for firms and households in the euro area will continue to improve. Moreover, today’s decisions will support our forward guidance on the key ECB
interest rates and reinforce the fact that there are significant and increasing differences in the monetary policy cycle between major advanced economies. Taken together, these factors should
strengthen demand, increase capacity utilisation and support money and credit growth, and thereby contribute to a return of inflation rates towards 2%.
Let me now explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. Real GDP in the euro area rose by 0.2%, quarter on quarter, in the third quarter of 2014.
The latest data and survey evidence point to continued moderate growth at the turn of the year. Looking ahead, recent declines in oil prices have strengthened the basis for the economic recovery to
gain momentum. Lower oil prices should support households’ real disposable income and corporate profitability. Domestic demand should also be further supported by our monetary policy measures, the
ongoing improvements in financial conditions and the progress made in fiscal consolidation and structural reforms. Furthermore, demand for exports should benefit from the global recovery. However,
the euro area recovery is likely to continue to be dampened by high unemployment, sizeable unutilised capacity, and the necessary balance sheet adjustments in the public and private sectors.
The risks surrounding the economic outlook for the euro area remain on the downside, but should have diminished after today’s monetary policy decisions and the continued fall in oil prices over
According to Eurostat, euro area annual HICP inflation was -0.2% in December 2014, after 0.3% in November. This decline mainly reflects a sharp fall in energy price inflation and, to a lesser
extent, a decline in the annual rate of change in food prices. On the basis of current information and prevailing futures prices for oil, annual HICP inflation is expected to remain very low or
negative in the months ahead. Such low inflation rates are unavoidable in the short term, given the recent very sharp fall in oil prices and assuming that no significant correction will take place in
the next few months. Supported by our monetary policy measures, the expected recovery in demand and the assumption of a gradual increase in oil prices in the period ahead, inflation rates are
expected to increase gradually later in 2015 and in 2016.
The Governing Council will continue to closely monitor the risks to the outlook for price developments over the medium term. In this context, we will focus in particular on geopolitical
developments, exchange rate and energy price developments, and the pass-through of our monetary policy measures.
Turning to the monetary analysis, recent data indicate a pick-up in underlying growth in broad money (M3), although it remains at low levels. The annual growth rate of M3
increased to 3.1% in November 2014, up from 2.5% in October and a trough of 0.8% in April 2014. Annual growth in M3 continues to be supported by its most liquid components, with the narrow monetary
aggregate M1 growing at an annual rate of 6.9% in November.
The annual rate of change of loans to non-financial corporations (adjusted for loan sales and securitisation) remained weak at -1.3% in November 2014, compared with -1.6% in October, while
continuing its gradual recovery from a trough of -3.2% in February 2014. On average over recent months, net redemptions have moderated from the historically high levels recorded a year ago and net
lending flows turned slightly positive in November. In this respect, the January 2015 bank lending survey indicates a further net easing of credit standards in the fourth quarter of 2014, with
cross-country disparities decreasing in parallel with an increase in net demand for loans across all loan categories. Banks expect that these dynamics will continue in early 2015. Despite these
improvements, lending to non-financial corporations remains weak and continues to reflect the lagged relationship with the business cycle, credit risk, credit supply factors and the ongoing
adjustment of financial and non-financial sector balance sheets. The annual growth rate of loans to households (adjusted for loan sales and securitisation) was 0.7% in November, after 0.6% in
October. Our monetary policy measures should support a further improvement in credit flows.
To sum up, a cross-check of the outcome of the economic analysis with the signals coming from the monetary analysis confirmed the need for further monetary policy accommodation.
All our monetary policy measures should provide support to the euro area recovery and bring inflation rates closer to levels below, but close to, 2%.
Monetary policy is focused on maintaining price stability over the medium term and its accommodative stance contributes to supporting economic activity. However, in order to increase investment
activity, boost job creation and raise productivity growth, other policy areas need to contribute decisively. In particular, the determined implementation of product and labour market
reforms as well as actions to improve the business environment for firms needs to gain momentum in several countries. It is crucial that structural reforms be implemented swiftly, credibly
and effectively as this will not only increase the future sustainable growth of the euro area, but will also raise expectations of higher incomes and encourage firms to increase investment today and
bring forward the economic recovery. Fiscal policies should support the economic recovery, while ensuring debt sustainability in compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact, which
remains the anchor for confidence. All countries should use the available scope for a more growth-friendly composition of fiscal policies.
We are now at your disposal for questions.
* * *
Question: Two questions. You said that you’ll keep buying bonds until inflation is back on track. So basically, you have an open-ended programme. Do you see anything in terms of the
percentage of outstanding debt that you can buy before you start overly influencing price formation on the secondary market, as the European Court of Justice suggested that you should
My second question is on the risk-sharing. Could you perhaps explain to us why you decided to move away from your usual procedure of pooling all the risks, and in the context of that, if I
understood you correctly, for 8% of government bonds, the ECB will still pool the risk. I would understand that you make an exception for euro area institutions, but why do you make an exception for
these 8% of government bonds if otherwise, you decided it was wiser not to share risks?
Draghi: The answer to the first question, yes we will buy government debt up to the percentage that will allow a proper market price formation. Therefore, we have two limits. The first one is an
issuer limit, which is 33%, and another one is an issue limit, which is 25%. In other words, we won’t buy more than 25% of each issue, and not more than 33% of each issuer’s debt. The 25% limit, by
the way, is the one foreseen in order not to be a blocking minority in the collective action clause assemblies, basically, bond holders’ assemblies, and it’s the basis for us to be able to say, there
is going to be pari passu.
The other question, first of all let me say I was surprised that this risk-sharing issue became almost the most important thing about our monetary policy decisions today. In fact, it shouldn’t be
so, but let me explain how we reached the percentage of 20%, and what is the reasoning behind this decision.
First of all, let me start by saying that each monetary policy operation always has some fiscal implication, and for the Central Bank what matters first and foremost is that monetary policy is
effective, and then it takes into account these implications, but without prejudice for the monetary policy effectiveness. Usually, these fiscal implications are dealt with easily within a
one-country framework, between the central bank and the treasury. But in the euro area, there is no European treasury, and each national treasury gives an implicit or explicit indemnity to its own
central bank, but not the euro system as a whole.
So the question on how to allocate risks in the euro area has been with the Governing Council since the very beginning. There is a combined ruling coming from the statutes of the ECB and from a
Governing Council decision that a default mode is a full risk-sharing mode. However, the Governing Council is also free to decide what it deems more appropriate according to the circumstances. Now,
it is not the first time the Governing Council has used its discretion. Let me give you a few examples. Originally, in the early times, there were two lists of collateral, one risk-shared, the risk
of which was shared, the so-called Tier 1, and one where the risk was not shared, and that’s Tier 2. The additional credit claims decision we took about, I think two years ago, was on a
On the other hand, there are other examples where we actually use the full risk-sharing. For example, the Dutch central bank was indemnified for some small losses based on full risk-sharing. The
Luxemburg central bank was indemnified for Icelandic banks when, you’ll remember there was that crisis, on a full risk-sharing, and we raised the buffers on a full risk-sharing for some potential
losses that Germany, the Bundesbank, might have after the Lehman crisis.
So, there is a history that shows both decisions. Let me add, this has nothing to do with the singleness of the monetary policy, because the decisions are being taken by the Governing Council with
a euro area focus, as I just said in the introductory statement, so the same is true for sovereign bonds. The modalities, the amounts, the rules, the limits that you just asked me about have been
decided here in Frankfurt.
The Governing Council is the sole decision-maker, and the decisions are meant to affect monetary and financial conditions across the whole euro area. This way, this time, we had a situation where
the programme is very large. In this sense, it is different from the SMP, for example. It’s very large. And so, on the one hand, we want to keep the principle of the risk-sharing in place, and that’s
why we retained the 20% share under the regime of full risk-sharing.
On the other hand, we want to take a decision that would mitigate the concerns that many participating countries in the euro area have about the unintended fiscal consequences of potential
developments in the future.
But also, let me make a final consideration. Is risk-sharing or no risk-sharing a fundamental decision as far as the effectiveness of this decision is concerned? We believe that it might have some
effects, but they are not relevant. Let me give you an example where actually it is fundamental; OMT. In OMT full risk-sharing is fundamental for the effectiveness of that monetary policy measure and
you understand why; because it’s selective, it addresses specific countries, the countries are under stress, the debt sustainability is an issue and there are tail risks that could make things
precipitate for certain individual countries. In that case, risk-sharing is fundamental for the effectiveness of monetary policy, and by the way, to address these risks, OMT is there, ready to be
acted, in case there were risks of that kind, of that nature, tail risks were to materialise, and that programme is under full risk-sharing.
Question: Just to go back to these points that you’ve made on the risk-sharing. You mentioned unintended consequences of potential developments in the future. Could you clarify a bit what
types of potential developments could there be? Does this mean that there’s a possibility for example of a default of a euro zone member or that you would be buying these government bonds and then
maybe you’re going to be selling them at a loss, that there’s a possibility at some point that you’d be selling these securities that you’re purchasing?
The second question, just in a bigger picture sense, why should the public, why should the financial markets think that QE will work in terms of boosting inflation, in terms of restoring
economic growth, employment in the euro zone?
Draghi: I think you should ask the first question to the people who have these concerns. We took these concerns into account, and that’s why this decision would mitigate these concerns, but
certainly, we are not in a one-country setup. We are in a multi-country setup, so the issue of potential fiscal transfers coming from our monetary policy decision is there. So the first question we
should ask, is it fundamental for the effectiveness of monetary policy or not? If it’s not, then we can do something to mitigate these concerns. Do we want to abandon the principle of full
risk-sharing? Absolutely no, and as I said, the singleness of the monetary policy remains in place.
On the second question, we would believe that the measures taken today will be effective, will raise inflation, medium-term inflation expectations, and basically will address the economic
situation in the euro area. There are several channels through which these measures will be effective.
The first is the portfolio rebalancing effect, where you basically substitute bonds with cash, and therefore banks, at that point, will have more incentive to lend to the private sector,
households and companies. Then you have signalling effects on inflation expectations. This is a quite important channel. Let me just give you an example why.
Of recent inflation expectations, medium-term inflation expectations, dropped by something like 50 basis points. Since our nominal interest rates are at the zero lower bound, this meant that real
interest rates went up by about 50 basis points, basically nullifying the effects of our reductions of nominal interest rates, the two reductions of nominal interest rates that we had decided in the
course of the year. So we do expect that effect to be also important.
Finally, let me add something here, because it’s actually quite important. What monetary policy can do, I’ve said this many times, but I think itis worthwhile repeating it. What monetary policy
can do is to create the basis for growth, but for growth to pick up, you need investment. For investment you need confidence, and for confidence you need structural reforms. The ECB has taken a
further, very expansionary measure today, but it’s now up to the governments to implement these structural reforms, and the more they do, the more effective will be our monetary policy. That’s
absolutely essential, as well as the fiscal consolidation side. So structural reforms is one thing, budget and fiscal consolidation is a different issue. It’s very important to have in place a
so-called growth-friendly fiscal consolidation for confidence strengthening. This combined with a monetary policy which is very expansionary, which has been and is even more so after our decisions
today, is actually the optimal combination. But for this now, we need the actions by the governments, and we need the action also by the Commission, both in its overseeing role of fiscal policies and
in its implementing the investment plan, which was launched by the President of the Commission, which was certainly welcome at the time, now has to be implemented with speed. Speed is of the
Question: My first question is has the decision today been unanimous, with a wide consensus? Can you give us a bit of a flavour on the discussion and how these decisions were
My second question is on a quick, back of the envelope calculation. The programme you have announced today seems to amount to €1.1 trillion, which is more than the previous intention of
the Governing Council for balance sheet expansion. Could you explain that? Could you, if I understand correctly, this number includes the current ABS and covered bond programmes, so how about also
the liquidity injection from the TLTROs? Thank you.
Draghi: At the meeting today -- it’s the first time that we’ll have the accounts be published of this meeting, and so we have also worked out some qualifiers to indicate how the meeting proceeded.
The meeting was unanimous in stating that the asset purchase programme is a true monetary policy tool in a legal sense. That’s important, because it establishes the principle that this is a monetary
policy tool that should be used in the right situations, but it is part of our toolbox.
Second, there was a large majority on the need to trigger it now, and so large that we didn’t need to take a vote.
Third, there was a good discussion on the need, I would say a majority on the need to trigger it now, but of course there were differing views about the need to act now.
And finally, there was a consensus on risk-sharing set at 20%, and 80% on a no-risk-sharing basis. So, unanimity on the asset purchase programme being a monetary policy tool, a large majority on
the need to trigger it now, and some discussion on the need to trigger it now, in fact I say a large majority, but not unanimity, and finally, consensus on the risk-sharing set, as I’ve just
The measure of this asset purchase programme exceeds what, well it doesn’t exceed really, it’s in the ballgame. You’ll remember that you have two figures for the beginning/early 2012 balance
sheet. One is in January, the other one is in March, so this figure by and large is set in that ballgame.
Question: Mr President, there is a lot of talk about the losses that will derive from these purchases. I wanted to focus attention on the possible money inflows, payments deriving from
buying for instance government securities, that would come from asset purchases. Can you give us an idea of what will happen with this money actually that is going to come from those securities paid
on a monthly or a yearly basis? I mean is that going to be held as reserves by the national central banks, and can it be ruled out completely that it might be used in the future for possible fiscal
Draghi: The answer to the second point is absolutely no. As I just said, it would be a big mistake if countries were to consider that the presence of this programme might be an incentive to fiscal
expansion. They would undermine the confidence, so it’s not directed to monetary financing at all. Actually, it’s been designed as to avoid any monetary financing.
This programme should increase the lending capacity of the banks. This programme, the national central banks, the ECB would buy bonds, and then banks will have this money, and this money can be
used either to repay some liabilities, or it would be placed in our deposit facility, in which case they would have to pay a negative interest rate, so there is an incentive to lend to the private
sector, stronger incentive than there was simply on collateralised borrowing as we used to do in the past, namely out of TLTROs. In this case, there is no limitation. The limitation, the three-year
maturity that was present in the TLTROs, in this case isn’t there.
Question: Could you give us an indication on the maturities of the bond you’re going to buy?
Second question, there is a debate in the academic community whether the central bank can in the case of a hypothetical default actually, or could run with a negative capital. Could you
tell us your views on this issue in the euro area context?
Draghi: The first question is yes, the maturities range between 2 and 30 years. So it’s very long. The second question really shows how important you made this risk-sharing issue, because it shows
a degree of sophistication in understanding what happens if. Now, what happens if, it can be two things. First of all, if we have an event, the first thing that would be drawn upon would be the
buffers of the national central bank. By and large, most central banks have adequate buffers, so nothing will happen.
Question: My first question is about this open-ended commitment to conduct asset purchases until you feel as though you’re on a path where it’s consistent with achieving the inflation
rates below but close to 2% in the medium term. People seem to have very different views about what medium term means. Would it be possible to clarify? And, is it possible for you to give us a signal
now of what you think the division will be between the private sector asset purchases and public sector asset purchases as well please?
Draghi: On the first question, I really only read again the statement. I just don’t want to speculate, giving horizons of dates, of deadlines. So these purchases are intended to be carried out
until end September 2016, and will in any case be conducted until we see a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation. You might as well have asked, what is sustained adjustment? Sustained
adjustment in the path of inflation, which is consistent with our aim of achieving inflation rates below but close to 2% over the medium term. You know the medium-term notion is a complex one. I have
discussed this notion. It depends on many parameters, and at this point, certainly we wouldn’t want to speculate on precise deadlines.
The other question, , it’s difficult to give a precise division between the precise split between the two purchases, because first of all the size of the market for ABS is relatively small,
although we think it will expand in the coming months, and the covered bond programme has done quite well, much better than the other programme, but also we don’t know what the market size will be
next year. What you could look at is basically the past behaviour as an inference for the future behaviour of our purchases.
Question: Two questions. One is a technical one. We are talking a lot of about the asset side of national banks’ balance sheets, national central banks’ balance sheets, when we’re talking
about this programme, and I just wondered, I was hoping you could clarify that on the liabilities side, there is also a complete, or there is also risk-sharing in the sense that funds that are
created through this QE programme are fully fungible across the euro system. There seems to be a lot of talk about that in the market.
Draghi: Absolutely. That’s why under certain circumstances, I find this discussion on risk-sharing quite futile.
Question: Second question was, you’ve added this tool to your toolbox. Is this it now? Is this it? Can people expect the next monetary policy direction to be towards a
Draghi: I have some jokes that I could make at this point in time, but I’ll just re-read the statement if you want, because that’s really what we can say today, and I’d just rather avoid jokes on
this. I mean, the overall situation of inflation, inflation developments, doesn’t allow us to make these jokes.
Question: My first question would be, it's not actually very explicit here in the press release whether that means that you're not going to buy into Greece's debt right now.
Second question would be whether you're also considering buying bonds which are actually already trading in negative territory when it comes to yields.
Draghi: Second question, the answer is yes.
And to the first question, let me say one thing here. We don't have any special rule for Greece. We have basically rules that apply to everybody. There are obviously some conditions before we can
buy Greek bonds. As you know, there is a waiver that has to remain in place, has to be a program. And then there is this 33% issuer limit, which means that, if all the other conditions are in place,
we could buy bonds in, I believe, July, because by then there will be some large redemptions of SMP bonds and therefore we would be within the limit.
And by the way, let me add, if there is a problem, if there is a waiver, all these are not exceptional rules. They were rules that were already in place before. So we're not creating.
Question: Two questions. What do you answer to those arguing that an effect -- a possible effect of the QE will be to rise some price bubbles on certain categories of assets?
And secondly, you mentioned that there were certain members within the Governing Council arguing not to act now, but maybe at a later stage. Could you maybe give us some of the arguments
those people had for this demand?
Draghi: On the first question, we monitor closely any potential instance of risk to financial stability. So we're very alert to that risk. So far we don't see bubbles. There may be some local
episodes of certain specific markets where prices are going up fast. But to have a bubble, besides having that, one should also identify, detect an increase, dramatic increase in leverage or in bank
credit, and we don't see that now.
However, we, as I said, we are alert. If bubbles are of a local nature, they should be addressed by local instruments, namely macro-prudential instruments rather than by monetary policy.
The second question, well, I would say the readings of reality differ. In some cases the inflation developments are considered to be temporary or heavily affected by temporary factors like the
fall in oil prices and so on. So it's different readings of reality, which suggest a different urgency in acting.
Question: My first one is on inflation expectations. You mentioned that they have decreased further in recent days and weeks, and this is despite the fact that markets were increasingly
pricing in QE and seeing it as a done deal. What makes you confident that this trend will now be reversed now that you have decided and you are going for QE?
And the second one is on fiscal policy and monetary policy. In your speech at Jackson Hole in last August you said that fiscal policies inother large advanced economies has been more
available and more effective compared to the euro area. And you said, and I quote, this reflects the fact that the central bank in those countries could act and has acted as a backstop for government
funding. And your argument was that this allowed fiscal consolidation to be more back-loaded. So my question is, is the ECB, with this QE program, now this kind of support for government funding in
the euro area?
Draghi: Well the answer to the second question is absolutely no. Absolutely no. We shouldn’t forget that --perhaps today is the first time I say it, usually by now I am in the fifth time-- We
shouldn't forget that our mandate is price stability, price stability defined as keeping inflation rate close but below 2%. And we are, at this point in time, distant from that objective.
And to give you a few ideas, the average inflation rate for 2014 was 0.4%. The five-year, the average inflation rate over the next five years is 0.3%. And the inflation rate, the average inflation
rate over the next 10 years at this point in time, these are market-based measures, are 0.9%. The 5y-5y inflation expectation is today, I think should be around 1.64, to be compared with an average
So there is little doubt, in our view at least, that one should act. We believe and are convinced and have good arguments to think that the monetary policy measures that we have decided today will
contribute to lift inflation expectations. You said that they are already priced in the market. Well, I would agree with you. Some, it's hard to say how much, but certainly some of the effects have
already been priced in the market. But there is a difference between expectation and actual announcement that things are going to be undertaken. So I think that's, in the end, after months pass by,
it's the announcements that really matter. In other words, expectations work only if there is certain credibility. And we are showing that this credibility is deserved with today's action.
Question: Just a clarification on the semantics. I take it that the consensus you've indicated for the split between sharing and non-sharing is weaker than the large majority? I also
wanted to know if the people who objected or dissented on the risk sharing were the same people who had concerns about the risk sharing in the first place or were these a different composition of the
The other thing is about the signalling of this operation. By abandoning partially the risk sharing, aren’t you signalling to investors that there are a number of banks, central banks in
the euro system, and the ECB also, that are not willing to have on their books the risk of a number of countries?
Draghi: I addressed the first question already. We have shown that all monetary policy measures have some fiscal implications. What matters is, first and foremost, the effectiveness of the
monetary policy. In other words, it's called monetary dominance. And we are operating under that principle. This is geared to our mandate, which is maintaining price stability. These fiscal
implications are usually dealt in a one-country set-up rather simply. In a multi-country set-up they are dealt in a different way. And I told you about the history that shows that they were dealt in
various ways, I would say based on an ad-hoc consideration of the circumstances.
I have told you that risk sharing or no risk sharing was not a fundamental aspect of the effect, of the effectiveness of our monetary policy measures today, while it is a fundamental component of
our OMT programme. I think to understand this is very, very important. Keep in mind the distinction between the two programmes.
And finally, given the size that this programme will have and the fact it's so broad-based all across all countries, the solution that we found seemed to be the most reasonable. On one hand you
want to keep the principle of full risk sharing in place. On the other you want to mitigate the concerns expressed by several member countries. And we can do so because it's not essential for the
effectiveness of the monetary policy.
The consensus means the following, means that everybody could either agree or not object. The large majority means that a lot of people agreed and a few people objected. So, they are different
notions. And you'll have to get used to these qualifiers. From now on I cannot say we had a fantastic majority or things like that. No. There will be either a majority or a large majority or a
consensus, or unanimity.
Question: There's a big debate at the moment as to whether what matters most is the flow or the stock, the buying of assets or what is already held on the balance sheet. I'm curious as to
where you come out on that particular debate.
And second of all, what would you say to those who are concerned that when the ECB is buying up bonds, electronically printing money, whatever one calls it, this is the first chapter in a
story that leads inevitably towards hyperinflation. What's your response to that?
Draghi: On the first point, the way the introductory statement reads says that both things are important. The overall amount but also the scale of these purchases, the monthly flows are quite
meaningful, as is the overall amount.
The second question, I think the best way to answer to this is, have we seen lots of inflation since QE programmes started? Have we seen that? And now it's been quite a few years since they
started. Our experience since we have these press conferences goes back to a little more than three years. In these three years we've lowered interest rates I don't know how many times, four or five
times, six times maybe. And each time someone was saying this is going to be terribly expansionary, there will be inflation. Some people voted against lower interest rates way back at the end of
November 2013. We did OMT. We did the LTROs. We did TLTROs. And somehow this runaway inflation hasn't come yet.
What I'm saying is that certainly the jury's still out. But there must be a statute of limitations. Also for the people who say that there will be inflation, yes, when, please? Tell me, within
Question: If the ECB staff estimates in the coming months show inflation rate in the medium term around 2%, what are you going to do? Are you stopping the programme or continuing until
Draghi: That is a question similar to the one that has been asked before. Here I will read you again the statement. It says they are intended to be carried out -- they are intended -- to be
carried out until the end of September 2016 and will in any case be conducted until we see a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation, which is consistent with our aim of achieving inflation
rates below but close to 2% over the medium term.
Question: I have a question. There are certain central banks that explicitly say what is the model how the exchange rate translates into inflation. Is there a model that the ECB's working
with? And if there is a model, what is your expectation? How much of nominal exchange drop of euro is needed for achieving the inflation target? That's first question.
Then second question, in your August press conference, you mentioned that you saw the trend of central banks selling euros from their reserves. Do you still see the trend
Draghi: I'm not sure I understand the second question, but the first question is, I've said it many times, for us the exchange rate is not a policy target. It's important for price stability, for
growth, but it's not a policy target. The movements in the exchange rate since three years were the outcome of diverging monetary policy cycles as well as divergent economic recovery paths between
major jurisdictions. They were not intended, it was not an action geared to cause these exchange rate movements. They were the outcome.
Question: You mentioned in August that you see the trend of other central banks selling euros from their reserves. And my question if you still see the trend continuing.
Draghi: I'm not sure I mentioned that. I can't remember, because we never comment on other central bank policies. So whoever wants to ask me about Switzerland, just you should know; we never
comment on other central banks' decisions.
Question: First of all, how is it that buying bonds in Germany, where credit is not a huge problem, is going to translate into help for the credit-starved companies that we have in the
so-called periphery of the eurozone?
And the second question, it's been more than six years since the Federal Reserve did its first QE program in the United States. It's only now disentangling itself. And we see even in
United States right now that price pressures are quite low. Are we to expect a similar trajectory in the euro zone? And if it turns out that way, what is plan B?
Draghi: On the first question, this programme is meant to create a large injection of liquidity that is fungible across the euro area. So, if it starts in Germany, it can easily flow everywhere
through our payment system. But certainly where the spreads are higher, you would expect greater effectiveness, greater immediate direct effects from this policy.
The second point is you said do we expect our inflation expectations to stay low after a prolonged period of time, and if we have a plan B. I say again, this is a question that's been asked
before. What if? We just present a plan A and we have a plan A. Period. And the sentence and the wording here could be, actually says many things. So I'm not going to reread it, but each word has
been carefully chosen.